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Preface

Three major subjects are the concern of this study:
Mysticism, Plotinus, and st. Augustine,
would allow elaborate investigation.

any one of which
Here, we have made

no attempt to deal with any one of these comprehensively,
but have been concerned only to make a comparative analysis of the mysticisms of Plotinus and Augustine.
The writer's interest in Plotinus stems from the fact
that Plotinus is both a first-rate philosopher and a mystic,
being generally regarded as

11

the father of Western mysticism."

The significance of Augustine in the history of Western
Civilization

and the fact that he is both a convert from

neo-Platonism and a mystic

make him an apt subject for

comparison with Plotinus.

Both men carried their first

principles to their logical conclusions so effectively that
even today

one aan detect overtones of their fundamental

theses re-occuring within the various systems of contemnorary
philosophy and theology.
Admitting an appreciation for m1st1cism, the writer finds
it difficult to aooept a mysticism-for-the-sake-of-mysticism,
but is rather

attracted to mysticisms of the type of Plotinus

and Augustine's---mysticisms that are clearly metaphysically
related and also suggest a meaning for ordinary human experiences.

-ii·
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Explanation
Some ot tho· footnotes ha.ve been ma.de ra.ther
lengthy, especially in Chapters II, III, IV,
und V. Such footnotes have been designed us
an additional feature and serve the function
either of 111\listro.ting the literary style and
manner of argument -<>f Plotinus and Augustine
or of expanding certain of their ideaso
If the render happens to be bored with-lengthy
footnotes, he may restrict himself simply to
the reading of the text.

"The fire still burns on the altars

o~

Flotinus.11

Eunapiua

Chapter I
Introduction
The Moaning of Mysticism

Only a small number of mystics havo boon
of mysticism.
mystics.

~h1losoohcrs

Still a small0r number have been nhilosophical

Tho nurnoso of this thesis is to examine tho thought

of two philosonhical mystics, Plotinus (A.D. 205-270), the
chief neo•Platonist, and st. Augustine (A.D.

354.430), Bishop

of Hippo, Christian Church Father and chief Christian apologist
of the first five centuries.

Although Augustine was himself

a neo-Platoniat for a number of yoars before his conversion to
Catholic Christianity, there are
mysticism

so~o

basic differences in his

and the mysticism of Plotinus.

By comparing the

systems of those two men we may be able to see these differences
and to note the two fundamental strains of Christian and nonChristian mysticism evident thoughout the development of
Western thought. We shall seek to see what differences Humanism#

-2Supernaturalism, Emanati oni si;i, T:rinitarianism, Revela tioriJ etc.
make in the formation of a mysticism.

But, before y;e.,oan ai1e.S.yz.e

the mysticism of Plotinus and Augustine we must
atudy

or

f~.rst

the meaning of mysticism, itself.

What is mysticism?

Is it an art, a process, a

science~

a technique, a religion, a philosophy, a way of life?
whemdoes it originate?

real.tty

How ar-d

Does it come from the mind or from soma

outside ·of the'.:mindfl ·.

or is it a Revelation?
ful?

make sotie

Is it a product of natural causes

Is the condition pathological or

health~

Should it be praised or ridiculed, encouraged or challenged,

held in reverence or held in scorn?
The uncertainty that most neonle have concerning the correct
answers to these questions serves to illustrate the general
confusion there is in the mind of the average man, and in
literature, as to the exact meaning of mysticism.

As Dean Inge

aptly remarked, few words have been more loosely used in the
English language,

to the extent that there can never be any

certainty in the mind of the user that anyone else has the same
meaning of the term as he does.

Anyone who attempts to use the

term must first define it before he dare take its meaning for·
granted in his usage.
Generally, the term signifies an

ex~erience

looked on as a

direct communication with the ultimate reality of the universe,
usually conceived of as God.

It is characterized by feelings of

-3extreme bliss, or ecstasy, relaxation or sel.f"-a.bandonment, and
certa1ntf that there ls direct knowledge of ultimate real1ty,itself'.

Most of the major cultures have recorded the existence

of mystics, and often.they have figured prominently in the
history of religions, for example, Zoroaster, Buddha, Moses,
Mohammed, Jesus, Paul, Aµgustine, Luther, Aquinas, Loyola,
Zinzendorf, Wesley, and Jonathan Edwards, to name a few.
The definition of mysticism, however, is a rather.difficult
task due to the wil.. e variations of opinions of both the mystics
and the philDsophel"-s of mysticism concerning the exact- nature,
meaning, and

seop~

of the

experience~

way from sheer qua9kery and

11

Judgments vary all the

forillless spe,Qulat1on11 to the con-

clusion that it is the most elevated religious meaning possible
to the heart and mind of man.
of the heart."

Goethe termed it

11

the scholastic

Harnack called it "rationalism anplied to a

sphere above reason.

F. H. Bradley writes:

"Nothing can be more real than what we ~xperience in
religion. The person who says that man in his religious
consciousness is not in touch with reality does not know
what he is talking about."·
l
William James considered it a state or a feeling common to all
religions, but Leuba, on the other hand, insists that only
certain religions incorporate

l. quoted by

w.

11

true 11 mysticism.

Roman Catholic

R. Inge, Mysticism.!!'! Religion, P•

15.

.

·4writers usually regard it as a supernatural suspension of nat'ti.ra'.L
law and relate its me~ning direotly to the sacraments of the
Roman Cattlolio churchi
self-hy~nosis,

It has bean regnrded as auto-erotioi~m~

and neurasthenia.

James Hinton has termed, it

"an assertion of a means of knowing that (which) must not be
tried by ordinary rules of evidenoe---the claiming authority fer

-

. a

our own impressions."

R. A. Vaughan has termed it "that f'or:r.i

of error which mistakes for a Divine manifestation the
of a merely human faculty. 113

operati~n

Victor Cousins has written:

11

Myst1oism is the pretention to know God without intermediary, and so to speak~ raoe to face. For mysticism,
whatever 1s between God and us hides Him from us ••••
Mysticism consists in substituting direct 1nspirat1on for4
indirect, ecstasy for reason, rapture for philosophy." .
Protestants vary widely in their opinion of mysticism,
some such as Thomas Hy\vell Hughes insisting that Protestantism,
with its evangelical concept of the direct experience of Christ
through taith is mystical at tts very core, and others, such
as Paul Elmer More, concluding that it is a disease of religion.
Luther was rather mystical, being influenced by Tauler and some
other German mystics, but Calvin looked upon it with disfavor.
Theologians in the Sohle1ermacher1an tradition

usu~;1y

tavor it

whereas exponents of the Ritsehl1an position are opposed to it.

-5Suoh thinkers as Karl Barth and Emil Brunner have ranged themselves strongly against it.
It must

not be concluded, however, that only oonf'uFd.on

remains concerning the nature of mysticism.

The difficulty of

explanation lies in the fact that it is an essentially private
experience.

The mystics and nhilosophars who attempt to inter•

pret mysticism must d''

RO

in terms of their own philosophies,

and the philosophies themselves vary in their meanings. Actually,
there is

oonsider~ble

agreement among all the mystics ooncern!ng

the psychological aspeot of mysticism.

Certain characteristicg

seem alwaye to be associated with the experience.

William James

has listed them as (l) ineffability, (2) passivity, (3), transciency, and

C4)

noetic certainty.

Immediacy should.possibly be

added to this list due to its pronounced effect as part of the
experience, although it is not necessarily a distinctive inner
characteristic.
The mystical experience is -immediate in that it is a1ways
a direct awareness of some other.reality, that is, some reality
other than the reality of one •.a ordinary self.

It is not a

secondary experience, a recall or a meditation on the nrinc1pl6
of a thing.
thing

itself~

It is rather the immediate part!cination in the
All mystics seem agreed on this point.

The mystical experience is ineffable in the sense that the
experience itself defies description by comparison with other

hum.an exner1ences.

Most mystics admit their inability

discursive about the matter and explain that the

~o

weakn.~ss

not in the lack of the richness of the experience but

be
ller

1

!'R. ~b.e:- ~.l'

the inability of language adequately to communicate faali.r.g.,
Mystical literature makes use of poetic descriptions, similies,
and the like to attempt to incorporate some of the nature of tbe
feeling.

11

William James comments on this oharaoteristin:

respect the

1!1 t::O'LJ

experience is more like a state of feeling tha"l

state of intellect.

5
11

The implication is that one must

ll

-

pcsRoss.

a certain facility for understanding the experience, l!ke

t~e

ability to appreciate a symnhony, before he may gain the mean!.ng
and effect

or

what happens in the occur renoe.

' mystical experience 1s passive in the sense that it is
The
art inner experience which seems to come of its own accord once
,

I

1ts oonditions are met.

The mystic does not bring it about or

cause it to occur

by meeting the conditions of its ooour-

exce~t

rence 1 However, the meeting of the conditions necessary to the
occurrence

or

'

the eJ_tperience does not rieoess.arily'1nsUl'e its

occurrence in every instance. In the highest level of the ex~erience the ind1v1duai seems to feel ae 1f he were taken over--~ossessed by some ~ower outside

or

himselt~--aome powe~ that he

cannot control.

5. William James, Vari ties of Religious

Exnerien~, th

;Bo.

The mystical experience is transient in that its state of
eostasy or illumination, according to certain interpreters, remains only tor a very short time.

It

may

take days, or years,

or even a life-time to arrive at the high level of ecstasy, but
once attained the experience itself may be only momentary, like
a flash of light. William James says it may last only an hour
or two at the most.

Even though the experience itself is tran•

sient, the memory of the exnerience remains for quite a long
time and constitutes a powerful influence unon the consequent
behaviour of the individual.
Noetio certainty is always typical of the e:xperience. There
is always certainty in the mind of the believer about the fact of
his experience, and often there is also the conviotion of a revelation---ot the recention of DBW
ly known.

ideas and meanings not previous-

Yet, revelation is not necessarily an 1i{egral part of

mysticism, as mysti6ism may consist merely of the affirmation or
denial of some idea previously known.

Characteristically,

mysticism is the affirmation or denial of the nature of reality--the affirmation that there ,!! some ultimate spiritual reality
attested to by its ability to be experienced.

Technically, the

concern is not so much that of the overall nature of ultimate
reality as it is the bare assertion that such does exist in an·
experienoeable way.

Bertrand Russell has wr1tten1y aptly of

this phase of the experience&

-s"The mystic insight begins w1 th the sense of o. eyntcry
unveiled, of a hidden wisdom now suddenlybeoome certain
beyond the nossibility of a doubt. The sense of certainty and revelation comes earlier than any definite bel1.ef'.
The definite beliefs at Which mystics arri~e are the result
of reflection upon the inarticulate experience gained in 6
the moment of insight. 11
I

In a rather loose sense, this process·may be considered as a
religious awakening or religious

con~ersion.

Mysticism is often thought of as an art or process entered
into and followed according to a formula
ic behaviour.

~·

more or less scientif•

The bulk of the literature written by avowed

mystics deals ~mainly with';.. the details involved in the 'Practice

or

mysticism as an art, and there is a certain general s1m1lar1ty

1n the formulae they suggest.

Whenever mysticism is considered

as a technique or nrocess it is usually conceived of in terms
of a series of stages of exneriences, which have been described
by various writers as
ter~~nology

0 the

mystic way. 0

These stages vary in

and place of division in the various mystical systems,

but they may be roughly divided into (1) mortification, or bodily

-

-

discipline,

(2~

-

purgation, or purification, (3) concentration, or

mental fixation, and (4) illumination, ecstasy# and joy.
In mortification the mystic brings his -physical nature under
control of his mental or sniritual nature.

k•

quoted by Inge, Mysticism

The will becomes more

!!l Religion,

P•

24.

and more in control or the body.

It might be necessary even to

inflict damage upon the body in order to bring it under the control of the soul. The purpose of this stage is to cut oneself
loose from the controling impact of one's physical nature in order
to allow the freer operation of the mental nature.

Symbollically•

it indicates an allegiance to that which is considered to be of
higher value.
Purgation is mental purification.

Not only must the indivi"
l

dual be released from the effects of the passions, the mind itself
must be cleansed of its impurities.

It is a catharsis in which

everything inconsistent with the nature of the objective sought
is ignored and neglected, and, insofar as possible, deliberately
excluded from consciousness.
Concentration is the stage of the active endeavor to think ·
about the order or condition of the object sought.

Consideration

is given to the details of information known about the object.
Wheras purgation is the elimination from thought of everything
inconsistent with the goal of the mystic

quest~

concentration is

the bringing to mind of everything consistent with it.
The stage of illumination is the one in which qthe light
breaks

through.~

....

The nature of the object or condition becomes

directly exper1encable, culminating in

union~ joy~

and ecstasy.

The object of the quest is realized and the whole process is
terminated~

only to be gegun all over again.

...
Fundamental problems concering mystloism ate the questions
whether the experience may be termed normal or abnormal,

whe~jhor

it is to be considered valuable or disvaluable, and whether it

i~

to be agreed that there is a. revelation of reality in it. AG has
already been indicated, philosophers of mysticism are in

disagre~~

ment concerning these questions.
Whether or not one wishes to term the experience

11

normal 11

depends, of course, upon what he defines as rtot'mal experience.
To say the least, it cannot be called an ordinary experience•
Whether or not it is an average experience or an experience
universal to all men. is not easily determined.

Most mystics

insist that the experience may come to anyone who meets its
necessary conditions, but it is not certain if everyone has a
native ability or canacity to meet the necessary

conditions~

Some interpreters think that there is a class of mystics, a

certain group of people wh' are suited by their mental natures
tor being mystics•· and the implication is that there are other
neople who could never bring thmnselves to meet the required
conditions.

The suggestion 1s that there are people who would

be incapable ot mysticism as a tone deaf

~erson

would be unable

to anprec1ate a S'Ylllphony. The answer to this question must
be left uncertain as it w:>uld be practically impossible to
fathom all of the reasons why a certain
or unsuited ror mysticism.

~erson

seems suited

Mysticism does seem to be a normal

eXperience for very religious people.

There is reason to believe

that any man is capable of having mystical experience unless he
has been hindered from Antering into it by certain other
ical

psycholog~

conditioning.
The value of mystical experience must be answered in terms

of the query "valuable for what."

All mystics will insist that

the experience is valuable-in-itself, and should be encouraged
as an end-in-itself.

Philoso~hers

judging mysticism sometimes

disagree concerninJ whether or not the experience should be
encouraged.

Some insist that it

cause~

damage to the general

mental well-being of the mystic, especially in instances when it
allows a free disregard of reason.

All instances of mysticism

more or less allow a break-down of the final appeal to reason.
If the test would be "Does it lead to productive activity?"
the answer would have to be that it has in some instances, and
in others it has not.

Many mystics are not vocal about their

mysticism and certain types of mysticism seems to encourage
activity more than others.

Rufus Jones identifies mysticisnt

with the creative element in religion. He writes:
"It is not too much to claim ••• that whenever, in the course
or history, religious life and thought have had a fresh
new birth, have surged up with a new intensity to a higher
level, and have brought release of new power to live by,
there has always been at the heart of the movement a leader
of the creative type.• •• 11
.,

7.

Rufus Jones, Some Exnonents .2f. Mystical Religion, P• 23•

-12.-

Most of the rounders of the world's great civilized religions
have been mystics.

A crucial question, indeed, is whether or not thera is a
revelation of reality in mysticism.

This is the central claim

of all myst1cism---all mystics agree that they have communicated
with reality and that at least some message

o~

affirmation

denial of the nature of reality has been indicated.
enough

conclusion.

.

. :_•

This

question must be decided on the basis of a dooiaion as· to
the evidence is adequate and reliable

o~

whe~her

to lead to thi::r

Some nhilosonhers have concluded that it is, and

some have concluded that it is not.

It would be a rather

sweeping assertion to .conclude that all mystics have been under
an illusion about the nature and meanings of thir own experiences,
yet, certain interpreters conclude just this.

Others admit

tht~

illusion, but sanction it as a value ... · In mysticism, we are
faced with the problem of communicating inner feelings and
intuitive meanings

in a way that will be meaningful to people

who do not have the same inner feelings and meanirigs.

This

is a problem in mysticism because it is a problem in meaning,
language~.

and communication in general,.

Our suggestion is that

the clue to the answer to this question·wili, in the final
analysis, depend upon the ""articular metarihysical and religious
understanding

or

the philosopher who makes the judgment.

cannot help but make our judgpients on the basis

or

We

our own

experiences and their meanings.

If one's

own metaphysical and

religious beliefs do not allow the possibility of mystical life,
he will likely term all mysticism an illusion.

On the other

hand, if one feels that he has, himself, had experiences similar
enough to those which the mystics assert to admit the reality
and value of the experience, and if such are not contradictory
with his own metaphysical and religious meanings, he will likely
term the experience a true revelation.of reality.
Our theory here is that a metaphysical and religious meaning

must necessarily be involved in the basic meaning of mysticism
itself---that any particular occur.ronce of myseicism will imply

a specific metaphysical and religious position. Therefore, the·
~eaning

of any particular example of mysticism cannot be inter•

prated apart from an analysis of the basic metaphysical and
religious concents associated with and to a large extent prior
to its occurrence. Our assertion is, that the objectives

~ought

within mysticism are in reference to metaphysical meanings known
at least in some sense---possibly
mystical experience.

symbolically~--prior

to the

This metaphysical knowledge may not have

the emotional quality of that obtained within the mystical experience, but it does have the power to serve as one of the reasons
why the experience is entered into.

~

The wide variations 1n the meta-physical conceptions ass,,c1 a(j ..,
'

ed with the various philosophies of mysticism should serve as an
adequate example of' tlia-importance of this factor in the underste:td
ing of mysticism.

Our thesis is that variations in prior meta-

nhysical concepts account in large measure for the variations in
consequent ideas of the final ideal within the mystical nrooess
or experience.

or

course, it might be admitted that mystical

experience itself is a factor contributing to these metaphysical
meanings, but such is not the exact concern of this thesis.
Granting that metaphysical concepts are affected by the mystical
process---that mysticism is essentially a conversion experience,
philosophically, psychologically, morally, and otherwise---we are
but adding the assertion that they also affect the reason for
entering into the process and the inherent meaning of the process.
The meaning of mysticism oan never

~e

stated in a definition

or indicated by a purely scientific explanation of the psychological . process involved,

Its final meanings are ontological

meanings---beliefs about the nature of being, life, and value.
As such, its meaning is better expressed by poetry than by logic
-~-it

1s better felt than understood.

Yet, we are faced with the

need for an agreed upon working definition of mysticism for the
pur~osea

of this thesis.

Here we are willing to accept for

practical purposes the definition of

w.

R. Inge that mysticism

1s "the attempt to realize, in thought and feeling, the immanence

of the temnoral in the eternal, and of the eternal in the

·a

temporal;'' · that ot Pfleiderer who writes:
..

"Mysticism is the immediate feeling of the unity of the
self with God; it is nothing, therefore, but the fund~m~ntal
feeling of religion, the religious life at its very hea~t Q
and center;"
'
and the defintion of Albert Seth:
"Mysticism is a phase of thought, or. rather, perhaps o:f
feeling, which from its very nature is hardly susceptible
or exact definition. It appears in connection with tha
endeavor of the human mind to grasp the Divine essence or
the ultimate reality of things, and to enjoy the blessedness
of actual comw.i..~nion with the highest. The first is the
·
philosophical side of Mysticism; the second, its religious 10
side."
It is quite erroneous to think of mysticism simply as an
art or a process.

In it there must be meanings that reach beyond

the mere level of feelings---meanings whose essences involve more .
than the essences of the various psychological

st~tes,

and have a point of reference beyond the limits of the
logical experience itself.

psycho•~

The meaning of mysticism should be

divorced from the conception of it as a science
of certain techniques

themselves•

or

the mastery

and be thought of in terms of its particu-

lar concept of the nature of being and ultimate reality---as it
1s these meanings that matter most even within reference to the
techniques themselves.

8. W. R. Inge, Christian Mysticism, P• 5•
9• quoted by Inge, ~., P• 3'9•

-

10. Ibid.

-16Tho mysticism or Plotinua and Augustine is to be found
not only in the processes involved in their final ways of. Sa.J .•
vation, but also in the basic ontological concepts involved
their metaphysics and general religious meanings.

In

ord~r

1~

to

study their mysticisms we must study both their metanhysics ann Yt{
their religion.

Our method will be to analyze

the!n·meta~hysios~

religion, and techniques of mysticism in order to determine
oe»tain similarities and differences and to see how their
meta~hysics

and religious meanings affect the meanings of

their mysticisms.

-17-

Chapter II
The Metaphysics of' Plot·1nus
The root concept of the system of Plotinus is that of
positing of the nature of ultimate reality as a supra•existent
.ideal form or

orde~.

Three factors apply in such an order:

unity, intelligence (mind), a~d soul.

The ultimate constituent

of this ordeii, variously called by Plotinus as "the First;u
"the One," "the Good," "the Simple," "the Absolute;" nthe
Transcendence," "the Infinite," "the Unconditioned, 11 and !'the
Father," is an inexpressible being
surpassing existence.
things

devoid of qualities and

From it all existence and existing

come by means of its production of a next lower, less

real stage of its own self expression.

Such a stage in turn

produces a next lower, less real stage of its self expression
which in turn does the same thing, and so forth, on and on,
until the level of pure nothingness or illusion is reached.
The doctrine is that the universe is constituted of an indefinitely complicated and systematic

series of levels ranging

-18'

from the ultimate Supra-existent Belng, through the various
forms of existence, to aheei., nothingness,, with every item :b.av ...
ing a precise location ar.d relaticnship by

v~.rti.i.e

Every thase

OJ~

flows from, emanates

o~

Real's" impingement upon it within the system..

existence --everything that exiata
irradiates out of this ultimate

-~

of t:he irsu":J?J1'·..

reality and also aspires ir-

1ts own consciousness to flow back toward it.
The most vital element of the system is best conceived of
logically as unity.

Being 1nexpres1ble and devoid of qualita-

tive attributes, any conceptual indication of it will be inadequate.

Strictly speaking, it is not a First Cause, for First

Cause is a lower formulation than the Supra-Real itself.

l

It

may not be said to be non-existent and it may not be considered
as a thing that exists.

This situation beyond existence and the

ordinary conceptions of being is defended by Plotinus on the
grounds or its immanence in all things without its possibility
of being identified with any

or

them.

2

h iUl tJW.nb!t-• however aica.J.ted., august, ara later than This ((The One)) 1
It is the souroe of' all, though in some sense It is no souroe: we must k~ep
all things apart from It • • • even freedom of action. • •• It oan enter into
no relation with the realm of ExistEmoe."
VI• 8. P.
·. '
I

"When we oall it a Cause we are not making an ass ert1on about .Lb but about
ourselves; we speak of what we derive .from It while It remains steadfastly
within Itself." VI. 9. 3. All quotations of the l\Ords of Plotinus are from
the Ste,r.hen MaoKenna Translation. See Bibliogr~:phy and Appendix.
2. 'lrhe 6ne is all things and no one of than: the source of all things il!f
not all things; all things are its possession -- rumiing baok. so to speak,
to it -- or more oorreotly, not yet so, they will be. • • •
(continued on next page)

-19-.

Vfuen Plot1mis speaks of the Supra-Real as "the Good .. 11 he
is attempting to expi'ess the idea of' its perf'ection -- that
there is nothing of evil or imperfection as a part of its nature
He writes:
"· •• The ,rord "good" used of him (the One) is not a predioate
ass6'Eing his possession of goodness; it conveys an identifioation. It
is not that we think it exact to oall him either good or The Good: it
is that sheer negation does not indicate; we use the term The Good to
assert identity without the affirmation or Being."
VI. 7~ 38.
"Unity seeks nothing towards its being or its well-being or its safehold
upon existence; oe.us e to all, hoVI can it acquire its oharaoter outside
of itself or know any good outside? The good of its being oan be no
borrow~ng: .This is: the Good • • • • This Principle is not._therefore-to
be identified with the good of which it is the source; it is good in
the unique mode or being The Good above all that is good~"
VI. 9. 6

com•

It is preois ely becaus.e there is nothing within the One that all things are
from it a in order that Being may be brought about the source must be no
Being but Being 1 s generator, in what is to be thought of as the primal aot of
generation. Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lacking nothing, the One is
perfect, and in our metaphor, has overflowed, and its exuberance has produced
the new: this product has turned again to its begetter end been filled and
has become its contanplator and so an Intelleotual-Prinoiple." V.2. 1.
"Generative of all, the Unity is none of all; neither thing nor quality nor
quantity nor intellect nor soul; not in motion, not in time; it is the self•
defined, unique in form or better, formless, existing before Form was, or
Movement or Rest, all of which are attachments of Being and make Being the
manifold it is."
VI. 9. 3
"No wonder that to state it is not easy; even Being and R>:rm are not easy,
though we have a way, an approach through the Ideas.
The soul or mind reaching 'bov:ards the formless finds itself incompetent to
grasp where nothing bounds it or to take impression where the impinging -reality is diffuse; in sheer dread of holding to nothingness, it slips away.
The state is painful; often it seeks relief by retreating from all this
v~gueness to the region of sense, there to rest on solid ground, just as the
sight distressed by the minute rests with pleasure on the bold." VI. 9. 3.

-20-

On his idea of the Supra-Real as "the First," he writes:
hAnything existing after The First must neoessarily aria e fron thai:;
First , v1hether immediately or as tracing baok to it throueh .!.nt·J.:.·v·c'nl.ents; there must be an order of seoondaries and tert:lal·le:::, ~n
whl~h any s eoond is to be r er erred to The First, any third to bha
seo6'bd. Standing before all things, there must exist a Simple::,
diftering from all its sequel, self-gathered, not inter-blended with
the forms that rise from it, and yet able in some mode of its own ·to
be present to those others' it must be authentically a unity, not
merely something elaborated into unity and so in reality no more than
unity's oounter!'eit. V. 4. l.
"All that is not One is oonserved by virtue of the One, and from the
One derives its oharaoteristio nature; if' it had not attained suoh
unity as is consistent with being made up of multiplioity we oould not
affirm its exist en.a es it we are able to affirm the nature or single
things, this in virtue of the unity, the identity even, whioh eaoh of
then possesses. But the all-transcendent, utterly void or multiplioity1
has no mere unity of partioipation but is unity's self', independent or
all else, as being that trom whic}i, by whatever means, all the rest take
their degree of unity in their standing,, near or far, towards it." V.3.15

His conclusion is that this Supra-Real 1s indefinable, beyond
sense, beyond formulation, and in some degree, at least, beyond
logic.

He

writes:

"Thus The One is in truth beyond all stat anent i any at'firmation is of a
thing; but the all transcending, resting above even the most august
divine lli.nd, possesses alone or all true being, and is not a thing
among things. We oan give it no name because that would imply predi•
cation: we oan but try to indicate, in our own feeble way, something
oonoerning it."
v. 3. 13.

If this is the case, then, that the best

ex~ression

of

reality lies within the concept of unity -- sheer unity, pure
and simple, but beyond language and activity, as Plotinus asserts
to be the situation .... what hope is there for the attainment ot
any understanding of reality?

The answer is round in the sec·ond

element or his system: namely, intelligence, mind, or spirit.

-21-

By means of this second factor some connection may be established
between the One and all existing things.

Since mind is that

which is most like the One,and nearer to it than all else,and yet
is itself not transcendent, not a Supra-Real, but an existent
functioning within the world of existents, it is the avenue of
all understanding.

It is that factor about reality that is

understandable, and as such.!l! understanding.

It is form,

pattern, principle, order, intelligence, meaning,. purpose, and
consistency.

It is the inherent intelligence - factor or

principle of all being.
mind or spirit.

reason~·

All being below the One forms a part of

It is the factor through which all parts of

the total universe are seen to be connected one with the other
by virtue of the oneness of their purpose, intelligence, pattern,

etc,.
Conceived· of as intelligence, or possibly as super-intelligence, some of the richness of the idea is likely to be lost
unless the term

11

spirit" is also incorporated within it.

This

is because mind is not to be conceived of as pure abstraction but
rather as an existing thing.

It is the first and highest of the

comprehendible realities -- the richest knowable reality..
formulation of its status

By his

in his system Plotinus gives to in-

telligence a near-religious connotation, for as he sees it, mind
1s reality as we may know it.
Mind is produced by the One as a sort of byaproduct resulting from the overrlow, irradiation or aemanation" of the One

-22·
itself.

It constitutes a rough image of the One without

bein~

the One, much in the same sense that a mask may be a moulded.
image of a face without being that face.

It is tho n.rst, cf tL.F.1

three major nhases of emanations obtaining within the sy::tt em_,
and the first one of all the many emanations there are within
the realm of existing things.;

3.

Plotinus comments upon its order and origin:
"But how and what does the Intellectual-Principle see, and, especially,
how has it sprung from that whioh is to become the object of this vision~
··
The mind demands the existenoe of' these Beings, but it is still in trouble-·o:ver
the problem endlessly debated by the most ancient philosophers: from such a
unity as we have deolared The One to be, how does anything at all come into
substantial existfJ'lloe, any multiplicity, dyad, or number?
Why has the Primal not remained self-gathered so that there be none of this
profusion or the manifold nhich we observe in existenoe and yet are compelled
to trace to that absolute unity?
In venturing an answer, we first invoke
God Himself, not in loud v~rd but in the 'nay or prayer whioh is alway& within
our power, leaning in soul towards Him by aspiration, alone towards the alone.
But if' we seek the vision of that great Being within the Inner Sanctuary-self-gathered. tranquility remote above all els e--we begin by considering the
image stationed at the outer precincts, or, more exactly to the moment, the
f'irst image that appears. How the Divine :Mind comes into being must be ex.;
plained. Every moving has neoessarily an object towards which it advances:
but since the Supreme oan have no such object, we may not asoribe motion to it.
anything that comes into being after it oan be produced only as a oonaequenoe
of' its- unfailing s eli'-intenticn•• '4Given this immobility in the Supreme
it can neither have yielded assent nor uttered decree nor stirred in any way
towards the existence or a secondary. ·
What happened then? What are we to conceive· as rising in the neighbo~·
hood of' that immobility? It must be a :ciroumr.t~di:ation~...,:,.Produoed· from -the ·Supre:ne
but from the Supreme unaltering••and may be compared to the brilliant light
enoiroling the sun and ceaseleesly generated from that unchanging substance.
All existences, as long as they retain their aharaoter, produce about themselves, i'rom their essences, in virtue of the power which must be in them,
some neoessary, out"v1ard facing hypcstnsis continuously attached ·to 'than and
representing in image the engendering erohetypes1 Thus fire gives out its heat,,
·
(oontinuocl on next p!1ge)

In certain passages Plotinus seems to identify mind with truth.
The One cannot be truth since it is beyond expression, but mind
cont.
snow is cold not merely to itselfJ fragrant substances are a notable instance
for. as long as they last, something is diffused from them and perceived
wherever they are present. • • • V. 1. 6.
The Intellectual-Principle stands as the ima~e of The One, firstly because
there is a certain necessity that the first should have its offspring. oa~ry
ing onward much of its quality, in other words that there be something in
its likeness as the sun's rays tell of the sun.
Yet the One is not an Int ell eotual-Principle: how then do es it engender an
Intellectual-Principle? Simply by the faot that in its self-quest it has
vision: this very seeing is the Intellectual- Principle. Any perception of
the external indicates either sensation or intelleotion, sensation symbolised by a line, intelleotion by a circle ••••
All there, too, is a unity, though a unity which is the potentiality of all
existence. The items or this potentiality the divine intelleotion brint;s
out, so to speak, from the unity and knows than in detail, as it must if it
is to be an intEllectual principle.
It 'has besides a oonsoiousness, as it were, within itself of this same po•
tentiality; it knoins that it can or itself bet;et an hypostasis and can determine its own Being by the virtue emanating from its prior; it knows that
its nature is in some sense a definite part of the context of' that First;
that it thenoe derives its essence, that its strength lies there and that
its Being takes perfection as a deri vati,ve and a recipient from the First.
It sees that, as a member of the realm or divisiop and part, it receives
life and intellection and all else it has and is, from the undivided and
partless. since that First is no member or existence, but can be the source
Of all on oondition only Of being held down by one distinctive shape but
remaining the undeflected unity.
V. 1. 7.

The.t station towards the One (the f a.ot that something exists in pr es enc e or
the One) establishes Being; that vision directed upon the One establishes
the Intellectual-PrinoipleJ standing towards the One to the end of vision,
it is simultaneously Intellectual-Principle and Being> and attaining
resemblance.in virtue of this vision, it repeats the act of the One in
pouring forth a vast power."
v. 2. 1.

-21+being the thing neare$t to the One, and yet
truth.

Mind is a "secondary God, 11

4

ex~ressible,

is

Since the Intellectual-Principle is expressible it may be seen
as ultimate truth, for intellect,on both begins and ends in
this realm of mind.

5

as-

'•

•

.

·<

universe of authentic beings,, the Truths
suoh it is a great god or better,,
not a god among gods but the Godhead entire. It is a god,, a secondary god
manifesting before there is any vision of that other,, the_ Supreme (the One)
which rests over all, enthroned in transoendence upon that splendid pediment
the Natu~e following olose upon it.
The Supreme in its progress oould never be borne forward upon some soulless
vehicle nor even directly upon the soul: it will be hearalded by some
ineffable beautyr before the great YJ.ng in his progress there comes first
the minor train,. then rank by rank the greater and more exalted,, oloser to
the King the kinglier ••••
In that royal progress the King is of another order from those that go before
him, but the King in the Supreme is no ruler over externs; he holds that most
just or governanoes, rooted in nature, the veritable kinship, for he is King
or Truth. holding sway by all reason over a dense offspring of his own, a
host that shares his divinity,. King over a king, and over kings and even more
justly called father of Gods,"
v. 5, 3.
5. "This Intelleotual•Prinoiple,, if the term is to oonvey the truth, must
be understood to be not a principle merely potential and not one maturing f'rom
unintelligence to intelligence-· that would simply send us aJeeking, onoe
more, a necessary prior -- but a principle which is intelligenoe in aotuality
and in eternity.
·
• • • • A principle whose wisdom is not borrowed must derive from itself any
intelleotion it may make: and anything it may possess within itself it oan
hold only from itself; it follows that, intellective by its o'V!Il resouroe and
upon its own oontent. it is itself the very things on which its intelleotion
acts••.• What then is its oharacteristio Act and what the intellection which
makes knower and knoY!?l, here identical?
Clearly, as authentic Intelleotiou, it has authentio intelleotion or the
authentic existent, and establishes their existenoe. Therefore it is the
Authentic Beings • • • • 11
V. 9. 5.

"We take it then,, that the Intellectual •Principle is the authentio existences and contains them all - not as in a place but as possessing itself'
(continued on next page)

-25Plotinus views mind as the same as both truth and being.

Truth

cannot get beyond mind either in reference to the One (due
the inexpressibility of the One) or in reference to Soul
Soul only has meaning and understnnding in terms of
Mind also

extends

be said to exist,

t~

(fo~

mind.)~

eve~

the entlre range of everything that may

gi~ing

forth the very suggestion of being nr

existence in any instance by virtue

of its evidence of principle.

Mind is both a thinker and "thoughts."
objects of thought are all identical.
universe, rather the universe

Thinker, thinking, and
Ideas are not copies of the.

( the practical universe) is the

imperfect copy of the one essential idea: mind.
On the subject of the relation of mind as a unity with
individuals, Plot1nus 1 own words are clear enough:
"Intelleot as a whole must be thought of as prior to the int elleots
actualised as individuals; but when we come to the particular intellects.
we find that what subsists in the particulars must be maintained from
the totality.
The Intellect subsisting in the totality is a provider
for the particular intellects. is the potentiality of them: it involves
them as ·:members or its universality. while they in turn involve the
universal Intellect in their particularity. just as the particular
science involves science the total.
The ~reat Intellect, we maintain, exists in itself and the particular
intellects in themselves; yet the particulars are anbraoed in the whole,
cont.
and being one thing with this its content.
All are one there and yet are
distinct a similarly the mind holds many branches and items of knowledge
simultaneously, yet none of them merged into any other, each acting its
O'\l'm part at call quite independently, every conception coming out from the
inner total and working singly.
It is after this way, though in a 01.oser
unity. that the Intellectual-Principle is all Being in one total - and yet
not in one. since eaoh or these beings is a distinot power, whioh. however,
the total Intellectual-Principle includes as the species in a genus, as the
Parts in a whole. • . •
V. 9. 6

-26and the whole in the partioulars. The particular intellects exist by t'.!r:tt •
selves and in another. the universal by itself' and in those. All the-·
partioluars exist potentially in that s elf-EIXistent universal, v.hioh o.ofa•.
ually rs the totality. potentially eaoh isolated member: on the othel' ,h.,.r?.v
eaoh particular is aotually what it is (its individual self} potentially
the totality. In so far as what is predicated of them is their esser..loEi,
they are actually what is predicated of them; but where the predicate is a
genus, they are that only potentially. Qi the other hand, the universal
i"6 so f'ar as it is a genus is the potentialrty of' all its subordinate
species, though none of them in actuality, all are latent in it. but
because its essential nature exists in actuality before the existence of'
the species, it does not submit to be itself partioularised. If then the
particulars are to exist in actuality·- to exist, for example. as species-the cause must lie in the Aot radiating from the universal." VI.2.20.

"How then does the universal Intelleot produoe the particulars while. in
virtue of its Reason-Principle, renaining a unity? In other mrds. how
do the various grades or Being• .. ,arise • ••?

It is a universal rule that whatever reasoning discovers to exist in Nature
is to be found in Intellect apart f'rom all ratiocination: we conolude that
Being has so created Intelleot that its reasoning is after a mode similar
to that ot the principles which produce living beings, torthe Reason•
Principles, prior to reasoning though they are, aot invariably in the
manner which the most oarei'ul reasoning would adopt in order to attain the
best results....
·
Everything exists forever, unfailing, involved by very existence in eter•
nity. Individuals have their separate entities. but are one in the (total)
unity. The complex, so to speak, of than all, thus combined is IntelleotJ
and Intellect, holding all existence within itself, is a complete living
being, and the essential Idea of Living Being. In so tu as Intellect sub•
mite to contemplation by its derivative, becoming an Intelligible, it givet'
that dtrivative the right also to be called "living being.
VI. 2. 21.

When we think or Being we have t? think of, it iP. terms ot certain categories.

The categories of mind are: lite, Being, motion,

stability. identity# and difference.

He ss7s

ot 11te:

"We have found Substanoe (Essence) and lite simul'taneously present in
Soul. Now. this Substanoe is a oonmon property ot Soul. but lite. common
to all souls. differs in that it is a property ot Intellect also.

-27Havint; thus introduced Intelleot and its life we make a single
t;enus or what is common to all life'" namely mt ion. Sub::itano e
and the Motion which constitutes the highest life we must oc•ndd.er.
as two genera; f,or even though they form a Ull?ity, they e.2·e se,?FJ.rable to thought which f~.nds their unity not a unity; otherwise :lt
could not distinguish them.
Observe also how in other th:Lig$
Motion or life is clearly separated from Being -- a separe:Ho!l
impossible~ doubtless, in True Being, but possible in its shadow
and namesake.
In the portrait of a man much is left out, and
above all the essential thing, life: the 0 Being" of' sensible thi::igs
is just suoh a shadow of True Being, an abstraotion from that Being
complete \'\•hich was lif'e in the Arohetype; it is because of' this i::oomplet eness that we are able in the Sensible world to separate
Being from life and life from Being."
VI. 2o 8.

Life is not the

ty~ical

is a property of mind.

indication of the order

or

mind, but it

Although life applies to soul, still

mind can not he said to be lifeless.

Plotinus says the

Int~llect

"• •• lives a life that endures and keeps a thought acting not
upon any future but upon that which already is, upon an eternal
present -- a thought s eli'-centered1 bearing on nothing outside
of itself."
VI. 2. 8

Both motion and stability are characteristic of mind.
There is both change in the universe and an inherent stability to it all.

The mind moves, but it does not go any place}

it is rather its movement within itself.

Mind does not

change, it rather acts maintaining its typical stability in
the midst of its action.
Plotinus i1troduces Stability to Being and Motion viz.:
"Being,then, containing many species. has but one genus. Motio~
however, is to be classed as neither a subordinate nor a supplement of' Being but as its ooncomitantJ for we have not found Being
serving as substrate to Motion. Motion is Being's Act; neither

-28is separated from the other exeept in thought; the two na:~ur'31'l
are one; for Being is inevitably actual, not potent:l.nL •••
Now I!;.otion., thus manifested in conjunction with Being~ do si::; nr,t
alter Being's nature ... unless to complete ita esse·:rtial c~.a:r-~
acter -- and it does retain forever its own peculiar natul'.'s; at
onoe. then, we are forced to introduce Stability.
To rej eo7.
Stability would be more unreasonable than to rClject Motion; for
Stability is associated in our thought and oono eption with Bciinr,
even more than with Motion; unalterable condition., unchanging
mode, single Reason-Principle ·- these are charact eristios of
the higher sphere.
Stability, then. may also be taken as a single genus. Obviously
distinct from Motion and perhaps even its contrary. that it is
also distinct from Being, so also would Motion be, with equal
right.
Why identify in the case of Stability and not in that
of Motion. vJhen Motion is virtually the very life and Act both
of Substance and of Absolute Being? However, on the very same
principle on which we separated 1,!otion from Being with the under•
standing that it is the same and not the same .... that they are two
and yet one -- we also separate Stability from Being. holding it
yet. inseparable; it is only a logical separation entailing the
inclusion among the Existents of this other genus. To identify
Stability with Being, with no difference between them, and to
identify Being with Motion., would be to identify Stability with
:Motion through the mediation or Being, and so to make Motion
and Stability one and the same thing."
VI. 2. 7.
''Being.the most firmly set of all things, that in virtue of which
all other things receive Stability; possesses this Stability not
as from without but as springing within as inherent.
Stability
is the goal of intellection., a Stability which had no beginning,
and the state from which intellection v1as impelled was Stability,
though Stability gave it no impulsion; for !lotion neither starts
from lv:Otion nor ends in Motion.
Again. the Form .. Idea has
Stability., since it is the goal of Intellect: intellection is the
Form's Motion.
Thus all the Existents are one, at onoe Motion and Stability;
Motion and Stability are genera all-pervading., and every subsequent is a particular being, a particular stability and a
particular motion."
VI. 2. a.

Identity and Difference need little explanation beyond
the indication that mind maintains its essential identity and
Yet undergoes
particulars.

an active process

or

dealing with different

-29Plotinus explains briefly:
" . • • • Identity and Dif.t'erenoe have the generio status independently
of the particular.
They will. moreover. be primary genera. beoaus e nothing can be predicated or them as denoting their essential nature. Nothing, of
oours e we mean. but Being; but this Being is not their genus. since
they cannot be identified with al\Y' particular being as such •.•• "
"In sum~ the unity exhibited in Being on the one hand approximates
to Unity-Absolute and on the other tends to identify itself with
Being: Being is a unity in relation to the Absolute, is Being by
virtue of its s equenoe upon that Absolute: it is indeed potentially
a plurality. and yet it remains a unity and rejecting division
re.f'us es thereby to b eoom e a genus • "
VI• 2. 9.

Mind is manifested in the whole

Being will manifest mind.
~art~culars

in their

or

the universe and any part

or

Over and above the appearance ot all

multi~licity

is both a transcendent and an

immanent unity in virtue of the Intellectual- Principle.
In the second element in his system, Plotinus solves the
ancient problem of how the universe may be both fixed and in
movement.

Mind is not identical with the total universe for

there are certain elements and factors within the universe in• ·
consistent with it.
ale

.or

Yet, Mind is identical with the ration-

the universe to the extent that all forms, all Being,

find their ideal archetypes and even their
within Mind.
minds.

individual meaning

Mind, however, is .not an aggregate of little

It is rather itself one unbroken, extensive, consistent

and com~rehensive simplex.

It pervades all Being -· more cor-

rectly -- all Being is its innnediate identity and production.
Within the universe there are certain elements, factors,

-30T'.1,12:;-e

~are

situations, etc., inconsistent with mind.

not a part

of Being for they are so possessed with inconsistencies, mu).ti· ...
plicities , falsehood, and so far removed from beauty and gocd.··
ness so as to have no evidence of mind.

In their rapid chang-

ing state they form a contrast to the inherently ordered relation of mind.

Whereas their movement involves change and dis-

ordered motion. the movement of mind involves no change

at all

for mind is always continuously in action, in self-expression,
within its fixed and eternal realm.

Change and multiplicity in

things indicate their lack of mind, their lack
istence.

or

authentic ex-

Ordered, unified action indicates the presence of mind,

the participation in the fixed orders and relationships of Being,
an ident·ity with the overall stability in the universe.
We may conceive of mind, then, as not the logical ultimate
of existence, but rather as the practical ultimate of our understanding.

It is truth ( truth is a practical idea), it is

authentic existence, it is spirit, reason, intelligence, and
perhaps even personality.

Anything devoid of it is non-exist-

ent, and yet it emanates itself in lesser degrees of richness,
eventually to have a logical determination

a~

Soul.

The third tactor in Plotinus' system is Soul.

It is the

Second Emanation of the whole system, logically coming from
mind in essentially the same manner as mind logically contin-

ually issues forth from the One.

Soul constitutes a sort ot

-31second order of being, its reality being by virtue of some
1nherence of mind.

To the order of Soul belongs all living

things,for the principle of soul is the principle of lifee
Soul is less real than mind due to its status of being
more distantly removed from the One.

Although there is no clear-

ly indicated distinction between any of the stages of emanation
so that there is a continucus flow of unbroken

series

contin-

uing through.out, soul may be conceived of as occurring after the
final ( hy-pothetical) stage of mind.
first order

or

soul

This is to say that the

(the first soul emanation) is lower in de-

gree than the last order of mind.
Soul may be conceived of as mind in movement, or as the
fixed motion of mind.

The concept is nearly identical with the

concept or life, for as Plotinus sees it, everything that is
alive is a soul.
alive

~

The doctrine is not that everything that is

a soul, but rather that everything that is alive .!.,!

a soul, for to be alive is to be a soul and to be a sdul is to
be alive.

In the physical universe in which we live we see most .. :
things in their soul-condition.

We customarily

think of life

in reference to soul and soul in reference to life.

Both

concents are abstractions in which there is embodied something

or

the energizing aspect of the universe.

Plotinus, in one of

his passages, bids us to look deeper into the nature of things

-32as ·we see them in their soul-condition to observe that ·beyonC:
soul there is mind, that beyond mere movements there is
principle of movements

1

--

th~

beyond principles there is a iJF.1.t-C .s.i''.·1

based upon an even more ultimate ideal unity.
The concept of the soul in Plotinus is so closely interwoven with the concent of mind, and also with even the One,
that it may be
ed concepts.

unders~ocd

only in reference to prior establish-

Soul is so closely identified with mind that it

would not be incorrect to say that soul .!.§!. mind in exactly the
same sense that it would not be incorrect to say that mind is
unity or the One.

Yet, from a practical point of view different

words must be used to describe the various aspects of reality
in the system of Plotinus.
Soul is the immanence of mind.

In an ultimate sense, of

course, it is also the immanence of the One through the media
of mind.

Soul is mind in process, the more local, immediate,

sensible effect of mind:
existential level.

mind operative on its practical,

Whereas it is the distinctive nature of

mind in itself to be fixed, non-evolutionary in order, un•
changing, and according to principle, Mind

nevertheless,

emanates out to a lower tunctioning level wherein external
change and multiplicity may become so associated with it
that it must no longer be called mind but soul.

-33Soul still retains the fundamentals of mind in its fundamental
6
Soul, as a lower order of mind, just as mind is a
order.

6. "Soul is sub~.equent to Intellect, yet b;</ its vory nature it involves
Intelleot in itself and peroeives more clearly in that prior."
VI~- 2~ 2:?.
" • • • That vision direoted upon the One establises the IntelleotuaJ.Principle; standing toward3 the One to the· end of vj.sion, it is simul-·
taneously Intelleotual-PrlncipJ.e and Being; a:p.d attainin.g~resembla:nce in
virtue of this vision, it rep eats the aot of the Une in pouring forth a
vast power. This second outflow is a Form or Idea representing the
Divine Intellect as the Divine Intelleot represented its own prior, The'
One. This active power sprung from essence • • • is Soul.
Soul arises as the idea and act of the motionless lntelleotual-Principle
--- which its elf sprang from its own ·motionless prior--- but the soul's
operation is not similarly motionless; its im·age. is generated from its
movanent • • • • "
V. 2. l

"So~l, for all the worth we have shown to belong to it, is yet a s eoondary
an image of the Intellectual-Principle: reason uttered is an image or the
reason stored within the soul, and in the same way soul is an utteranoe
of the Intelleotual- Principle: it is even the total of its activity. the
entire stream of life s ent forth by that Principle to the production of
further being; it is the forthgoing heat or a fire which has also heat;
essentially inherent • But ''1ithin the Supreme we must see energy not as
an overflow but in the double aspect of integral inherence with the estab•
lishment of new being. Sprung, in other m>rds, from the IntelleotualPrinoiple, Soul is intellective, but with an intel1-eotion operating by the
method of reasonings: for its perfecting it must look on that Divine
Mind, which may be thought or as a father watohing over the development
or his ohild born imperfect in comparison with himself."
v. l. 3.
"Time at first • •• lay, s elf~cono entrated, at rest within the Authentio
Existent: it was not yet Time; it was merged in the Authentic and motionless with it. But there was an active principle there, one set on govern
ing itself and realising it8elf (: the All-Soul). and it chose to aim
at something more than its present: it stirred .from its rest, and Time··
stirred with it • • • • For the Soul contained an unquiet faculty., always
desirous or translating elsewhere what it saw in the Authentic Realm,
&.nd it could not bear to retain within itself all the dense fullness of
its possession • • • • Putting forth its energy in act after aot, in a-· ·
constant progress of novelty, the Soul produces succession as well as actJ
taking up new purposes added to the old it brings thus into being what had
~t existed in that former perica when its purpose was still dormant and
its life was not as it since became •• • •
(continued on naxt pngo)

...34lower order of the

One~

may be viewed in its own connotatiort

as the lively aspect of mind:

mind in action, mind in motion.

cont.
•
.
Time, however, is not to bo c·:moe:i.ved as outside c:.f Soul; Et;ernity is not
outside of the Authen·bic 'ExifJ'l:euo 3! mr is it to be taken as a sequence or
succession to Soul • • • • It ~~s a ·lihing seen upon Soul, inllerent, coeval to it1
aG Et;ernity to the Inbelleotual Realm."
III. 7. 11.

nThe (Universal) Soul --- containing the Ideal Principles of Real-Beings,
and itself an Ideal Principle ,. __ includes arl in concentration within itself.
just as the Ideal Principle of eaoh particular entity is complete and selfcontained: it 11 therefore,, sees these principles of sensible things because
they are turned, as H were, towards it and advancing to it: but it· cannot
harbour them in their plurality,, for it cannot depart from it's- lfind; it ··
sees them,, therefore, stripped of Mass. Matter, on the contrary, destitute
of redsting power since--it has no Act of its own and is a mere shadow, oan
but accept all that an active power may choose to send. In what is thus
sem:~· from-·the Reason-Principle in the Intellectual Realm, there is already
oolrl;ai_ned a degr.ee -of the partial objeot that is to be formed: in the image
making impUlse within the Reason-Principle there is already a step (toward
the lower manifestation} •••• "
III. 5. 18
"Let every soul recall, then at the outset the truth that soul is the aUthor
of all living things, that it has breathed the life into them all, that
whatever is nourished by earth and sea. all the creatures of the air, the
divine stars in the sleyJ it .is the maker of the sun; itself formed and ordered this vast heaven and oonduots all that rlwfihmio motion: e.nd it is a prinoi•
ple distinct from all these to which it gives law and movement and life,
and it must of necessity be more honourable than they. for they gather or·
dissolve as soul brings them life or abandons them, but soul, since it can
never abandon its elf, is of eternal being • • • •
As the r·ays of the sun throwing their brilliance upon a lowering cloud make
it glenm all gold, so the soul entering the material expanse of the heavens
has given life, has given immortality: what was abject it has lifted UpJ and
t~e heavenly system, moved now in endless motion"by the soul that leads it in
wisdom, has become a living and a blessed thing; the soul domiciled within,
it takes worth where, before the soul, it was stark body, --·clay and water-·
or, rather, the blankness of Matter, the absence of Being • • • "
V. l. 2

-35Whereas the inind is more of a. simnle un1 ty; soul is a complex
embodying the whole vital essence of the world and of all
individual in it so that the whole universe fits together as
one living organism.

7

If then, it is the characteristic of soul to be active --what does it do?

The answer is that it produces bodies.

It

does not create them out of nothing but rather creates them out
of itself: it emanates them as by-products.

According to the

thinking of Plotinus, being does not come and go, it remains
eternally in its fixed limits, eternally having its same degree
of intensity and reality.

Individual. things, however do come

into existence, have an individual history and pass away.
shares

Soul

in this procGsa, producing bodies as an emanation in

similar mamer in whicli .mind pro'duces .s.oul· and ~in,'..whj}.ch.~mind is
produced by the One •. Soul acts as a shaping and arranging

.

'

7. He writes oonoernin~ the soul of the univers.e: "If we oan traoe
neither to mate-Ylo.l. t::t!)enoies (blind ~J.t{!J onts) llvl" to any deliberate int en.•
tion the influeno e.:i from without which reach to us and to the other forms ·
of life and to the terrestrial in general,, what ca.use satisf'aotory to reason
remains? The s eo ret is : firstly 1 that this All is one universally oompr ehena i ve living being,, encircling all the living beings within·it. and having a soul, one soul, which eitends to all its-manbers in the degree or plir~icipaiib membership held by eaoh; secondly, that every··separate 'thing is an
integral part of tnis All by belonging to t qe total ma~rial fabric ...;;
unrestriotedly a part by bodily membership, while,, in so far as it has also
some participation in the All-Soul it possesses in that degree spiritual
membership as well,, perfect where participation is in the. All•Soul alone,,
partial where there is also a union with a lower soul. ~ ••
T~is One-All, therefore 3 is a sympathetio total and stands as one living being; the far is near; it happens as in one animal with its separate parts:
talon, horn, finger,, and any other members are not continuous and yet; are
effectively near • • • • Where all is a living thing summing to a unity there
is nothing so remote in point or place as iiot to be near by virtue of a
nature whioh makes of the one living being a sympathetic organism." IV .4.32

factor in giving a pattern or principle to the more remote,
multiple, diffuse, and dis ...arraneed levels of em.anations.
distant emanations are so diffuse, so inconsistent, so
ed that in their state apart from

These

diearrang~

soul they may said to have no

being. This is Plotrunus idea of theoretical matter:

that which

is so multiple, chaotic, and disorganized that it has no affin•
ity with unity.
exist.

Technically, pure matter does not actually
Plotinu~

It is not a part of

system of real

it is a part of his system of becoming.

~ei~g,

yet,

It may not properly be

included as authentic existence, however, Plot1nus must suggest
its logical existence below the level of Soul.
cal extreme of his system of emanations,

It is the logi-

namely emanation out

of sheer nothingness itself.
Bodies are matter that tends toward form:

forn.f~atter.

Yet, the form of bodies does not come from the nature ot matter
itself but rather from soul.

All evidences of form come from

Each particular soul emanates its own body, the form ot

soul.

the body coming from soul.

The logical conclusion trot; Plotinus'

doctrine on the subject would be that every body is a soul
It

.

embodied", although he usually makes reference to the concept

ot living bodies only to about the level ot 11 vegetal 0 things.
He writes that every part of the universe has a lite

SJ!

~ kind:

"'ife cannot think of the universe as a soulless habitation, however vast
and varied, a thing of materials easily told ott, kind by kind --- wood
and stone and whatever else there be, all blehding into a kosmos: it

-3·7must be alert throughout, every member living by its own lii'e, nothing
that oan have existenoe failing to exist within it. And here we have
the solution ot the problem, "How an ensouled living form oan inolude
the soulleuf\ for this aooount allows grades or living within the
whole, grades to some of whioh we deey· life only because they are not
peroeptibly self•moved: in the truth, all of these have a hidden life;
and the thing v.hose life is patent; to sense is made up or things whioh
do not live to sense, but, none the less, ooni'er upon their resultant
total wonderful powers towards living • • • • "
IV. 4. 36.

Since lite is ideqtified with soul, living bodies are those that
have more soul as a part of their nature.
with the body, but is

n~ ~1th1n

The soul 13 present

it, for the body is penetrated

in every part by the soul that created it.

It is a situation
8
in which souls have bodies rather than bodies have souls.
Si PlG'lims.. elttb6'rate~...:on thi·s .point ':i:tl an oxo ell ont pass age a
"The soul • • • may not be oonsidered to be within the body as in a spaoe:
space is a oontainer,, a oontainer oi' body: it is the home or suoh things as
consist of isolated parts,, things, therefore, in which at no point is there
an entirety; now, the soul is not a body and is no more contained than
containing.
Neither is it in body as in some vessels whether as vessel or as plaoe of
location, the body would ranain, in itself, unensouled. If we are to think
o:r some passing-over from the soul ---that self-gathered--thing •••to the containing vessel, then soul iS- diminished by just as muoh as the vessel takes •••
Nor oan it be in the body as in some substratum: anything in a substratum
is a oondition affecting that --- a coloilr, a fonn ---but the soul (is no
condition of' something else), is a separate exist eno e.
Nor is it present as a part in the ·wholeJ soul is no part or body. Ir we are
asked to think or soul as a part in the living total we are i'aoed with the old
dirUoulty: •• HOVI it is in that whole. It is oertainly not there as the wine
is in_ the wine jar,, or as the jar in the jar, or as some absolute is self•.·
Present,
Nor can the presence be that or a v1hole in its parts: It would be absurd to
ihink of the soul as a total of which the body should represent; the parts ..
t is not present as Form is in MatterJ for the Form as in Matter is inaepa• ·
rable, and, further, is something superimposed upon an already existent thingJ
~,~l, on the contrary is that which engenders the Form residing within the
~ter and therefore is not the Fbrm. It the reference is not to the Form
(continued on next pn.gcJ.

Just as mind, conoeived of as a totality may be pictured as
embracing all the reason principles, patterns, and explanaticna

or

all individual things, so soui Dlay be conceived of as a tctal9
1ty or all the active life principles or all individual things.
Conceived or individually, every individual thing or item exists
in direct and

immedia~e-

relationship to soul.

"Individual" souJ.s

are to be conceived or only in terms or one total sQul-nature in
general •

•

actually present, but to Form as a thing existing apart from all formed objects ..
it is hard to see how such an entity has found its way into body, and at a~
rate this makes the soul separable. How comes it that everyone speaks of
soul as being in body, Because the soul is not seen and the body is: we per•
ceivetho bcdy, and by its movement and sensation we understand that it is··ansculed, and we say that it possesses a soul; to speak or residence is a natural sequence. If" the soul were visible, an object of' the se~ses, radiating
through the entire life, if' it were manifest in !'till f'oroe 'to the very""outermost surf'aoe, we would no longer speak of soul as in body; we would se.y the
minor was within the major. the contained within the container, the fleeting
within the perdurable."
r.v • 3. 20.

9 .!'The soul is the author or all living things, • • • it has breathed
the lire into then all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea. all the
creatures or the air, the divine stars in the sky; it is the maker or the
aun1 itself formed and ordered this vast heaven and conducts all that rhythmic
motions and it is a principle distinct from all these to which it gives law
and movanent and life, •• • they gather or dissolve as soul brings them
lii'e or abandons than. • • •
The material body is made up or parts, eaoh holding its own plaoe, some in
mutual opposit6on and others variously interdependent; the soul is in no
such oonditionJ it is not whittled down ao that life tells· of a part of the
soul and springs where some suoh separate portion impingesi eaoh separate
lire lives by the soul entire, omnipresent in the liken.etas of the engendering
rather, entire in unity and entire in dii'fUsed variety. • • • "
V• l. 2

-39Being indestructible life-principles,souls do not come into
being within time.

However, individual souls do have

their relationship with bodies: that of being

h~.stor~.es

i~prisoned

i:1

with a

particular body for a certain period of time --- a tragic process
which occurs over and over again constituting the endless episode

ot reincarnation of every individual soul.

Strictly speaking,

birth and death cannot apply to souls.
Perhaps the most significant fact about Plotinus' teachings
about soul is his explanation that man is most characteristically
a soul.
univer~e,

He is only one among many sorta of' souls within the
and his relationship

to mind and the One is essential-

ly the same as .that of all other souls.

ot all souls

in~the

He shares the common lot '

manner of his coming into existence as an in-

dividual in his connectedness with the universe, and in the fact

ot his meaning and destiny being incorporated within the nature of
the system.

Among the order of souls; man is ranked a little above

Cehter in the scaling of individual souls.

On this Plotinus

\7r1tes:
"In the Universe the middle and lower members are human beings; above
. them .. the Heavens and the Gods that dwell there; these Gods with the
· entire circling expanse of the heavens constitute the greater part of
the Kosmos: the earth is but a o antral point. • • ..
.

ft.&t• humanity, in reality is,, poised midway between gods and beasts,
and inclines nov~ to the one order, now to the ot.her; some men grow
like to the divine,, others to the brute, the greater number stand
natural •• • •"
III. 2. 8.

-4oAs an individual human being, man consists of an individual soul that has generated a body with which it is assocj.ated.,
As a soul man is part of mind and part of the One.

His body,

being incidental to his being, is comnosed of matter,which acts
contrary to the inherent nature of soul and nrovides a constant
.

~

struggle between the soul and the body.

Everything there is

that is bad about man is due to his involvement in matter.
Everything noble and worthy about his is due to his soul nature.
Strictly speaking, we may not say that man has a soul nature,
for he actually has only soul nature.

His personality is to

be identified with his soul-ness, and with this alone.
can we say that man has a mind.

Neither

It is rather the case that man

is a nart of mind by virtue of being a soul.

His particular

reason nrincinles, patterns, ideal forms, destiny, etc.J are
but a pa.rt of mind in general and ultimately, as we have indicated, are a part of the inherent unity of the universe.
Yet, so long as we maintain the setting of man distinctively
as a soul we may to some extent picture him as having a
particularized mental aspect.

The position of man in the uni-

verse and his involvement as a soul limited by matter set
the stage for the drama of human history.
On various occasions Plotinus refers to the analogy of
a series of concentric circles with radii extending from the
Ultimate center as a means of describing his system.
ments concerning these may well

His com-

summarize the presentation

-41of his system.

He writes:

" ••• A oirole related in its path to a centre must be admitted to owe
its scope to that centre; j.t has somethinp; of' tho nature of that "ortrP.
in that the re.dinl lines c~nverging on that one c entra::. point ar.f-lirn11rl·Ve
their impinging ends to that point of oon..,.re't't;enoa and of dcpertnre, !;hti
dominant of radii and terminals: the ter:ninals are of one nc:i;u:r.e vi. ch
the oentre, separate reprodu0Itio~1s of it,, since the centre is, :1.n L\
oertain"sense,, the t<".tal of terminals and radii impinging at every point
upon itJ these lines reveal the centre; they are the development o:f' thr.-1;
undeveloped. In the same way we are to tnke.uBoing-. This oomb:..nF.id
power springs from the Supreme, an outflow as it were de'7elopment from
That and remaining dependent upon that Intellective natu~e, shovtlng
forth That v1hioh, in the purity of' its oneness, is not Intellectual•
Prinoiple sinoe it is no duality.. No more the.:i in the oirole are the
lines or oiroumfrenoe to be identified with that Centre which is the
sou;roe of both:· radii and oirole are images given forth by indwelling
power and, as produots of a oetta.in vigour in it, not cut off from it."

VI.

a. 18.

" ••• Imagine a small luminous mass serving as centre to a transparent
sphere, so that the light from within shows upon the entire outer surface.
·otherwise unlit: we surely agree that the inner core of' light, intact
and immobile, reaohes over the entire outer extension; the single light
of that small oentre illuminates the whole field., The diffused light
is not due to any bodily m3gni tud~ of that central point which illumi•
nates not as body but as body lit, that is, by another kind of power
than corporeal quality: let us then abstract the corporeal mass,.
retaining the light as power: we oan no longer speak of' the light in
a..~y particular spot; it is equally diffused within and throughout the
entire sphere•• ••"
VI. 4. 7.
11

• •• Aa a help towards stating the nature of' the produo ed mul tiplioi ty•••
we use the example of many lines radiating .from one centre; but while
we provide :for individualization "VJe must care.fully preserve mutual
pres enoe. Even in the oas e of our oirole we need not think of separated
radii: all may be taken as forming one sur!'aoe: where there is no
distinction even upon the one surface but all is power and reality undifferentiated, all the beings may be thought of as centres uniting at
one central centre: we ignore the radial lines and think of their
terminals at that centre, where they are at one. Restore the radii;
onoe more we have lines, ea.oh touohing a generating centre or its own,,
but that centre remains coincident vtlth the one first centre•• ••"

VI. 5.

s.

-42we may diagram his system as follows&
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In summary, the four elements
One, Mind, Soul, and Matter.

or

Plotinus' system are The

Everything after the One is a

dation of the One insofar as it exists in any reality.

g~a

Everything

that exists is a part of the One so that to be real and to be the
One are one and the same thing.

Mind, Soul, and Matter, in order,

are less real than the One, each in succession being less real
than the one before, but the reality of all three may be analyzed

into the One.

Everything that exists after the One, exists

insid~

of the One and as a part of it, but is i,.ot solely ·1dent1cai :witti.ite

This arrangement

or

things accounts for the explanation ot

the nature of the universe and also for its origin.
1s itself eternal as the One is eternal.

The universe

Time or succession do

not apply in the case of any of the P.arts of the system.
Life is inferior to both Mind and the One, being identified
with movement and change rather than with unmoving existents.
Qualities of differentiation apply more in the case of the in•
ferior parts of the system, such as in the case of souls, individual things, and matter, rather than in reference to the richest
centers of reality: Mind and the One.

Although all other things

spring from the One in origin and meaning, there is no change in
'POsition within the framework of the system, all movement and

change being self-movement or change within position.
Man is a soul, and as such is a part of both Mind and the One.
His soul emanates a body, which is a burden to him and from which
he longs to be free.

Within the system. man is located at about

~idpont between the extremes of disvalue and value: matter and
'D\11'

.

e unity, c/
u~i

c/
and ~v

•

-~-

Chapter III
The Religion of Plotinus
According to Porphyry, Plotinus was not a religious man ,
according to the then-contemporary standards for judging a
religious man.

He abstained from all rites and sacrifices,
.
~

rejected the popular Greek polYtheism of his

~ay, a~d

partici-

pated in no forms of' public or private worship. Typical of
his attitude in these matters 1 Porphyry tells, was his utteI'-•
ance: "The Gods must come to me, not I ·to them. 11
Plotinus, notwithstanding, was quite a religious men.

His

philosophy is essentially a religious philosophy and his concepts are fundamentally religious concepts.

It seems to be the

case that he was so concerned about religion that he could not
tolerate any meager expressions

or

1t 1

so that his scorn for

popular religion was but h1s way of' testimony to a higher
level of religious devotion.

From what Porphry bas to say

about his behaviour in general and on the basis of the centrality of religious concepts in his system, he is to be seen as an
intensely religious man, completely absorbed

in ultimately

religious concepts and

dedicated

to a religious

way

or

life~

It might be well said of him, as it was said of Spinoza, that
he

wo.s a

"God-into:x.:tcated11 man.

clue to his over-..all

hcnes~.;y

:!.n

non~c.on!'o!'I!lity

Eis

refus~.ng

is 'but

a

to p:r:-ofes9 his religi ..

ous allegiance except in term13 of h1s cwn philosc;phy, which, a·t
the time, happened to be aJ.:ten 1;o his
belongs to that long

l~.st

con-ljor!1.porA:.."'i.es.

irreligious~

o:f men wh'> e.re i'ormally "

not because they l:hir.tk: l.,aligion is

u.n~.mpo:r.ta.rt :> bu~

feel that its mea.:n:!.ng and ess e!lce

cannot be

symbolisms and ceremord.esJ but

mi.1st

B:e

because they

incc:rpo!'~.ted

be connected,

related.~

in
an.d

explained within a system.

· Iy
religion

is not a simple undertaking to attempt to analyze the

or

Plot;tn·;.s o

Due to his

disposit~.o:n.

on the subject he

never O.iscusses rel:tgion. in any ce.tegorical way,,
has to say that may be termed

11 religious 11

over the whole of his writings.

That which he

is rather scattered

We must also grant that cate-

gorical concepts of religion often do not mean the same thing in
different settings, so that in a study of religious ideas, that
Which was said within one system must necessarily be

tra~slated

into that which is understood in terms of an.other system or set

Of categories •. Add to this the abstractness and

abstruse~ens

of

many of the ideas of Plotinus and the task becomes difficult and
challenging.

We propose an analysis of the religion of Plotinus under

-46the headings ot (l) his concept of deity, (2) bis idea ot man,

(3) his concept ot sin, (4) his ideas of life and death, and (5)
his philosophy of salvation.
Reference has already been made to,Plotinus' skepticism
concerning the ordinary de1.t1es ot Greek polytheism.

Throughott

the Enneads numerous references are made to them, but there is

no reasoh to believe that the terms are to be taken to have meaning except in a literary sense.

11

0uranious (heaven) is some -

times useQ. to denote unity., "Kronos," sometimes means mind, and
11

Zeus 11 is often used to indicate the World•6oul.

1

1. Jt typical example of' the latter is: "But· Zeus •-- ordering all,
guardian and dispose.,possessor for ever.of the Kingly soul and the
kingly intellect, bringing all into being by his providence, and presiding
over all things ns they come, administering all under plan and system, unfolding the periods of' the kosmos, many of which stand already aocomplished·'WOUld it not seem inevitable that, in this multiplicity of concern, Zeus
should have memory of all the periods .. their n1unber and their different
qualities •••• Even this matter of' Zeus' memory of the kosmic periods is
difficult •••• Zeus cannot know the n\llllber of' his works ..... Zeus knows his ·own
unlimited lite, and in that knowledge, knows the activity that flows from him
governor~

to the kosmos •••• "
IV. 4. 9
and a.gain:
"When under the name of Zeus we are considering the Demiurge we must
leave out all notions or stage and progress, and recognise one unohan:ging
and timeless lite •••• "
(see also1 III. 5. 8, 9;

v.

IV. 4. 10

1. 7J & v.

s.

12)

•

-47'l'he question
God, specifically,

o~

determining what is Plotinus' doctrine

~

is to be

con~1.derod

o.'!''

God, accC'rdinB to

his interpretation, is not so easily determlno.cd,

':ehe qi.'J.estion

demands some elaboration.
Plotinus uses the word God or
writings.

11

theos 11 many times in his

However, he does not explain the meaning that he

would attach to the term. 1 and apparently uses the term loesely
to apply to different parts of his system at different times.
We may not deduce his doctrine of God from an analysis of his
use of the word alone.

·There are five possible ways of interpreting Plotinus•
idea of God.

They are (1) the identifying of God with Plotinus'

concept of gods and demons, (2) the identifying of God with the
World-Soul, (3) the identifying of God with

the Divina-Mind,

(4) the identifying of God with the One, and (5) the identifying
ot God with Plotinus' entire system of real being (authentic
existence).
The possible argument for the first case is that Plotinus
believed in the existence of a collection of beings existing
'betvre~n the level of man and the World-Soul.

greater than men, not as completely

11

They were souls

embodied 11 as men, more

powerful than men --- serving in some sense as mediators between
the higher order than they and men.

In short, the view seems

to have a rough parallel tq the concept of the Ol'YJJlpian deities,

-48with the exception that these gods arid demons were even less
limited and less colorful than the

po~ular

Greek' deities.

demons were lesser powers than the godsabut both were of

The

the

same general tYPe 1 the -difference being that the gods ranked
higher and were essentially more noble in character.

2

2. Plotinus speaks of this second higher level of spiritual beings
above men viz. : "You are wrongedJ need that trouble an immortal 'i You are
put to death; you have attained your desire. And f'rom the moment your citizenship of the world becomes irksome you are not bound to it. Our adversa ..
ries do not deny that even here there is a. system of law and penalty: and
surely we o annot in justice blame a dominion whioh awards to every one his
due, where virtue has its honour, and vioe oomes to its fitting shame, in
which there are not merely representations of the gods, but the gods themselveg. watchers from above, and--- as we read---easily rebutting human reproaches, since they lead alll things in order from a beginning to an end.alloting to eaoh human being, as life follows lire,, a fortune shaped to all
that has prededed --- the destiny which, to those that do not penetrate it,
becomes the matter or boorish insolenoe upon things divine •••• · We must
recognise that other men have attained the heights or goodness; we must admit
the goodness of the celestial spirits, and above all of the gods ---those
whose presence is here but their contemplation in the Supreme, and loftiest
or them, the lord of this All, tho most blessed Soul. Rising still higher,
we hymn the divinities of the Intellectual Sphere, and above all these, the
mighty King of that dominion, whose majesty is made patent in the very
multitude or the gods·"

II. 9. 9

And again: "We must, therefore, lny down the grounds on which we distinguish
the G ods from the Celestials---that is, when we emphasize the separate
nature of the two orders and are not, as oft en in praotioe1 inoluding these
Spirits under the common names of Gods.
It. is our teaohing and conviction that the Gods are immune to all passions
while we attribute experience and emotionbo the Celestials which, though
eternal Beings and directly next to the Gods, are already a step towards
ourselves and stand between the divine and the human.~.~
·
· It is beat not to use the word"Celestial" of any Being of that Realm; the
word "God" may be applied to the Essential•Celestial •·- the auto-daimon ·-·
and even to the Visible Powers or the Universe of sense down to the Moon;
Goda, these too, visible,, secondary, sequent upon the Gods of the Intellectual
~etU.m, oonsonant with Them,, held about Them, as the radiano e about the star.
Mlat then are these spirits? A Celestial is the representative generated by

-49Although it is true that Plotinus speaks of these higbor
~~Jt(

spiritual beings as gods, we can1be content with the con.(·,J,u,d.t,r.
that he intended for such to be his total doctrine

or

deity~

Such animism is quite inconsistent with his more elaborate cm:.cept of being, in general, and it would be difficult to th1nJ:
that which we would term 11 deity11 existing on a lower level the.n
some other formulated concept or being.
A much better argument can be made for identifying the
World-Soul as deity.

Plotinus goes to great detail to

en:.pb.as~.ze

his doctrine of man's essential identity with the World-Soul,
the great life of the universe.

It is his distinctive message

about man that as a soul he is identified with all souls in the
universe and even with the universe as a soul.

For all practi-

cal purposes man's connection with any other aspect of being
is directly dependent upon the W·orld-Soul, for man must reach

cont.
ea.oh Soul when it enters the Kosmos. And why? by n Soul entering the Kosm6s?
Because Soul pure of the Kosmoa generates not a Celestial Spirit but a God:
hence it is that we have spoken or Love, offspring of Aphrodite the Pure
Soul, as a God ••••
But what partioipation oan the Celestials have in Matter, and in what Matter?
Certainly none in bodily liiatter; that would make them simply living thinga
of the order of sense. And if', even, they are to invest themselves in bodies
of air or or fire, the nature must have already been altered before they
o~uld have any oontaot· with the corporeal. The Pure does not mix, unmediated,
'lliith bady --- though- many think that the Celestial-Kind, of its very eas enoe,
comports a body aerial or or fire."

III. 5. 6.

-50even mind and unity through the medium

or

soul.

;

3.
Plotinus v.rrites: "But what becomes of the soul's infinity if' it :ts
thus fixed. The infinity is a matter of' power: there is question not of the
soul's being divisible into e.n infinite number of parts, but of' an infinite
possible eff'eotiveness: it is infinity in the sense in which the
SupreI!lo
God, also, is f'ree of all bound.
This means that it is no external limit that defines the individual being or
the extension of souls any more than of God; on the oontrary each in rj.ght r>f
his own power is all that it ohoos es to be: and we are not to think of' it as
going forth from itself' ( losing its unity by any partition): the fact is
simply that the element 'Within it, which is apt to entrance into ·body, has
the power of' ill?llediate projection any whither: the soul is oertainly no·~
wrenched asunder by its presenoe at once in foot and in finger. Its presenoe
in the All is similarly unbroken; over its entire range it exists in every
several part of everything having even vegetal life, even in a part out of'f
from the main; in any possible segment it is as it is at its souroe. For the
body or the All is a unit, and the soul is everywhere present to itas to one
thing.u
·
IV. 2. 8
" •••While the Soul ( as an eternal, a Divine Being) is at rest --- in rest
finnly based on Repose, the Absolute ..... yet, as we may put it, that hugh
illumination of the Supreme pouring outwards oomes at last to the extreme
bourne of its lighte and dwindles to darkness ••••
Imagine that a stately and varied mansion has been built; it has never been
abonded . by its Architeot, who, yet, is not tied down to it; he has judged
it worthy in all its length and breadth of all the care that can serve to
its Being --- as far as it can share in Being --- or to its beauty, but a
care without burden to its director., who never descends, but presides over i
it from aboves this gives the degree in which the Kosmos is ensouled,, not by
a soul belonging to it, but by one present to it; it is mastered not mas'f?er;
not possessor but possessed. The soul bears it up, and it lies within,, rio
fragment of it unsharing.
The kosmos is like a net which takes all its life, ·as fe.r as ever it stretches
from being wet in viater, and has no not or its own; the sea rolls away and· the
net; With it, precisely to the full of its scope, for no mesh of' it oan strain
beyond its set plaoe: the soul is of so far-reaching a nature --- a thing
unbounded ---. as to ~braoe the entire body of the All in one extension; so
far as the universe extends, there soul is; and if the universe had no
existence, the ment of' the soul would be the same1 it is eternally what it
~s. The universe spreads as broad as the presence of the soul; the bound of
sts expansion is the point at whioh, in its downward egression from the
upreme, it still has soul to bind it in one ••• •"
"IV.- 3. ~
(continued on next page)
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The chief objection to identifying the World-Soul as God
cont,
"The Intelleotunl-Principle in the Supreme hns ever been the sun of that
sphere - let us accept that as the type of the creative Logos- and i.mmediately upon it follows the Soul depending from it, stationary Soul from
stationary Intelligence. But the Soul borders also upon the sun of thic
sphere, and it becomes the medium by which all is linked to the over-world;
it plays the i;>art of an interpreter be!iween what emanaies from that sphere
down to this lower universe, and what rises - as far as, through Soul,
anything can·- from the lower to the highest. 11
IV. 3. 11
"The administration of the kosmos is to be thought of as of a living unit:
there is the action determined by v1hat is external, and has to do with the
parts, and there is that determined by the internal and by the principle ....
And in· the oase of the universe, the administration is all the less oompliodi
oa.ted from the fact that the soul actually oiroumsoribes, as part of a living unity, all the members which it conducts. For all the Kind~ included in
the universe are dominated by one Kind, upon which they follow, fitted. into
it, developing from it, growing out of it, just as the Kind manifested in
the ,bough is related to the Kind in the trees as a whole. 11
rv. 4. 11
''We cannot think or the universe as a soulless habitation, however vast and
Varied • a thing of materials easily told off, kind by kind - wood and stone
and what ever else there be, all blending into a kosmos: It must be alert
throughou'.b, every manber living by its own life. nothing that om have
existenoe failing to exist within it.
And here we have the solution or the problem, "How an ensouled living form
can include the soulless": for this account allows grades of living within
. the whole, grades to some of which we decy life only because th'ey are not
perceptibly self-moved: in the truth, all of these. have a hidden life; and
the thing whoa e life is patent to s ens e is made up of things which do not
live to sense, but, none the less, confer upon their resultant total wonder•
ful powers towards living. • • •"
IV. 4. 36.
"'Fire, air, water,, earth, are in thanselves soulless -- whenever souls is in
any of them, that life is borrowed •• and there are no other forms of body
than these four: even the school that believes there are has always held
them to be bodies.. not souls, and to be witbout life. None of these, then,,
having life, it 1\0Uld be extraordinary if life crone aoout by bringing them
together; it is impossible, in fact, that the oollooation of material
entities should produce life, or mindless entities mind. No one, moreover,
would pretend that a mere chance mixing could give such results: some
regulating prinoiple would be neeessary, some Cause directing the admixture:
t he guiding principle would be -- soul •••• "

IV. 7. 2.
(continued on next poge)

_,(!_
in Plotinus is the fact that Plotinus also clearly refers to ·chb
Divine -Mind as deity.

Deity cannot be accounted for apart frum

something that is itself greater than soul.
effect a meaning but it is not itself
standpoint

Immanence may eff130

that meaning.

Fror11 the

of pure immanence there would be much argument for

the view that the World-Soul alone is all that may be considered
deity in Plotinus, but if we look to the meaning of experienoe
in something
that is itself transcendent of the experience it.
.
self, we must appeal to that which is more divine than soul,
namely mind.
oont·~-·

"Thus in sum,, the soul,, a--divine being and a dweller in the loftier realms,,
has entered body: it is a god,, a later phase of the divine: but um.er ....,_.,
stress of its powers and of its tendency to bring order to its next lower,
it penetrates to this sphere in a voluntary p"lunge •••• -'The aot reveals the
povier,, a power hidden, and we might almost say obliterated or non-existent,
unless at some moment it became effective: in the world as it is,, the richness of the outer stirs us all to the 1'/0nder of the inner whose greatness
is displayed in aots so splendid."

IV.

8. 5.

"Now are we to hold similarly that your soul and mine all are one, and that
the same thing is true of the universe,, the soul in all the sever al forms of'
lii'e being one soul, not parcelled out in separate items,, but an omnipresent

id~tity? First we must assure ourselves of the possibility of all souls
being one as that of' any given individual is •• •• "
II
--.
IV. 9. l.
How can a multitude of' essential beings be really one? Obviously either the
one essence will be entire in all,, or the man¥ will rise from a one which
remains unaltered and yet; inolucles: the one-maey in virtue of giving itself.
~ithout self-abandomnent,, to its own multiplication. It is competent thus II
give and remain, because while it penetrat·es all things it can never
1~ self'
be sundered: this is an id entity in variety.• •• 11
rv. 9. s

-53To identify Plotinus' concept of mind with deity would bA.
to identify God with principle, pattern, intelligence, and

-

spi~it~

-

It would be the conceiving of being and deity as one and the
thing.

In this connection it will be remembered that unity or

the One does not conform to the normal requirements
concept

Aan:e

11

of the

being 11 in that it is being 1 s source, a Supra-being in

the sense that its intensity of being is too high to be known.
To interpret the Divine-Mind as God would also be the viewing
of the whole system of authentic being, for even soul as mind•
in-motion must ultimately be identified as mind, pattern, principle. spirit, intelligence, etc.

Some suggestion along these

lines- is given by the fact that Plotinus gives an unusual prominence to the treatment of mind in his system.
identifies the Intellectual-Principle as God.
speaks of Prayer the implication is quite
be directed toward mind.

4

He at least once
When Plotinus

stro~g

that it is to

The very concept of prayer would seem

to be rather ridiculous unless that which responds existed in
some condition of mind.

The following passage from Plotinus

gives some implication to this effect, but the point is debatable:

4~

------ ----- ------· ------"Thus we have here one identioal Prinoiple,

the Intellect, which
is the universe of' authentic beings, the Truth: as such it is a great god,
or, better,, not a· god among gods but the Godhead entire. It is a god, a
seoondary god manif'esting before there is any vision or that other1 the
Supreme which rests over all, enthroned in transoendenoe upon that splendid
Pediment, the nature follovdng close upon it•"
v. s. 3.

i

"But ho·w and what do es the Ihtel.i eotuai-Prinoiple see and, esp eoi ally
how has it sprUJlr; from that whieh is to become the objeot or i·t;E v5s.i.cn
In venturing an answer, we first invoke God Himself, not in loud W(..r.t
but in that ww of' prayer which is always within our power, leani:n~ ;.u
soul towards Him by aspiration, alone towards the alone ••••
v. l, 6.
11
It 1s not here explicit whether alone towards the alone" imp1i~"s

direction toward the Intellectual-Principle as an object or
towards

the One ae anobject.

On the bas!s of other·paesagea

6ne could get no farther than the Intellectual-Principle in the
medium of prayer even though he may be directed to an object

beyond it•
The objection to the identity of mind and deity in Plotinus
is that such a view sacrifices logical scope in the oonce~t of
deity to the practicality of devising deity as an object.

The

View is not so much an explanation of deity in Plotinus as it is

a resort to the necessity of conceiving of deity in terms of
understandable categories.
Although not many interpreters have suggested it, there is
some reason to identify the One and God.

From this approach,

God is always conceived of in terms of ultimates.
than an ultimate io not God.

Anything less

It might be a secondary god or a

lllediation of' God, but worship may only be directed toward a
logical ultimate.

This view is that Plotinus indicates a

logical definition of what God must be even though such a God
1s not the God of human experience.

The One or unity is to

be seen as the ultimate combination and coherence of all known

-55values in a manner so as

to be a:inf1nitely infinitett" to

borrow a l)hras e of Samuel Alexander.

Often Plot,.nus refers to

the One or unitJ as "The Good" and by this connotat1.or. he
something more

than rightneas in behaviour.

He means

r-~e~-,.

I'!

th~:d;

whose very existence is entirely good. This doctrine is consistent with the ancient and

traditional tendency to

me~ge

the

concept of independent or ultimate good in with the concept of
ultimate deity and vice versa.
This view presents the One as a sort of God of

Philosop.~ers.

There is a sense 1n which Philosophers will worship a logical
God

~ather

than a practical God.

It is necessary to experience

all values in their ultimate formulations before the admission

or

the thesis that they must logically exist in ultimate com-

bination.

'I'he abstract mind always worships more than it

experiences.
The identity of unity and deity is not at all inconsistent
With the Hebrew concept of the utter holiness of God as Jahveh,
the ultimately self-existent

11

I am that I am. 11

It would be

difficult to calculate how God could be anything less than the
ultimate coalescence of values and still meet the logical demands
that must be put upon the concept of deity.

The question at

issue 1n this interpretation of the God of Plotinus is whether
or not the ·concept of deity in Plotinus may be limited to the

Ultimate logical merger of values.

That which he ascribes to

the One is usually ascribed only to deity.

or more correctly The Perfect or Perfection.

The One is perfect,
Soul and Mind are

not perfect in themselves for they must have their perfection
only through the emanation of the One.

The One is at peace

with itself, being its own object, whereas mind must have the
One for its object and soul must have mind.

The One was not

produced, it contains its own self-causality within itself.
Mind and soul, however, are productions. The One is Eb ove will

in the sense that it constitutes its own object as well as its

own desires.

The One is a complete self-activity: a sel£-1den-

tical essence {Vl.8.l;), logically situated above even thought
and thinking (I.
sense.

7. 1). In itself it is complete in every

It would seem to be the case that Plotinus' own de•

scription of the One is the same as our usual description of
deity.
There is further evidence, however, that Plotinus himself
did not identify the concepts

11

God 11 and "The One. 11

He writes

at one place:
"Think or The One as Mind or as God,, you think too meanly; use all
the resource of understanding to conceive this Unity and, again,, it
is more authentically one than God, even though you reach for God's
unity beyond the un~ty the most perreot you can conceive. For This
is utterly a self-existent, with no oonoomitant whatever. This self•
sufficing is the essence or its unity.·· Something there must be
supremely adequate, autonomous,, all-tr·anacending,, most utterly without need."
VI, 9.6.

A tentative suggestion at this stage is that Plotinus seems to
~ank God less than he ranks the One.

Plotinus a~pears ambiguous

-57as to a conclusion about the matter as sometimes seems to rank
· God as something less than the One and sometimes appears to use
the idea of God to serve as a synonym for the One.

The answer

to the problem is too difficult to undertake within the limits
of this study.

May it suffice to say that there is considerable

evidence to support the identity of deity with the One, but also
evidence in Plotinus to the contrary.
The most likely view, in the opinion of the writer, is the
fifth possibility, namely the view that the God of Plotinus is
the identity of all three elements or states: unity, mind, and
soul as one deity.

This would be saying that the entire system

or metaphysical reality as

~lotinus

suggests it is the same

thing as deity --- that the real world (authentic existence)
and God are one and the same thing.

This would be a modified

pantheism rather than a thorough-going pantheism due to the
fact that God could not be identified with our entire phenomonal
world.

Only that part of the universe that might be concluded.

to be real could be oonsidered as deity.
Evil --- all

Illusions, Matter,

the negative aspects of our universe conceived ot

aa sheer multiplicity, chaos, etc. share no part of reality,
being or deity.
As Plotinus would have it, deity is everywhere --- in the
Sun,

Moon and heavenly bodies, in spirits and demons that in-

habit the upper world, in anything that possesses ~ife.
says that inanimate things have a

11

He even

life of their own" even

-58though we

thr~.ugh

within them.

5·

our senses may not discern the

pecul~.ar l~_fe

Plotinus speaks of both soul and mind as

upon different occasions.

Gc.C.y

One question at issue in these in..

stances is whether he is thinking of the soul as God in the
sense that it is the One and in that sense only, or whether he
is considering the soul as soul as making up a part of deity.
The arguments

already given in this chapter for possibility # 2

namely, the identifying of God with the World-Soul seem to indicate that soul considered in itself is treated as deity.

The

same situation occurs in reference to mind, as already heretofore_ mentioned, so that the conclusion that should follow is
that Plotinus treated both soul and mind as God, and implicitly
so treated the One.

5oemthing of his beaching about deity wouli

be left out if the concept were limited to any one of the three
parts of his system of authentic being.

Unless it can be shown

that in associating soul and mind with deity Plotinus means for
soul and mind to be considered

as God only in the sense that

they may be considered the One, the best practical solution to
the question is the identity of deity with the whole system of
authentic being.

·s~ ·He
however
... •wood
must be
nothing

writes: "We oannot think of the universe as a soulless habitation
vast and varied, a thing of materials easily told off, kind by kind
and stone and whatever else there be, all blending into a kosmos: it
alert [ alive J throughout, gvery member living by its own lif'e,,
that can have existenoe failing to exist vdth it."
IV. 4.36

-59Although it would not be necessary to think of Plotinus'
view or man as a religious one, his doctrine or man is a vital

part in the religious a.apect of his

sy~em.

Religion is possible

because man can do something about his condition.

Even though

man is closely identified with nature, and especially with ali
being by virtue of his existence as soul, his destiny is not
purely determined by

hi~

situation or environment.

the high road or the low road

a~d

He can choose

his choices make a moral dif-

ference in the determination of future reward and punishmenta.
As has already been indicated, man is significantly a soul.
He is a soul embodied with that not consistent with soul.

This

accounts for the struggle within the consciousness of man between
that tendency toward the noble and good and that tendency toward
the ignoble and evil·

Matter makes man evil, soul makes him goode

The moral struggle is the struggle to be more soul-like in total
disposition rather than to relax into the downward pull and
degradation of matter.
Man as soul is not notably different fr0m any other soul in
general with the exception that he is a higher soul than some
Of them and a lower soul

than others.

It is the distinctive

mess.age of Plotinus that man is located in the mid-point of the
total universe.

As a soul he shares in the world or being and

aa a soul embodied he shares in the world or becoming.

Even in

the ranking of the souls he does not belong to the highest order
of souJ.a, but is again ranked in the middle of the order of souls.

-60It is the doctrine of Plotinus that man is the central figure
in the universe although not the epitome of its value.
Man can and does sin, according to Plotinus.

Sin consists

simply in man's choosing of that which is below him in preference
to that which is above him: the surrender

to a lower value (for

that which has no value) instead of allegiance to supreme values.
Sin is being like the nature of matter instead of being like the
nature of soul, mind and unity.
Punishment for sin is mainly reserved for future life and
is effected by karma.

reincarnation.

Like all souls, man as a soul undergoes

Justice is effected by the fact that the soul

in its next existence is incarnated in a body most in keeping
with the faculty that it has developed most in its previous incarnation.

Plotinus writes:

"Those that have attained the human level are men once more. Those
that have lived wholly to sense become animals --- corresponding in
species to the particular temper of' the life --- ferocious animals
where the sensuality has been accompanied by a certain measure of
spirit, gluttonous and lascivious animals where all has been appetite
and satiation of appetite.
those who in their pleasures have not ev'en
lived by sensation, but have gone their way in a torpid grossness become mere growing things, for this lethargy is the entire act of the
vegetative, and such men have been busy be-treeing themselves. Those,
• •• that otherwise untainted, have loved song become vocal animalsJ
kings ruling unreasonably but with no other vice are eagles; futile
and flighty visionaries ever soaring skyward, become high-flying birds;
observance of civic and seoular virtue make man again. or where the merit
is less marked • one of the animals of communal tendency,, a bee or the
like."
III. 4. 2

Perhaps P~otinus is not completely serious in everything he says
in this particular passage and may even be presenting the idea

-61in the

11

myth11 tradition, but his doctrine or reincarnation is to

b~

be taken as a serious explanation of the possibility of justice

in reference to sin.

,·

6

Sin is to be seen, nevertheless, as a possibility under the
self-determination of souls rather than as an indication of any
indeterminancy of soul.

Souls as particularu souls exist under

a system of rigid determination and whatever freedom of choice
men or other. souls have occurs within a limit of their particular
order, withih their power to act as free agents insofar as freedom
is operative in their current incarnation.

The doctrine is,

further, that the higher the order of the particular soul, the
greater the degree of free choice.

Men have more free choice

than horses, and spirits and demons have more free choice than

men. Even though choices are determined by the particular
.~_

________

.. .,,..

_,,_;.:__

______________

__________

--::,

s, Plotinus ax:presses the idea: more teohnioally, viz. &
"In that
archetypal world every form of' soul is near to the image t the thing in the
world or copy} to which its individual oonsti tution inclines it J there is
therefore no need of a sender or leader acting at the right moment to bring
it at the right moment whether into body or into a definitely appropriate b
body: of it own motion it descends at the precisely true time and enters
where it must. • • • The Souls go forth neither under compulsion nor of
freewill; or at least, freedom, here, is not to be regarded as action upon
preference; ~t is more like such a leap of' the nature as moves men to the
instinctive desire of sexual union, or in the case or some, to tine oonduot:
the motive lies elsewhere than in the reason: like b destined unfailingly
to like, and each moves hither or thither at its fixed moment." IV'. 3. 13.

essential nature of the soul in its current incarnation, they
are still to be considered as free choices in that the responsibility for the current condition resides in choices made in
previous incarnations.

Action in accordance with providence

is not necessarily action to which the soul is determined by
providence.

hence, misfortune and suffering are to be viewed

as the just payment for sin committed in a previous incarnation.
In like manner, goodness, virtue 1 and nobility as well as vice,
suffering and pain

are to be conceived of as the result of

moral action on the part of souls acting as free agents.
summ~ry 1

In

although the soul as soul cannot will to do evil, sin

may be considered as the impulse of souls to free themselves from
their participation in the nature of the World-Soul and to allow
themselves to become like the nature of matter.
Essential in every religion is some qualitative concept of
life, some suggestion of the nature of the summum bonum for man.
Parallel with that will be the opposite condition, usually conceived of as "death."

In this sense life is conceived of as

nearly identical with the concept of value in contrast with the
less qualitative concept of being as existence.
concept is the

ImP,licit in the

suggestion that man can do something about mak-

ing existence more qualitative, and the doing of such is at
least part of what is involved in religion.
Plotinus' summun bonum is the

mystic~l

identity of the soul

_-63(i.e. man as a soul) with the One, an
ship that can only rarely occur.

estatic joyous relation-

It is the high peak of his

religion, the culmination of his discipline of salvation.
Plotinus, however, also granted the fact of the impossibility of
life being lived on such a high plane of joy.

In a secondary

sense, then, we may say that his comcept of the good life is the
life dedicated to the discipline of attaining mystical identity

of the soul with the One.

By similar parallel, death occurs

when sin is effective ·-- when soul is so limited by its involvement in matter as not to typify the inherence of the One in
it.

In short, life for Plotinus is the joy of identity in

communion with the One, death is merger into Matter

and multi-

plicity.
But how doos

on~raaoh

the

~ummum b~

according to

Plotinus?

What technique or routine does Plotinus suggest as

the way of

salvation for man? The answer constitutes his pbil•

Osophy

of Salvation.

As has already been indicated, the metaphysics of Plotinus
1s a system of ideal reality: the conceiving of the real as the
ideal in typical Platonic fashion.

However, in his doctrine ot

Sa1va·bion Plotinus indicates a practical religious way of life in
Which man may come into immediate

union with the ideal.

In

this manner, _he counteracts the possibility allowed by Plato

conceiving of ideal life as a sheer abstraction.

ot·

For Plotinus,

-64the real world is no abstraction, no mere idea in the mind.
Instead, it was a thing there to be known, more or less, by
means of and virtue of the souls proper behaviour in the

pro-

cess of its search for ideal life.
The whole necessity for Salvation rests upon the thesis of
Plotinus that the soul

{ man as soul: man as an individual)

exists in the universe in a

11

fallen 11 stat e.

Man finds his

identity with deity by conceiving of himself as soul, as having
emanated ultimately from the very ideal world for which he longs.
Parallel to his doctrine of Emanation as it applies in the broad
metaphysical sense (wherein the ultimate overflows to produce
less real stages which overflow repeating the same process in
turn)

Plotinus's soterology incorporates the doctrine of

"Epistrophe,"

namely the desire and attempted return of the

soul to that from which it ultimately came.
Plot1nus, Salvation

Apparently, for

is possible only among individual souls,

and possible to all individual souls.
Salvation, as Plotinus sees it, is essentially
involving three processes:

a technique

(l) catharsis, or purification

(morality); (2) dialectic, or the practice

or

the discipline

of philosophy; and, (3) illumination, or enlightenment ( Vu~trr. s)

---a

state of ecstasy wherein the soul finally comes into direct

communion with the One itself·
journey from soul

The way of Salvation is a

to mind to the One, the emanations are

re-

traced in the process so that the soul progressively realizes
its identity with the World-Soul, the Divine-Mind, and finally
with the One itself.
Salvation occurs in stages.
not

The stages and processes are

to be seen as distinct in themselves but rather as

ally flowing from one into the other.

grad~

They constitute a gl"adual

inclined plane rather than steps of a pyramid.

They are to be

interpreted not so much as a formal process entered into as they
are as

an informED. way of life, a prolomged and sustained

effort

to penetrate deeper and deeper into spiritual realities

of li_fe --- into
terms it•

11

fa1th in the unembodied11 as Plotinus himself

Affirming the existence of an ideal order and supra-

sensual reality, the way of Salvation is an introspective journey
away from the

wo~ld

of sensuous

reality into the world

of the

soul, and hence into the world of the mind until the journey
finally stops in the ecstasy of enlighment, the direct communion
of man as a soul with the Ultimate.

It is a shifting of the

center of our conscious attention away from matter to soul,

mind~

and spirit --- the focussing of our minds away from their own

mental processes to an awareness of divinity -in-general.
It seems to be the teaching of Plotinus that everyone is
capable of entering into the process of Salvation, although he

-66conceeds that all may not begin at the same level.

7

Plotinus

further grants that all may not use the same method in the
journey

towar~

union with the One.

He indicates three fundamen-

tal methods or temperaments that a.nply in the entrance
Salvation:

that of the musician, that of the

the philosophel" •

8

lover~

into

and that of

1. t•~'\.nyone not of the stra;.eth ·!;o lay hold of the first soul, that poss es sing pure intellection,, nnst grMp that whfoh hM ·l:;o do with ou'l'." ordins.ry
thinking and thenoe ascend: ii' cr1en this prove too hare, let him turn to
account; the sensitiv{j phase which carries the ideal fcnns oi' the less fine
degree , that phase whioh ~;oc:-: w:d;h its powers, is immaterial and lies
just" within the realm of' Ideal··prinoipleS'. One may even, if it seem necessary, begin as low as the reproductive soul and its very prcduc-!;ion and
thence make the ascent, mounting from those ultimalieideal principles to
the ultimates in the hi&her sensG, that is to the pri1nals. 11
V. 3o 9.
'~. • • in ours elves the relation to the Supreme--is not identical from soul
to soul; some of' us are capable of' becoming UrJ.ate, otliers of striving
and almost attaining, ·while a third rank is much less apt; it is a matter
of the degree or powers of the soul by which our expression is determined
--- the first d agree dominant in the one person, the s eoond., the third
(the merely animal lif'e) in others while, still, all of us contain the
powers • 11
IV• 3 • 6 •
t!..

~hod

..1Io"t"1 lie$ the oO:urse? IG· it alike .for· all.;··or ·is··'th'ert1' a:;~t
for oooh olMs .or temper~~'?

For all there are two stages .. of the path . . . . the first degree is the
conversion f'rom the lower life; the second, held by those that have already
lllade their way to the sphere of the Intelligibles., lasts until they reaoh
the extreme hold or the plaoe, the Term attained when the topmost peak of'
the Intellectual realm is won• • • •
We must begin by distinguishing the three types. Let us take the musioian
first and indicate his temperamental E}quipment f'or the task.
The musician we may think of as being exceedingly quick to beauty,, drawn in
a very rapture to it: somewhat slow to stir of his own impulse, he answers
~t once to the outer· st.im•11us: as the timid aro sensitive to noise so he
h0 tones and the beauty they conveyJ all "that off' ends against unison or
arruony in melodies a.."'l.d rhymes repels him; he longs for :t:?easure and shapely
Pattern. This natural tendency must be made the starting-point to suoh a
man; he must be drawn by the tone~ rhythm and design in things of' sense: he
must learn to distinguish the material forms from the Authentic-Existent

(continued on next page)

Art, morality, and philosophy --- all may encourage the individual along the journey toward the One for in them all there
is a certain catharsis, a pur11'1cat1on.

They all must be

con ·•
whioh is the source of all these correspondences and of' the entire reasoned
scheme in the work of' art:· he must be led to the Beauty that manifests-·
itself' through these forms; he must be shovm that what; ravished him was
no other than the Harmony of' the Intellectual world ·and the Beauty in that
spnere; not some one shape of beauty but the All-Beauty, the Absolut'e
Beauty; and the truths or philosophy must be implanted in him to lead him
to faith in that which, unknowing it, he possesses within himself. 'What
these truths are we will show later.
I. 3. l.

The born lover, to whose degree the musician also may attain ....... and then
either come to a stand or pass beyond --- has a certain memory of beauty
but, severed from it now, he no·-ionger compregends it: spellbound by
visible loveliness he clings amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall
down no longer in .bewildered delight before some one embodied form; he must
be led under a system or mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and made
to disoern the One Principle underlying all, a Principle apart from the
material forms, springing from another souroe, and elsewhere more truly
present. The beauty, for example, in a mble course of life and in an
admirably organised social system may be pointed out to him --· a first
training this in tbe lo11eliness of the immaterial --~ he must learn to
recognise the beauty in the arts, soienoes, virtues, then these severea
and partioular forms must be brought under the one principle by the explanation of their origin. From the virtues he is to be led to the Intellectual-Principle, to the Authentic-Existent; thence onward, he treads the
upward way.
I. 3. 2.
The metaphysioian, equipped by that very character, winged already and not
like those others, in need of disengagemnet, stirring of himself towards
the supernal but doubting of' the way, -·needs only a guide. He must be shown,
then, and instructed, a willing wayfarer by his very temperament, all butself.. direoted. Mathematics, which as a student oy nature he will take very
easily, will be prescribed to train him to abstract thought and to faith in
t~e U~anbodied; a moral being by native disposition, he must be led to make
his virtue perfect: and after the lrathematics he must be put through a
course in Dialectic and made en ~adept in the scienoe."
I. 3. 3.

-68followed by dialectics, however, so that considered categorica:"..l.-r
the three processes or Purification, Dialectics and Ecstasy still
obtain in any manner or the way of Salvation.
With this in mind, how, then, may we chart the course or
the soul in its journey in the various processes on the way to
The first Of the processes,

Salvation~

elemen~ary

act of self-purification.

0~rtharsis 1

is an .

It is a cleansing of the

mind (soul) from all things alien to its essential nature.
Purification in Plotinus is to be interpreted as an act of morality as if Plotinus were saying that Morality constitutes the
first. demand for Salvation.

The basic moral act, according to

Plotinus, is the turning away from sense to soul, from body to
mind.

Matter is evil and souls

nect1on with

have their defilement by con-

Any process of salvation must begin with the
9
the disassociation or souls from bodies.
~odies.

9. "Ir a. man has been immersed· in tilth or dnubed m'..th"zhud · his.'rlat!v~f
~liness disappears. ·ana· all that :ts seen is the ··toul sturr beemeari:;i.g· him:
w.s ugly condition is due to alien mati:;er "that has encrusted him.. and if he
is to win back his ·graoe it must be his business to scour and purify him..
self and make himself whit he was.
So, we may justly say, a Soul becomes ugly ---by something foistered upon
it,, by sinking itself into the alien, by a fa11;· a descent into body, into
Matter. The dishonour of the Soul is in its ceasing to"be clean and apart.
Gold is degraded when it is mixed With earthy particleSJ ii' these be work.ad out, the gold is left and is beautiM,, isolated from all that is foreign
gold with gold alone. And so the Soul: i f it is to be but cleared of the
desires that oome by its too intimate converse with body1- emancipated fr0m
all the passions .. purged of all that embodiment had thrust upon i'ti, with,,..drawn,, a solitary, to itself again .... in that moment the ugliness that eame
only from the alien is stripped away.
I. 6. 5-.
0

Self~pui:t1ticat1on, or morality at this ievel begins first
by

the beginning

of

the practice of ordinary moral life in the

sense of being a gdod citizen.

It consists of active emphasis

upon and participation in the natural 6r public virtues; called
by

Plotinus,

11

the civic

virtues~ 11

These are the same virtues

as the four cardinal virtues of Plato, namely, wisdom, courage,
temperance, and justice. (I. 2. 1)

These virtues alone are in.

.

adequate to lead the soul to the One but- they do serve an

elemen~

tary and practical function in the process.
Plotinus writes--or their value: "T"he Civic Virtues • • • are a prinoiple
order and beauty in us as long as vre ·remain passing our lii'e here:
they ennoble us by setting bound and measure to our desires and to our
entire sensibility, and dispelling false judgement --- and this by
sheer ef.f'ioaoy of the better:.1 by the very setting of' the bounds, by the
faot that the measured is lifted outside of the sphere of' the unmeasured
and lawless. And further; these Civic Vir~ues --- measured
ordered
tliems elves and aoting as a principle of measure to the Soul whioh is as
Matter
to their forming -·- are like to the measure reigning in the
overworld, and they carry a trace of that Highest Good in the Supreme •• ':
I. 2. 2.

or

and

Civic virtues,as Plotinus sees them , have some minor image of
the One in them but their function is lim~ted primarily to the
realm or sense, to the functioning of souls with bodies•

They

serve the value of restraining men from entering into vice, and

or

purifying them from

entering into evil action, but much more

than this is necessary for the attaining of Salvation.

As

Plotinus incidentally comments:
"· •• our concern is not merely to be sinless
be God."

I. 2. 6.

but to

-70Beyond the simple negation of sense, morality also involves
the positive affirmation of the ideal.

Following Plato, Plot:tnus

suggests that the Civil virtues are but. poor examples of a higher
order of virtues, namely these same sorts of virtues in their
more idealized or intellectualized form.

10

As the soul becomes more and more introspective, purification becomes more and more a matter of inner purity.

The civil

virtues, apart from intercourse with bodiesj become ideal virtues,
virtues in distinctive reference to the soul itself.
in effecting its morality, turns more and more

int~

The soul,
itself and

looks upon its own reason --- looks to the deeper purifying of
soul as soul.

By this Plotinus seems to be saying that morality

itself is more than a negative limitation of the power of body,

lo.
"To Plato, unmistakably, there are two distinct orders of
VJ.rtue, and the oivio does not suffice for Likeness: 'Likeness-·to God,'
he say;- 'is a :f'light from this world's ways and things': in dealing with
the qualities of good oiti.zenship he does not use the simple term Virtue
but adds the distinguishing word oivio:--and elsewhere he declares all the ·virtues without exception to be purii'ioations. ·-But in what sense oan we oall
the virtues purii'ioations,, and how does purifioation issue in Likeness? As
the Soul is evil by being interi'used with the body, and by coming to share
the body's states and to think the body's thoughts, so it would be good, it
would be possessed cf virtue,, ff it threw off the body's moods- and devoted
itself to its own Aot: the state of Inbellection and Wisdom; never allowed
the passions of the body to a.ffeot it: the virtue of Sophrosyne (temperanoe J
knS'i'J. no fear at the parting from the body: the virtue of' Fortitude (courage]
and if reason and I:rrl;elleotual-Prinoiple rules: in which state is Righteousness. [ justloeJ •
Such a disposition in tho Soul, become thus intellective
and lll'!Ilune to passion,, it would not be wrong to oall Lj.kene3s to <kid • • • • "
I. 2. 3 •

-71it is a positive affirmation
r1ze8 many of his ideas

or

the purity of soul.

He summa-

concerning morality as follows:

"The solution is in understanding the virtues and what ea.oh has to
give: - thus the man will learn to work with this or that as every
several need demands. And as he reaches to loftier principles and
other standards, these in turn will define his··conduot: ·ror exaxnple,
restrainli in its earlier form will no longer satisfy him; he will v.-ork
for the final disengaganent; he will live, no lon~er; the human life
of the good man --- suoh as Civio Virtue commends --- but, leaving this
beneath him, will tako up instead another life, that of the Gods,
For
it is to the Gods, not to the Good, that our Likeness must looka to
model ourselves upon good men is to produce an image of an image: we
have to f'ix our gaze above the image and attain Likeness to the Supreme
I. 2. 7.
Exemplar,"

The principle advocated here, under the

1dea or doctrine of

Purification is the appeal to the ideal order of mind and unity

over and against the satisfaction associated with bodies.

An

educational process takes place in the sense that the soul learns
to dis-like the sensuous and to appreciate 'the ideai and

beautiful.

ll

11. Plotinus oomment11: "Cur interpretation is that the soul-•-by the
very truth or its nature • by its affiliation to the nobleat Existents in
the hierarohy of' Being---when it sees anything of that kin, or any traoa
of' that kinship# thrills.mth an immediate delight, takes its own to itself;;
and thus stirs anew to the sense of its nature and of all its affinity."
_
I~ G. 2.
"He that has the strength, let him arise and withdraw into him·
self', foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever f·rom
t~e
material beauty that onoe made his joy. 'When he peroeivee those shapes;
0
graoe that. show in body, let him not r>ursue: He must know them for
~ 0 Pies, vestiges, shadows, and hasten away towards That they tell of.••
BLet us i'l ea then to the beloved Fatherland t: this is the soundest oouns el.
tut -·what is this flight? How are we to gain the op en sea? The Fatherland
0
Us is There whenoe we have aome., and There is The Father.
(oont. on next page)

-72Civic virtues and a love for the ideal finally will lead to
the third stage or level of Purification, namely, a rigid asceticism in which the:e is a complete disassociation of soul and
body.

Plotinus explains that this is more than a mere withdraw-

al from certain evil aspects of the body --- it is a flight of the
soul entirely away from the body and all sensuous desire.

cont.
What then is our course,, what is the manner or our flight? This is not
a journey for the feet; the feet bring us only from land to land; nor need
you. think 0£ ooaoh or ship to oarry you awayJ all this order or things
you must set a.side and refuse to see: you must olose the eyes and oall
instead upon another vision which is to be waked within you,, a vision,, the
birt~-right of all,, which few turn to use."
a
I. b. ~ •
11
And tfiis intter vision, what is its operation?
"
Nev1ly awakened it is all too feeble to bear the ultimate splendour. There•
fore the Soul must be trained--- to the habit or remarking, first, all
noble pursuits:, then the works of beauty produced not by the labour of
the arts but by the virtue of men known for their goodness: lastly,
you must searth the souls of those that have shaped these beautiful forms •••
Withdraw into yourself and look. lmd if you do not find yourself
beautiful yeb, aot as does the oreator of a statue 'that is to be made
beautiful: he cuts away here, he smoothes there,, he makes this line lighter
this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you
also. out away all that is excessive, straighten all that is orooked,
bring light to all that is overoast, labour to make all one glow of beauty
and never oeas-e chiselling your statue, until there shall shine out on
you from it the godlike splendour of virtue, until you shall see the
perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine••••
If the eye that adventures the vision be dimmed by vice, impure, or weak ,
~d unable in its cowardly blenching to sea the uttermos_t brightness, then
it sees nothing even though another point to what lies plain to sight
before it. To any vision must be brought an eye adapted to what is to be
seen, and having some likeness to it. Mever did eye see the sun unless it
had first become sunlike, and never can the soul have vision of the First
Beauty unless itself be beautiful.. Theref'ore, first let ea.oh become
godlike and eaoh beautiful who cares to see God and Beauty ••• "
I •.6. 9.

In so doing, all individual souls realize their identity
with the World-Soul.

Individual things lose their consciousness

of their particularity.

The Soul instead or seeing itself

as

distinct, an item of individuality such as a single soul with a
single body, sees itself as more truly but one overall soul unit.
As such, each individual soul is not a function of the World-Soul,
nor does £t in any sense "belong" to the World-Soul.

Each one is

distincj in itself apart from body or other souls, however, by
virtue of the interrelatedness of each soul with all other souls
the overall likeness or souls, one to another, may be
Altho~gh

see~.

they exist separately, all souls may be said to

~artalte

of the nature of the World..Sou1 and find their overal 1 id.entity

1n the fact that their similarity is greater than their dis•1m1lar1ty.

By this technique the soul comes to see its true

existence as soul by ridding itself of its illusion or its real-

ity as body.

It looks upon its own reason and attains its

highest purity within the process of its discovery or the nature

Of itself as soul, or soul•ness in general, and of the overall

likeness or all souls.
Purif1cation1 then, can

hel~

the soul to see itself as an

item of value apart from body, but it cannot in itself lead the
soul tosee its significance as mind.

By catharsis and an ulti-

~ate asceticism the soul of man may see its identity with the

World-SouJ.:

the Soul of the World, all souls in general, but

catharsis alone cannot lead man to the Divine -Mind or to the One'

-74In order to go higher, in order to attain identity with the Divine
Mind, the soul must turn away from itself
its attention upon the Divine Mind.
the second major

pro~~as

as an object and fix

In so doing it enters into

in the way of Salvation, namely,

Dialectics.

This second process is the science or philosophical inquiry,
the practice
world.

or

philosophical mevhod in the analysis or the real

It is not philosophy in general but the discipline or

method of philosophy.

Plotinus writes on this point:

"But this science, this Dialectic ••• what, in sunh is it?
It is the method, or Discipline, that brings with it the power of
pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things--what each is, how it differs fro~ others, what common quality all
have, to what Kind eaoh belongs and in what rank eaoh stands in ita
Kind and whether its Being is Real-Bing, and how many Beings there
are, and how many non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings_.
Dialectics treats also of the Good and the not-Good~ and of the
particulars that fall under eaoh, and of what is the Eternal and what
the not-Eternal.... All this accomplished. it gives up its touring
or the realm of sense and settles down in the Intellectual Kosmos and
there plies its ovm peculiar Aot: it has abandoned all the realm of
deceit and falsity, and pastures the Soul in the "Meadows of Truth:"
it employs the Platonic division to the diso~nment of the Ideal-Forms~
of the Au~hentic-Existenoe and of the First-Kinds (or Categories of
Being): it establishes, in the light of Intelleotion. the unity there
is in all that issues from these Firsts. until it has traversed the
entire Intellectual Realm: then. resolving the unity into the particulars once more, it returns to the point from which it starts.
I. 3. 41:.

He further writes directly concering the relation of dialectic
and philosophy:
"Is Dialectic, then, the same as Philosophy? It is the precious par"t
of Philosophy. We must not think of' it as the mere tool of the meta•
physician: Dialedtic does not consist of bare theories and rules: it
deals with verities; Existences are, as it were, Matter to it, or,

at least it proceeds methodically towards Existences, ead possesses
itself', at the one step, of' the 110tions and or the· realities •••• 11

I. 3. 5.
.
"Philosophy has other provinoes, but Dialectic is its preoious part:
in its study of' the laws of' the universe, Philosophy draws on DialeotiG
mu oh as other studios and or afts use Ari thmetio, though, of' oours e.,
the allianoe between Philosophy and Dialeotio is oloser, And in Morals,
too, Philosophy uses Dialectic: by Dialectic it comes to contemplation1
thpugh it originates of' itself' the moral state or rather the disoipline
from which the moral state develops • 11

Dialectics may be interpreted

as

I. S. s.
the soul's transition

from its introspection in which it sees itself as soul, and as

identified with the World-Soul, to its vision of itself' as mind.
The soul reaches the Divine-Mind by means of the practice
dialectics.

ot

This must be done gradually, even pa1nstakenly.

That

which is authentically mind is determined by critical analysis,

step by step and 'Process by process, involving every real thing
in the universe.

As the process develops into its .tulness the

soul ceases to see itself as an
Jm,tirely upon mind.
t\!O

~bJect

and fixes its attention

Plotinus explains that there are

essentiall~

phases within dialectics i (1) the process of rising to the

level of the intelligible from the level of the world of sense,
and (2) a further process of discip~ine that takes plaoe within

the intelligible ~orld after that sphere has been r eached.

Of

the three genex>al t¥Pes of me~ capable of' being saved, the musi•
cian , the lover, the philosop°her, the first two of these need a

more

thorough~going catharsis

than does the philosopher since

the Ph1losophe~ by nature will already have been disengaged from
the ~Owers of sense.

It would be well to point out in this

.

-··-

-

connection that the transition from catharsis into dialectics
----~

is not so much of the order of a clear-cut division or

tion of one phase from the other as it is of a gradual, even
conscious change.

·-~

...

disti:.~ct

-- --

~ub~

Typical of the thought of Plotinus is the

general doctrine of the gradual evolvement of one phase or stage
of a thing into its

high€~

or lower level as a flowing change

without specification as to the exact time of
level

~o

change from one

another.

Plotinus writes that dialectics is a science that makes

us

capable of reasoning about the nature of things in order to
determine their real values.

It involves such inquiries as the

similarities and differences of all things

one to another, their

overall unities and possible differences.

It concerns itself with

the meaning and determination of good and evil, of what is eternal
and what is transitory, and of the careful analysis and ranking
of all forms of being following after the One.

The appeal is not

to the senses, but to reason and pri~ciple evident within the
intelligible

world here and now.

Plotinus says that dialectics

employs the Platonic method of division to discern ideas and to
define objects in order to conclude the various kind

or

essences,

the correlation and systematizing of essences, and the final
deduction

or

various conclusions from the material presented.

To this Plotinus adds, however, that dialectics thereafter

re-

~er~es itself in order to point back in explanation to the One,
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the place from which it ultimately started.

When it arrives back

at the One it "rests" having no further need to busy itself with
a multitude of objects 1 having arr!ved at unity itself.
The ultimate object of dialectics is the One.

From an ob-

servation of the various mind-principles the soul realizes the
unity of the Divine Mind and that even it finds its unity in
12
something superior to itself.

·· 12. n ••. Cleared of all evil in our intention towards The Good~ we · •
must ascent to the :Principle within cu:f'.'selves; from many, we must beoome ones
only so do ·we attain to knowledge of tha·c 1;J1ich is Principle and Unity. We
shape ourselves into Intellectual-Primiple and set it finnly in That; thus
what That sees the soul will waken to s::ie: it is through Intelleotual-Prinoipl.e
that we have this vision of The Unityl it must be our care to bring over
nothing whatever from the sense; to allow nothl/ing even of the soul to enter
into the lntellectual-Principl e; with Intellect pure, and with the summit
ot Intellect, we are to see the All ...Pure. If the quester has the impression
or extension or shape or mass attaching to That Nature he has not been led by
Intellectual-Principle which is not of the order to see such things; the
aotivity has been of' sense and of the judgment following upon senset only
Intellectual-Principle can inform us 0£ the things of its scope; its compe•
tence is upon its priors, its content and its issue: but even its conte~t is
outside of sense; ~nd still purer, still less touched by multiplicity, are
its priors, or rather its Prior.
The Unity, then, is not Intellectual-Principle but something higher still: Intellectual-Principle is still a being
but that Firs'5 is no being but precedent to all being: it cannot be a"being
for a being has what we may the shape of its reality but The Unity is !ld.i.h-,,u-6
ah~pe, even shape Intellectual. Generative of all, The Unity is none of all)
neither thing nor quantity nor quality nor intellect nor soul~ not in motion.
~ot at rest, not in place, not in time: it is the self-defined, unique in
0
nn .. or, better, formless, existing before Form was, or :Uovanent, or Rest.,
a1l of which are attachments of Being and make Being the manifold" it is."
It
VI. 9o 3
-·
lf' the mind reels before something thus alien to all we know, we must take
~~~ stand on things of this realm and strive thence t~ see. But in __the look
th'l'.a.re of thawing outward; this Principle does not lie away somewhere leaving
1 e rest void; to those of power to reach, it is present; to the inapt, absent.
snlou~ daily affairs we cannot hold ari objeot in mind if we have given our•
e ves elsewhere, oooupied upon some other matter; that very thing must be
(continued on next pagE?)

rhe message of Plotinus is that Man as soul by means of the dia ....
lectio comes to ·See himself as mind.

Just as catharsis leade man

to see himself as soul and eventually to realize his
identity with the World- Soul

the dialectic

inherent~

leads him to see

his identity through soul with mind and leads him up to the point
of merger with the Divine-Mind.
number

Qf

times

1

As Plotinus

expresses it a

it is a process of arriving at

11

faith in the

unembod1ed 11 by means of a scientific study. The dialectical
will indicate1 as it progresses step by step8 that there
must be something of the order of mental life behind each level
~rocess

that ·1s discovered.

The

various things that exist in the uni-

verse are revealed to exist not in themselves but by virtue of
some

primciple of operation superior to the things themselves.
,411

Each level of probing for a cause will reveal a deeper and

11

mental" cause behind each particular stage of existence.

On

on

~he

moreand

dialectical process goes until nature of mind becomes.less

complex and more simple and intense in its nature.

Finally,

cont,

~~ro:~ us to be truly the object of' observation. So here also; preoooupied. by.
i e ll'0..'9reas or something else, we are withheld under that pressure from beoom-

ng aware or The Unity; a mind gripped and fastened by some definite thing oan.

n~t take the print of the very contrary. As Matter, it is agreed, must be void
~h quality in order to aooept the types of' the universe, so and much more must
't e soul be kept formless if there is to be no ini'ixed impediment to prevent;

~ being brimmed and lit by the Primal Principle. In sum, we must withdraw
tr~m all the extern, pointed wholly inwards; no leaning to the outer; the
i~ al or things ignored, first in their relation to us and later in the very
e ea; the self put out of mind in the contemplation or the SupremeJ all the
ao closely There that, if' report were possible, one might become to
0 ~~lllerce
era reporter of' that communion."
VI. 9. 7.

the top level of the dialectic is reached and process

ceases~

fpr
..

the soul has then entered into the third stage, the level of' en..
lightenment ,

illum~nation

and ecstasy.

There are two phases to this third stage of Salvation, according to Plotinus: (l) unity with the Divine-Mind, and (2)

unity with the One.

The first of these may be considered to be a

mental process, the latter nay not be so considered.

The first

of these is characterized by its flash of' 1ns1i;ht and understand-

ing of various mysteries --- the joy of' finding meaning.
last phase is characterized

The

by sheer ecstasy, a beyond meaning

union with deity---a state of being inebriated with deity.

i3·

13, "Intelleotual-Prinoiple, thus, has two powers, first tha·t· or.
grasping intellectively its own content, the s eoond that of an advancing and
receiving whereby to know its transcendent; at first it sees., later by that
seeing it takes poss es sion of Int ell eotual-Prinoiple, b eoorning Done \..Q..nly( thing
With that: the first seeing is that of Intellect kno·wi.ng, the seoond that or
Intellect loving; stripped of its v1isdom in the intoxication of the nectar,
it oomes to love; by this excess it is made simplex and is happy; and to be
drunken is better for it than to be too. staid for these revels •• •• In thia
seeing of the Supreme it becomes pregnant and at once knows what has oome to
be within itJ its knowledge o:f' its content is vihat is desh·nated by its
-.
lntelleOtion} its knowing of tho S~.p;.·eme is the virtue of' th~t power-'·.Within
it by whioh in a later (lower) atage it is to become "'Intellective."'
As for soul, it attains that vision by--.. so to speak---conrounding and annullthe Intelleotual-Prinoiple within it; or rather that Principle immanent
n soul sees first and thence the vision penetrates to the soul and the two
'Visions become one."
VI. 7. 3'5.

ing

-80The third stage is not an advanced level ot dialectics.
process which takes place after dialectics.

Movement

It is a
occur~

~.n

the first phase of it ( union with Divine-Mind) but does not
occur in the last phase

(union with the One).

Union with the

Divine- Mind occurs in the merger of the soul as mind with the
overall mind-principle of the universe.

In the final analysis

it is of the order of a revelation of the ultimate sameness of

all

me~tal

di~~dual

life.

It is more than a mere similarity of one in-

mind to another individual mind.

that the two minds are not two minds

It is the realization

but rather truly one and

the same mind.
In the beginning Plotinus argues the fact of man as a mind

must be granted.

He writes:

"Man••• must be some Reason-Principle other than soul.. But why should
he not be some conjoint--a soul in a certain Reason·Frinoiple---the
Reason-Principle being, as it were, a definite activity which however
could not exist without that whioh aots ••• ?
The higher man ... rises from the more godlike soul, a soul possed
of a nobler humanity and brighter perceptions.... The higher soul
enters to bestow a brighter life, or rather does not so much enter as
simply impart itself; for soul does not leave the Intellectual but
maintaining that contact holds the lower life a perdant from it,
blending with it by the natural link of Reason-Prinoiple to ReasonPrinoiple: and man, the dimmer, brightens under that illumination. "

VI. 7. s.
''But how oan that higher soul have sense-perception? It is the

perception of what falls under perception There, sensation in the mode
of that realm:. it is the souroe of the soul's perception of the
sense-realm to tho lowest extremity of its counterpart There, pro o eed•
ing from the fire Intellectual to the fire here whioh becomes perceptible
by its analogy vdth that of the higher sphere. If material things
~xisted There, the soul '\\'OUld perceive them; Man in the Intellectual.
l:J.an as Intellectual soul, -would be aware of the terrestrial. This is

how the seoondary Man, oopy of Wi.an in the Intellectual. oontairis the
Reason-Principles in copy; and W.lan in the Intellectual-Principle
contained the Man that existed before any man. The divinel" shines
out upon the secondary and the secondary upon the tertiary; and even
the lastest I'ossesses them all •••• "
VI. 7. a.

Although we must speak of man as characteristically a soul, it is
part of the wisdom of Plotinus to indicate that man 1 s soul-ness
may be ex.plained only in terms of his mind-ness. The first phase
of the third and final stage of Salvation

a~ man•s~a.1~.

of himself as mind. Such a discovery comes as a flash of insight
after the long process of dialectics,
the sense that an identity is seen.

ot man

as

more basicall7 mind than

Plotin~s by

It is an illumination in
The

11

rec~gnition

of the nature

soul11 is explained b7

mean of air1entation from the nature of Intellectual-

Principle in general.

Having este.bliahed the fact that all

14. He writes: "Being, thus. at once Collective Identity and Colleotiva
Difference. Intellectual-Pringipal must reach over all different things; its
very nature then is to modify its elf' into a universe. I:f the realm of .
different things existed before it. these difi'eront;. things must have modified
it from the beginning; if they did not,, this Intellectual-Principle produced
all, or rather was all.
Beings oould not exist save by the activity of Intellectual-Principle;
wan•
daring down every way it produces thing after thing,, but wandering always
"1ithin itself in suoh self-bound wandering as authentic Intellect may knOWJ ·
this wandering permitted to its nature is among real beings which keep paoe.
with its movement; but it is always itself; this is a stationary wandering,,
~Wandering within the Meadow of Truth from which it does not stray. It
°lds and covers the universe which it had made the space, so to speak,, of
1ta movement, itself' being also that universe whioh is space to it •••
(oont. on next page)

-82being is of the order of mind and that soul and life are of the

order of mindj facts which will be clearly indicated by dialecticsr
cont.
The Intellectual-Principle is the Intellectual Act; its movement is complete,
filling Being complete; And the entire of Being is the Intellectual Aot entire, comprehending all life and the unfailing succession of things. Because this Principle contains Identity and Difference i'lS division ia oeas elessly bringing the different things to light. Its entire movement is through
life and among living things .. u 11
VI. 7. 13.
"There is infinity in Intellectual-Principle sinoe, of its very nature
it is a multiple unity,, not with the unity of a house but with that of a
Reason• Principle, multiple in itself: in the one Intellectual design it
includes within itself, '11' th were in outline,, all the outlines,, all the
patterns. All is within it,, all the power& and intelleotions.
VI. 7. 14.
" ••• Intellectual-Principle becomes all things, knows that fact in
virtue of its self-knowing and at ono e becomes Intellectual-Principle, filled
so as to hold within itselr that object of its vision,, seeing all by the
light :f'rom the Giver and bearing that Giver with it. In this way the Suprane
may be understood to be cause a.t once of essential reality and of the knowing
or reality ••• "

VI. 7. 16.
" A first must transcend its derivatives; the giver transcends the
given, as a superior. If therefore there is a prior to actuality, that
prior transcends Activity and so transcends· Life. Our sphere oontaining
life, there is a Giver of Life, a principle of greater good,, of greater
mrth than Life; this possessed Life and had no need to look for it to
any giver in possession of Life's variety. But the· Life was a vestige of
that Primal not a life lived by it; Life, then, as it looked towards That
was undetermined: having looked it had determination though That had none.
Life looks to unity and is determined by it, taking bound, limit, form. But
this form is in the shaped, the shaper had non.a1 the limit was not external
as something drawn about a magnitude; the limit was that of the multiplicity
or the Life There1 limitless itself as radiated from its great Prior."

Plotinus further explains Illumination as the soul's awareness
of its own awareness of i·i.;s overall identity with mind.

15

I

As has

15. He writes: "But sinoe Thence come the beauty and light in all# it
ia Thence that Intelleotual•·Principle took the brilliance of the I~telleotual

Energy whioh flashed Nature into being; Thence soul took power toward life,
in virtue of' that f'uller l!fe steaming into it. Intellectual-Prinoiple was
raised thus to that Supreme and remains with it, happy in tha presence. Soul,
too, that soul whioh as possessing knowledge and vision was capable, clung to
what it saw; and as its vision so its rapture; it saw and was stricken; but
having in itself something o:f.' that principle i:b. felt its kinship and was moved
to longing like those stirred by the image of the beloved to desire the
veritable presence ••• ., By only noting the flux of things it knows at once
that from elsewhere oornes the beauty that floats upon them and so it is urged
Thither, passionate in pursuit of what it loves: never--..unless someone robs it
of that love-•-never giving i1p til it attain. There indeed all it saw was
beautiful and v eri table; it grew in strength by aeing thus filled with the
life of the True; itself becoming veritable Bein and e.ttaing veritable
knowledge, it enters by that neighbouring into oonsoious possession of wha' it
has long been asking."
VI. 7. 31
self~owing oomes to the knowing of all the rest of our being
in virtu_e or this thing patently present; or by that power itself communicating
to us its own power oi self-knowing; or by our become identical with that
principle of kno·nledge. Thus the self-knower is a double person: there is the
one thf\t takes cognisance of the principle in virtue of' which understanding
0 oours in the soul or mind;
and there is the higher, knowing himself by the
Intelledtual-Prinoiple with itiioh he beoomes id entioal: this latter knows the
self as no longer man but as a being that has become something other through
and through: he has thrown himself as one thing over into the superior order,
iaking with him only that better part of the soul whioh alone is winged for the
ntellectual Aot and gives the man, onoe established There.. the power to
appropriate what he has seen••• • A man becomes Intelleotual-Prinoiple when,
~gnoring all other phases of his being, he sees through that only and sees only
hat and so knov1s himself' by means of the s elf•·•in other words attains the
self-knowledge whioh the Intelleotual .. Prinoiple possesses."
v. 3. 4.
iln
"The soul therefore (to attain self•knowledge) has only to set this
p ~ge. (that is to say# its highest phase) along side the veritable Intelleotual•
0 ~~noiple which we have found to be identical with the truths constituting the
~ri ea~s of intelleotion, the world of Primals and Reality_: for his Int ell eotual•
R noiple, by very definition, cannot be outside of itself# the Intellectual
t~ality: self-gathered and unalloyed, it is Intellectual•Frinciple through all
th~ range of its being .. --for unintelligent intelligence is not possible·-and
on \ 1t possesses of necessity self-knowing, as a being immanent to itself and
a'l/ing for function and essence to be purely and solely· Intelleotualnoiple. tt
v. 3. a.
111
••• our

Pr;

-84been suggested the first phase of the last stage of Salvation

for Plotinus, namely, union

wit~

the Divine-Mind, is to be seen

as the soul as mind realizing its own identity with eternal truth.
In this process the soul sees itself as identified

with all that

is meaningful and steady by virtue to its real being as mind, as

an eternal participant in the overall reason principle of the

universe. ·Multiplicity md change are seen to be a part of body,
not of mind, the real essence of man.

There is satisfaction at

the realization that there is something in man that is of enduring

value.

16

Union with the Divine-Mind, or Illumination, takes ·-

~

lB. 11 ••.The Intelleotual-Principle must have,, actually has., self-vision,
firstly because it has multiplicity, next because it exists for the external
and therefore must be'<t seeing power,, one seeing,that externa:i; in faot,, its
'Very essence is vision. Given some external,, there must be vision; and if
there be nothing external the Intellectual-Principle exists in vain. Unless;
th.ere is something beyond bare unity, there cnn be no vision: vision muct
converge with a visible obj eat. And this which the seer is to see can be only
a 1;1Ultiple, no undistinguishable unity; nor could a universal unity find anyt~ing upon which to exercise any act.... J,n agent must either act upon the
extern or be a multiple and so able to 0.ot upon its elf: maldng no advance te'lnrds. anything other than its elf 1 it is mdtionless and where it could know
only blank fixity it C'.:ln know nothing. The intellective power, therefore1
When occupied with the intellectual act, must be in a state of duality, whether
on~ of the two elements stand actually outside or both lie within: the intellec U~l act will ahmys comport diversity as nell as the necess~ry identity,
~nd in the so.me way its ch~fracteristic objects (the Ideas) must stand to the
ntellectual-Principle as 6t onoe distinct and identioal.... There can be
~\intellection except of something containinc; separable detail ••• _ The
lllnl e~lectual-Prinoiple,, thus,, is informed of itself by the fact of being a
u tiple organ of vision, an eye receptive of many illuminated objects.
i~·~~imilarl:y the knowing principle itself cannot ranain simplex, expeoially
is d e act of self-knowing: all silent though its self-perception be,, it
Si Ual to itself.
Of course it has no need of minute self-handling
lyn)e it has nothDng to learn by its intellective aot; before it is (effectiveIntelleot it holds knowle~eof its ovm content. Knowledt;e implies
(continued on neict page)

ilace as an inherently meaningtul experience.
~eaning,

It is a coming into

an enlightenment in the sense that some understanding

:omes in reference to situations that were previously not meaning•
tul or understood.

There is a joy connected with it but it is

lot the same joy as the j9Y that occurs in union with the One.
1oy in the Divine-Mind is the jioy of discovery ---the discover1'

of meaning.

It is the joy of relaxation from human

struggle~

release from the tension of intellectual inquiry, and the sheer
Lntellectual pleasure of seeing experiences unified in meaning.

In it, there is no loss of identity and intellection
t~ke

place.

contin~es

to

The soul retains its own self-consciousness at the

same time that it is aware of its

identit~

and

interactio~

with

another entity seen as a larger value-whole.
The final phases of the third stage of Salvation aocording
bo Plotinus is an absolute union of the soul with the O~e·

This

union is not the same as the sort of intellectual union, describ~uch

ed above for it is a literal_ merger of two entities.
sunnnum bonum for man, the complete absorption of the

~oul

is the

into

cont.

~es~r~ for it is, so to speak, discovery orcmnhJg ' search; t~e utterly

l'ldirrer<?ntiated remains self-centered and makes no enquiry about that self:·
anythint; capable of analysing its content,, must be a manifold• er

v.

3, 10.

-86that which is its original source, a joyful reunion of that which

is not different in any respect.
Plot1nus describes union with the One in terms of sheer
ecstasy.

Such ecstasy is pure joy, positive and unmixed, above

reason, above beauty, and above any categorical conception of goodness.

It cannot be described as a process for there is no change

occurring at any time, no struggle, no relaxation, no movement of
any sort.

17

17. "Now it rests: instructed and satisfied as to the Beirgin that
f:>here, it is no longer busy about many things:·· it has arrived at Unity and
it contemplates: it leaves to another soienoe nll that ooil or premisses and
oonolusions called the art of reasoning."
I. 3. 4.
11

• • • the highest has come to her, or rather has revealed its
presence; she has turned away from all about her and made herself apt.,
beautiful to the utmost, brought into likeness with the divine---by those
preparations and adorning which come unbidden to thos a grov1ing ready for the
vision---she has seen that presence suddenly manifesting with her, for there
is nothing between: here is no longer a duality but a two in one; for, so
long as the presence holds, all distinotion fades: it is as lover and beloved
here, in a oopy of that union, long to blel1d; the soul has now no further
awareness of being in body and will give herself no foreign name, not man,.
not living being,. not being, not all; any observation of such things fall
away; the soul has neither time ~or taste for them; This she sought and This
she has found and on This she looks and not upon herself; and who she is that
looks she has not leisure to know. Once There she will barter for This nothing
the universe holds; not though one would make over the heavens entire to her;
than This there is nothing higher,, nothing of more good; above Thia there is
no passing; all the rest however lofty lies on the downtping path: she is
?f'
perf'eot judgement and knows that This was her quest, that nothing higher
19
• Here can be no deoeitJ vJhere could she oome upon truer than the truth?
and the truth she affirms, that she is, herself; but all the affirmation is
~ater and is silent. In this happiness she knows beyond delusion that she is
for this !s no affirmation of e.n excited body but of a soul become
all'appy;
.
iain what she v1as of old,-•offioe, povier, woe.1th, beauty, knowledge--- of
a 1 she tells her scorn as she never could had she not found their better,
(continued on next page)

What is the underl71ng thesis

or

Plotinue' wa7 ot SalvationY

cont.
linked to This she oan !'ear no disaster nor even know it; let all about her
fall to pieoes. so she would have it that she may be wholly with This. so
hu:;r the happiness she has 'WOn to."
VI. 7. 34.
"Suoh in this union is the soul's temper that even the act or
Intellect onoe so intimately loved she now dismisses; Intelleotion is movement
and she has no wish to move, she has nothing to say of this very Intellectual•
Principle by means of whioh she has attained the vision, herself made over
into Intelleotual•Prinoiple and beooming that principle so as to be able to
take stand in that Intelleotual space. Entered there and making herself over
to that, she at first contemplates that realm, but once she sees that higher
still, she leaves all else aside....
In this state of absorbed oontenplation
there is no longer question of holding an obj eot: the vision is continuous
so that seeing and seen are one thing; obj eot and aot or vision have become
identical; of all that until then filled the eye no manory remains."

VI. 7. 35.
"•••There were not two; beholder ·was one with beheld; it was
not a vision compassed but a unity apprehended. The man formed by this
mingling with the Supreme must·-·ii' he only remember•••Oarry its image
impressed upon him: he is become the Unity., nothing within him or without
inducing any diversity; no mo'V'ement now. no passion, no outlooking desire,
0 noe this ascent is achieved; reasoning is in abeyance end all Intelleotion and
even. to dare the word., the very self 1 oaught away. filled with God, He has
Perfect stillness attained isolation; all the being oalmed, he tums neither
~o this side nor to that, not even inwards to hims elf; utterly resting he has
eoome very rest. He belongs no longer to the order of the beauti:f'ul; he
~as
en beyond beautyJ he has overpassed even the ohoir of' the virtues J he
11 hke one who. hav:lmg penetrated the inner sanotuary. leaves the temple
~ages behind him·-· though these become onoe more first objects of regard
~en he leaves the holies; for There his oonverse was not with image. not
rth traoe, but with the very Truth in the view of whioh nll the rest is but
0
secondary oono ern.

:ia

l!I

is the life or gods and of' the godlike and blessed among
from the alien that besets us here, a lif a taking no pleasure
tne things or earth; the passing or solitary to solitary. n
••• This

i:n,, liberation

VI. 9e 11.

-88It 1s that the soul may come to see that it is divine.

When soul

is disciplined by mind, when it comes to function according to
the inherent stability of mind and the final unity of the One,
its way of self-control has reached its peak.
do no more to effect its salvation.

It can of itself

Then, it is that the final

insight comes, namely, the insight that the soul itself, through
its inherent identity with mind, is itself identical with the One.
Soul is itself divine, man sharee

which is the supreme value.

in his order a part of that

In a figurative sense, man is part

of the One; in a literal way , the One is a part of man.
The Salvation of Plotinus resolves, then, to a self-intellec•
tive process, an intellectual re-evaluation of the nature of the.
soul.

The ascent of the soul in its final stages is but a jour-

ney or the mind in its process of introspection, a journey that
ends in a final iilumination and merger of mental orders into a
pure unity.

There is no change in the fixed positions and re-

lations between soul, mind, and unity, and the soul remains in
its same order and with the same body that it has until the body's·
death.

Rather; it is the case that soul, by introspection, makes

itself over into mind, assumes to its highest extent its inherent

possibilities as mind, and so comes to reach its full mentality
until eventually it climaxes into the order

or

sheer unity itself.

~n this final ecstasy, Plotinus is convinced that

that there is a

passage from the level, or order, of intellectual harmony or

-89mental identity to a virtual merger with the One itself.
to say that the so called §._oul tg

Cn~

identity, in the final

analysis, is in reality not a soul to One identity
One identity.

This 1&

but a one to

'

A virtual union or merger with the One is possible

only because the soul ia itself but a part of the One.

There can

be complete identit;y or merger only among parts that are them-

selves completely the same in order.

It is the message of

Plotinus, derived through the mystical experience itself, that
man's most real nature, if he but knew it,

~

QQg Himself.

In its journey up the way of Salvation, the soul first cleanse~

itself, removes from itself all impurities.

Then, it devotes

itself to positive enterprizes, self-edification processes, and

eventually to careful mental discipline.

As a result of the

precision of the dialectical process the soul gradually comes to
have a new realization of itself --- a new opinion of the basis of

or

its inherent nature, a new opinion

destiny.

Yet, it is not,actually

1

its over•tll meaning and

the gaining of something new,

~ut the regaining of something once known but lost.

In its

purification processes it comes to see itself' as '"not body but
soul."
comes

In its realization of its identity with the World Soul it

to see itself as not an individual but a part of the whole.

In its identity with the Divine -Mind, it comes to see itself

as "not soul only 1 but also mind."

In its eventual union with

the One it comes to see itself as "not only soul and mind but

-90also the 0ne, n

In the case of its union with the World-Soul, the
·relationship understood is that of soul to Soul. In the case of

union with the Divine-Mind, the relation is that of mind to Mind.
In the case of identity of the hum.an soul with the One, the rela.bion that of one to One.

All three processes take on the form

of a religious experience---an identity of the soul with God,
which, in the final analysis is but the

self-reali~ation.,

of the

soul that it is itself a oart of God, and that without getting
beyond itself, it may know in actuality that.which is the Supreme
value in and of the universe:
Reality Itself.

it may so directly know Ultimate

In the most technical sense, soul must cease to

be characteristically soul', and mind must c·eaae to be o:qi;i.racter-

istically mind at the nrecise time of the one to One relationship.
Man must cease being man in order to become God:

it is impossible

to be characteristically man and God in the same instance.

18

18. "In our self-seeing There, the self' is seen as bellbnging to that
order, or rather we are merged into that self' in us whioh has the quality or
that order. It is a knowing of the self restored to its purity. No 'tloubt ·
we should not speak of seeing; but we oannot help talking in dualities, seen
and seer, instead of holding, the achievement of unity. In this seeing, we
neither hold an object nor traoe distinction; there is no two. The man is
changed, no longer himself' nor ssli'-belonging; he is merged .nith the Supreme,
s~nken into it, one with it: oentre coinoides with oentre, for on this
higher plane things thQt touoh are all one; only in separation is there
dun~ityJ 'B:9' our holding away, the Supreme is set outside. This is why the
Vision baffles telling; we cannot date.oh the Supreme to state it; if vie have
~en something thus detaohed we have failed of the Supreme 'Whioti is to be
ov.n as one with ours elves•"
VI. 9, 10
i

11

11

The soul in its nature loves God and longs to be at one with Him
the noble love of a daughter for a noble father; but corning to hiiman birth

(continued on next page)

Plotinus claims to have had such a self-identity with
divinity a number of times.

He writes:

11

Maey times it has happened: Lifted out of the body into myself
[note that he did not go out of himself but into himself] J becoming
external to all other things and s elf•oenter~ beholding a. marvel-

lous beauty; tnen" mere than ever, assured of' community with the
loftiest order: em.oting the noblest life, aoquiring identity with
the di~ina; statir.nlng within It by having attained that activity;
poised above whatE'oever within the Intellectual is less than the
Supreme • • • • 11 eto •
IV. 8. 1.

Again he argues that we could not know that which is above thought

unless it were like (or of the same order as) that which we have
within ourselves:
11

••• but this Entity
[The One, The Goodl transcends all of the
intelleotual nature; by what direct intuition, then, oan it be
~rought within our grasp?
To this question the answer is that we oan know it only in the
degree of human f'aoulty: we indicate it by virtue or what in
ourselves is like it. For in us, also, there is something of
that Being; nay, nothing, ripe for that participation, can be
void of it •••• 11
III. 8. 9.

The point :ta further defended in Plotinus' own explanation of

Qont •
.and lured by the courtships of this sphere, she takes up with another love,
a mortal, leaves her father and falls. But one day coming to hate her shame,
ahe puts away the evil of earth, once more seeks the father, and finds her
Peace•• ,. Thus v1e have all the vision that may be of Him and of ourselves;
but it is of a self wrought to splendour, brimmed with the Intellectual
light, become that very light, pure, boµyant, unburdened, raised to Godhood
or, better, knowing its Godhood, all aflame then.•••"

VI. 9. 9.

~his same ideal is borne out in the report of Plotinus last words.

Eltstoohiua,
. 1s Physician, reports that he said& 11 1 am striving to give baok the Divino
in myself' to the Divine in the All."
quoted by Porphyry, Life of' Plotinus,
p. 2, in the Maokemia translation, op. oi t.:; Vol. I., P• 2 . - -

--

--92the difference between the sort of union that occurs in the soul's

union with the Divine Mind (mind to Mind) and the kind that occurs
in the union with the One (one to One) :
" ••• since the souls are of the Intellectual, and the Supreme still
loftier, we understand that contact is otherwise procured, that is
by those powers which connect Intellectual ag .nt with Intellectual
Object; this all the more, sinoe the Intelledt grasps the Intellectual
object by tho way of similarity, identity, in the sure link: of kindred.
Material mass cannot blend into other material mass: unbodied beings
are not under this bodily limitation; the:i:r separation is solely that
of otherness, of differentiation; in the absence of otherness, it is
similars mutually present. Thus the Supreme as containing no otherness
is ever present with us; we with it v1hen Y1e put otherness away •••• u
VI,,. 9. 8.

It is to be emphasized that Salvation is purely something
that the soul does in and to itself.

Man, alone, begins the whole

enterprize, solely within his own initiative.

Every step along

the way, every development, every result, is something that man

does in and by himself to himself.

Thus, the way is a. technique

ot self-discipline and self-control that may enter into and works
out totally by his own powers.

There is actually nothing un-

natural, abnormal, or "numinous" about it: Man simply saves
himself.

19.

19

And what is the meaning of Salvation: what does it

"It is not that the Supreme reaches out to us seeking our communion:.

~e /eac? towards the Suprane: it is we that become present. We are always

a.~ ore it: but we do not always look: thus a choir~ singing set in due order
1 ~ut the oonduotor,, may turn away from that center to which all should attend:
~ 6,.it but f'aoe arigh~ and it sings with bea~ty,, present effectively. We are
but~ before the Supreme---out off is utter d1ssolut:i!on; we oan no longer be--•
err we. do not always attend; this is rest; this the end of singing ill:
-ectively before Him, we lift a ohora.l song full of God."
VI. 9. a. ·
"God---we read---is outside of none,, present unperceived to all;
(continued on next page)

mean to be saved?

Plotinus' answer is that it is the knowledge

that man is a thing of value: of Supreme value.

It is the real-

ization by means of ecstatic experience of the astounding fact
that the soul is a nart of God.

From this

a philosophy of life

may be deduced wherein man finds new courage to face the hardships
of this life.

Now he knows that there is some deeper meaning to

life than that which comes from routine obsefvation.

Now he knows

that there is some righteous destiny for the soul---that there ia
something of ultimate goodness at large within our universe.
knows,

and he knows most convincingly.

had direct experience of that value.

He

He knows because he has

20

cont.
we break away from Him. or rather :f'rom ourselves; 'V1hat we turn from we cannot
r~aoh; astray ourselves. we cannot go in sear oh of another; a ohild distraught
Wlll not recognise its father; to find ours elves is to know our source."
VI. 9. '1.
_20. iictinus writes:. "Our being is the fuller for ourtuirurg.•Thitheri
this is our prosperity; to hold aloof is loneliness and lessening. Here is the
aoul•s peace. outside of evil. refuge taken in the plaoe clean of wrong; here ·
!~has its Aot. its true knovdng; here it is immune. Here is living. the true:
t at of today, all living, apart from Him, is but a shadow., a mimiory. Life in
bhe Supreme is the native activity of Intellect; in virtue of that converse it
~ings forth gods., brings forth beauty. brings forth righ'heousness, brings forth
Wl.thmoral good; for of all these the soul is pregnant when it has been filled
it God.
This state is its first and its final. beoause from God it comes.
h s go~d lies There, and once turned to God again. it is what it was. Life
r~r; riith the things of earth. is a sinking. a defeat .. a .failing of the wing.
\ our good is There is shown by the very love inborn with the soul~ ••• the
80
Thu' 0 ~her than God but sprung of Him must needs love. So long·as it iG
ere, it holds the heavaiily love; here its love is the baser ....
or
Those to Wllom all this experience is strange may understand by way
re1 1:~ earthly longings and the joy we have in w~nn~ng to what we most desire--lov· ering always that here what we love is perishable. hurtful., that our
ing is of mimiories and turns av~y because all was a mistake, our good was
(continued on next page)

-

...... _

-94Salvation, then, is to know God ( either the One or possibly
the whole godhead of One, Divine-Mind, and World-Soul), to be in
touch with God ----to have an estatic experience (or· experiences)

as a convincing point o:f' reference as to the real existence o:f'
items o:f' true

(enduring?) value.

It is to know the Ideal exis•·

tentially to the extent that a new moralizing process begin.a to

Having known a new meaning of what is Good the so'tll.
.,....
attempts to re•educate itself into a new order, even striving to
take place.

be consistent with That order.

Such a system of salvation by means of sel:f'-discipline is

-

'

reminiscent o:f' the Raja Yoga, or science of the soul, of philosophical Hinduism.

Both Plotinus and Hinduism affirm the

in~

.

herent dignity of man and suggest away for the realization of
~

the self as God.

Both suggest a tyPe of religious experience
.

-

wherein a ll sel:f'•individuations cease in a complete merger of

'I' and 'Thou r into a 11Thou art Thou. 11 (\'That art Thou," in the
cont.
not here, this was not vvhat we sour;ht: There only is our veritable love end
There we may hold it and be with it, posses in it its verity no longer submerged in alien flesh. Any that have eeen khov1 what I have in mind: the soul
takes another life as it approaohes God; thus restored it feels that the
dispenser of' true life is There to see,, that now we have nothing to look for
bu~ far othervds e, that we must put aside all else and rest in this alone.
~his beoome, This alone, all the earthly environment done away, in haste to
be free, impatient of aey bond holding us to the baser, so that with our
. eing entire 've may oling about This, no part in us remaining but through
it we have touoh with God,"

VI. 9. 9e

-95Upanishads ) •

11

The One"

Upanishads is an

or "That One" (liQ; eka;m)

of the

inexpressible Absolube and exists as "The All11

without differentiation of

be1~

from non-being.

This is quite

similar to The One ot Plotinus with the exception that Plotinu.s
does attempt to explain its differentiation.

The Divine-Mind,

or First Principle ot Plotinus is quite similar to the Vedantic
"Ishvara 11 or Universal Mind.

World-Soul is similar to the

Hiranyagarbha or "resplendent germ" of the Upanishads.
It will appear, then, that the mysticism of Plotinus is a
rational mysticism in all but its final stege.
w~y

of lite

It is a rational

that culminates in certain rare instances in an

ultimately irrational sort of ecstasy.

All processes along the

way of Salvation: catharsis, dialectics,. and even union with
the Divine-Mind, may be termed essentially "rational."

Only

the summum bonum itself is irrational.
•.

Such, then, are the views of Plotinus concerning

Salvation~

Salvation on the human scene, and, as a matter of fact, salvation for everything that is a soul.

If religion may be. seen,

~n the final analysis, as a way of Salvation involving a

peculiar ontology, epistemology, and axiology, and resulting

a distinctive philosophy of life, we may take the above views

or

Plotinus to be his religion.

1n

,-

Chaptor IV
The Motaphysios of Augustine
'rho root conoopt in tho toachings

or

Augustine is 11 God. 11

God is the only genuine

Everything bogins and onds in God.

roal!ty. ·.·God is reo.l1ty. o.nd roo.lity ·1a Ge>d. · A1·1· things ·tho.t
have reality do so becauso God is either present in them or with.
thom.

God is rosponsiblo for the existence of the universe,

being its chief nnd only cause.

However, God can not be iden-

tified simply with the universe.

Neither cnn the universe be

identified simply with God.
from the universe.

.Go~

9xists in his own right apart

All tho.t o:nnea:rs to be real is not necessar--

1ly God, only that which may be extablished as genuine reality

cnn be identified directly with God.
Augustine's metaphysical system 1e toulded directly upon

his ~articular doctrine of God.

In effect, Augustine makes

ontology and theology one and the same discipline.

In the

strictest sense, God may not be said to be within Augustine's
system---Re is outside of it holding it together.1 As the

le "Indeed tho power of the Crea.tor and His omnipotent and nll•
ex~Y!ng strength is for enoh and every creature the oause or its continued
8
enoe; and it this strength wore nt aJ]r time to oen&e from directing
·
(Continued on next page)
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-97cause of all that has been made, he is not a part ot that which
is made.

He is a cause of the system, the

first-r.eq~rement

for

its existence, its source, its solidarity, its final meaning.
2

The universe was brought into being by an act of God.

•

God, not

cont.
the things whioh-have been created, at one and the same time both their
species would oease to be and their whole nature would perish • • • , Since
we are other than He, we are not in Him for any other reason exoept that He
oaus eel it, and this is His work, whereby He contains all things... • • And
by this disposition 'in Him we live and move and are' (Acts xvii, 28).
Whence it follows. that if this His working were withdr·awn rrom··things, we
should neither live nor move nor be."
··
De ~.!9 litteram,, IV, xxii, 22, 23, Translate<! by 'Sx"ioh Przywara. in·
Tn Augustine Synthesis, p., 117.
.
11
2. As in the seed there are invisioly and at one time all the things
vi~ch in oourse oi' time viill grow into a tree, so the universe must be o-onceivea - - sinoe God created all things at· 'fhe same""time--- as having had at
the same time-·all the things whion were made in it and with it,, when the dey of'
oi' ·creation oame, not only the hea'Y'ens with the sun and the moon arid the
stars, whose species remain in their retary motion, and the earth and the
deeps, which suffer changing movelllents. and joined together below produo e the
other parts of' the v.'Orld; but also those things whioh earth and water produce
potentially and causally, before in the course or time they oame into being
in the shape of' whioh they are now known to us in those works which God
•worketh until now•--(John v, 17)."
.
E!, Genesi ad litteram, v, xx iii, 45. Translation by Przywara, op.oit.,p.119.

.....

.

-~

"Of' all visible things, the ·world is the greatest: of all invisible,
the greatest is God. But that the world is, we see; that God is, we believe.
That God made the world, we oan believe from no one more safely than from
God Himself. But where have we heard Him? Nov.here more distinctly than in
the Holy Scriptures,, where His prophet sad, 'In the beginning God created
the heavens and the earth.' ( Gen. i, 1.)
Was the prophet present; when
Goa made the heavens and the earth? Not but the wisdom or God, by whom all
things were made, was there,, ( Prov. viii, 27) and wisdom insinuates itself into holy souls,, and makes them the friends of God and His prophets,,
e.na noiselessly informs them or His works. They-are taught also by the ·
angels of God who always behold the i'aoe of the Father.; {Matt.xviii, ·-ior·and
announce His will to 'Vthom it befits. Of these prophe·.;s v1as he who said and
·wrote, •1n 'fihe beginning God or eat ea the heavens and the earth.' And so fit
: Witness was he or God,, that the same Spirit or God, who revealed these ··
hings to him,, enabled him also so long before to predict that our faith also
would be· forthooming." De Civitate Dei,, XI, iv. Translation in Nicene
~~~·Nicene Fathers,Philip Schatt,""editor, Vol .. II. P• 206.
see also De Genesi ad litteram, VI, vi.

----

the universe 1s et.al'n.al,. ish.e only et.e.J'na.1 being.

which 1s 1 was, and always will be.

He is that

The world begins, and so

does metaphysics, as Augustine sees the situation, in God's
primal act of creation. The universe did not just happen.

It

was made, and there is reason, purpose, and end-in-view in its

making because it all comes from a source that has meaning.

As

genuine reality, or true reality, God may be considered as the
~ctual

reason, energy, power, force and meaning in and behind

all there is, the factual under-support of all that exists.

The whole of reality may be said to be within God.
God's chief attribute is his eternality.

3

He is that which

always was, is, and ever wil;t. be without any degree of change

whatsoever --- the only absolutely steady individual.

3. "Because therefore the Word of God is One, by whioh all things v1ere
made,, whioh is the unol'-:angeaole truth, all things are simultaneously therein,,
potentially and unohangeably; not only those things which are now in this
whole creation, but also those which have been and those which are to be.
And therein they neither have been, nor· shall be,, but only area ana all things
things are lite, and all things are one; or rather it is one being end one
lire. For all things were so ma.de by Hinl, that whatsoever was made· in them
was not made in Him, but was life in Him.
Sinoe, 'in the beginning~ the
Word was not made,, but 'the ·word was with God, and the Vford was God" and
all things were made by Him:• neither had all things been .made by Him, unleH
lie had Hilllseli' been before ~11 things and not made. But in those things
"'~ich were made by Him, even body, whioh is not life, v.'Ould not have been ma4e
by Him, except it had been l:Ue in Him before it was made. For 'that which
was made-·was already li.fe in· Him; t
and not lii'e of any kind soever: for
the soulalso is the life of the body, but this too. is made, for it is ohang••
able; and by whdi was it made,, except by the unchangeable Word ot God?
For 'all things were made by HimJ and without Him was not ati:{thing made that
Vias lllade.' 'What ther afore, was made v:aa alrendy life in Him:' and not acy
kind of lif'e., ·but •the life (v1hioh) was the light or men;
the light oer•
tainJ.y or rational minds,, by whioh men differ from beasts,, and therefore

-99Nothing in, on, or about God Himself evolves in any

respect.

4

Rather than being devoid of qualities, He is supremely rich in

He

them, the chief ones being His goodness, justice, and love.

is at least like the order of mind, existing in himself as a
unity, infinite, omnisoient, omnipotent1> and c1"eative.

positive being, his state being rich, intense, and noble.

He is a
He

ooiit.
are men.

(it was)
Therefore/not corporeal light, whioh is the light or the flesh,
whether•it shine from heaven,, or whether it be lighted by earthly fires;; nor
that of human f'lesh only, but also that or beasts,, and 'doml even to the minutest
or worms. For all these things see that light: but that life was the light of
men: nor is it tar from any one or us, for in··1t •we live, and move., and have
our being.' (Aots xvi, 27, 28.)" DeTrinitate libri guindeoim, rv, i,. 3.
Translation by Arthur West Haddan inNioene Fathers:-o '• cit • ., Vol. III, p.70
· 4e "'What is the same, save that which is? 'What is-°thatWhieh is? That
which is everlasting. ~r vJhat is always different at different times, is not,
because it abideth not. Not that it altogether is not, but is not in the
highest sense. And what is that whioh is , save He wno when He sent Moses,
said unto him, I AM WHO AM (Ex:od. iii, 'ii} ? " Eharrationes in Psalmos, CXXX,5.
Translation by Preywara:, op. cit. p.- 93.

--

"• •• for anything, whatever in short be its exoellenoe, if it is changeable, does not truly exist; for there is no true existence so far as ohanged,
is not that which was: if' it is no longer what it was, a kind of death has
therein taken place; something that was there has been. eliminated,, and atlsts
more • • • • Whatever changes., and is what it vias not. I see there a kind ot
re in that whioh is, and death in that ir1hioh was • ••. Sift the mutations of
~ings, thou wilt find WAS and WILL BE: think on God., thou wilt find the IS,
ere WAS and WILL BE cannot exist." In Joannis Evangelium traotatus.
XXX'VIII, lo. Translated by John Gibb an"d9James Innes in Nioene Fathers,
0
.£.:. ~·· Vol. VII, P• 220.

U

"God always is,, nor has He been and is not,, nor is but has not been, but
De Trinitate, XIV,, xv.
;s He never will not·oe: so He never was not."
ranslation by Przywara., .2• ~·" p, 97 •

-----
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1worporates a fundamental holiness in the whole ot his order.
being ot the highest righteousness and dignity.

The qualities or attributes of God occur in or with him in
their sunreme state

the qualities

o~ ccou:t>::·er..~e.,

ths:rr.sel.~:es

the limited level ot: h..m1an

ocm,_'.'J'.' ~.. n

It 5.s
E.

'='.

situat:J.on in which

3t:n.to cf.' intensity beyond

comprehension~

The c9.so is not that

"qualities" are inadequate to describe God's na.tru.--e., but rather

that there is a lack of human capacity to realize the infinite
character of the qualities that God possesses.

God's qualities

never change in any respect; but man's awareness of them may do so.
Te~hnically,

.5

nothing.

according to Augustine, the world begins in

All reality other than God came into being out of

.
nothing for there was absolutely nothing existing before it out

ot which it was made..

God ma.de both the matter of the universe

as well as the forms of the universe, and made them both out of

s. "That out of' which God has created all things is what possesses
neither species nor :f'onn; and this is nothing other than nothing. For that
which in comparison with completed things is oa'.'J.ed formless, is_. if' it have
ally i'orm however slight, howeve:r inchoate~ not quite nothing, and oonsequGntly
this also, in so far as it is, is only from God., Wherefore, even if the
~iverse was oreated out of some :formless ma·ater, this very matter was oreat-ed
bro111. sornething which vms wholly nothing. l'br that which is not yet fanned_.
! ut is nevertheless in an inchoate state, so that it oan be given form. is
t~rmable by the goodness of God; for it is a good to have form. Consequently
e ca.paoity to be formed is also some good. Hence. the Author of all good.
~~o gives the f'orm,, also gives the power to receive the form. Thus everything
h ~t is. in so far as it is,, and everything whioh not yet is. but which can be,
0
'l ds this from God .... m
De vera religione libri i, xviii, ss.. za.
ransiation by Przywara,, op. OI't., P• 122.
See also7 Confessiones,, XII

--
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absolutely nothing --- all by his divine fiat.

Anything short

of the making of both matter and forms would fall short of actual

creation and be only the arrangement of that which would logically
demand a still more prior creation.

God ia the ultimate source

of the existence of everything that exists.

Be7cnd such a

eonce~t

of ultimate beginning only nothingness could occur.
The world not only came into being by an act of God, it is
sustained in its ordered condition by God.
girding or

over-reach~ng

It is God's

under-

support that keeps the unjverse as it

i~.

Without this sunnort, that which is real would immediately lapse
into nothingness.
6
creation.

The Creator is ever behind the world, his
-.

Creation is predominantly an act or an event.
process occurring within an event.

It is a

The six days in which God

created the universe, as recorded in the book of Genesis, are
to be treated as six episodes or eras occurring within the orie
creative event.

All creation took place

11 :1.rt

the beg:lhn1ng• 1 ~

Nothing is created now 1 although that which was formed potentially
in the beginning can come to be realized in its actual manifestation in the due course of time.

7

6. See footnote # l.
"For it is one thing to make and administer the creature from the
1
Gonnermost and highest turning-point of' causation, which He alone does who is
1 d the Cr ea.tor; but quite another thing to apply some operation i'rom without
n Proportion to the strength and faculties assigned to each by Him, so that
(continued on next page)
7.
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-192Creation~- does

not ooeur- within" time.

It ocours "in the

beginning,, 11 that is, at the time at which time began.,
world exists in time., but it was not created

~-n

the world will pass a'iay.

The

time for time

was created along with t!le world when lt wafl c:-.:-en.t ed.

itself a creation, a creat'..1!'e ·>

8

Time is

It once came ·t;o be and it,, like

From Augustine's -poi:1'i:i of -view

continuity is not the primary concern in creation.

1

time•

The main

cont.
"1hat is oreated may oome forth into being at this time or at that, and in this
or that way. For all these things in the way of origin and beginning have
already been created a kind of texture of the elements, but they rome forth
when they gab the opportunity._ For as mothers are pregnant with young.. so
the world its elf is pregnant with the oaus es of things that are born; whioh
are not created in exoept from that highest essence. where nothing either
springs up or dies,. either begins to be or ceases." De Trinitate, libri xv,
iii, 16. Translation by Haddan in ,?Jic~ Fathers, ~:-oit., Vol. III. p.62.
"But, in truth, somme hidden.seeds of all things that are born
corporeally and visibly, are oonoealed in the corporeal elements of this
world. For those seeds that are visible now to our eyes from fruits and
living things, are quite distinct from the hidden seeds of those former seeds;
trom '\'hioh at the bidding of the Creator, the water produoed the first
living creatures after their kind. (Gen. i.20-25).
For neither at that
time were those seeds so drawn forth into products of' their several kinds,
as that the power of produotion was exhausted in those products; but oftentimes. suitable combinations of circumstances are wanting, whereby they may
be enabled to burst forth and comp:.ete their species,, •• :lFor the Creator or
these invisible seeds is the Creator of all things Himself'; since whatever
oomes forth to our sight by being born, receives the first beginnings ot its
course from hidden seeds, and takes the successive increments of its proper
;ize and its distinctive forms from these as it were original rules." De
1ni tate, libri xv, iii, 8. Translation.. Ibid., P• 60
ugustine would say, for example, that an airplane or the Hydrogen Bomb was
~re~ted •in. the beginning." Everything that comes to be was created in the
eginning ~ut its aotual formation waits until its ooourenoe in time.
ti
a. "For if' eternity and tiltla are rightly distinguished by this, that
th~e d?es not exist witho\ t some movement and transition, v:hile in eternity
notre is no change, who does not see that there could have been no time had
aome creature been made, which by some motion could give birth to change,
{continued on next page)

fu

point in creation is the fact that it is something that God does.
"Primacy

11

seems to be more of a key to his thought about creation

than does "continuity" or"routine. 11

9

11

In the beginning " for

him means "foremost in rar..k, orde::> _, or ce:1.1snli t7 ,,!!

The beginning

of time is only of a secondary concern,, having irn:portance only
.•

cont.

··-the

various parts of which motion and change, as they cannot be simultaneous, sucoeed one another.,-·-and thus, in these shorter or longer intervals
of duration,. time would begin? Sinoe then, God, in whose eternity is no
change at all, is the Creator and Ordainer of time, I do :cot see how He can
be said to have created the world after spaces of time had elapsed, unless:
it be said that prior to the world there was some oreature by whose movement
time could pass.
And if the sacred and infallible Scriptures say that in
the beginning God created the heavens and the ea.rth, in order that it may be
understood that He had made nothing previously, for if He had made aeything
before the rest., this thing would rather be said to have been made 'in the
beginning., ' --- then assuredly the v1orld was made., not in time., but simul tan•
eously with time."
De Ci vi tate Dei, xi, 6. rranslation by Dods in
Nicene Fathers, op. cit-:; Vol .. IL p:-"2oa.
9. 11 God, Whom-a!l things serve, that serve, to whom is compliant every
Virtuous soul. By whose-laws the poles revolve, the stars fulfill their
oourses, the sun vivifies the day, the moon tempers the night: and all the
framework of things, day after day by vicissitude of light and gloom., month
after month by waxings and wanings of the moon, year after year by orderly
successions of spring and summer and fall and winter, oycle after oyole by
accomplished ooncurrences of the solar course, and through the mighty orbs of
t~ine., folding and refolding upon thans elves, as the stars still recur to their
first conjunctions, maintains, so far as this merely visible matter allows,
the. mighty oonstanoy of things. God, by whose everduring laws. the stable
motion of shifting things is suffered to feel no perturbation, the thronging
course of circling ages is ever recalled anew to the image of immovable quiet:
by whose laws the ohoioe of the soul is free, and to the good rewards and to
the evil pains are distributed by neoessi ties settled throughout the nature
0
1' everything. God, from whom distil even to us all benefits, by whom all
evils are withheld from us.
God, above whom is nothing, beyond vhom is
~othing, without whom is nothing. God., under whom is the whole, in whom is
The whole, and ;.vi th whom is the whole .... "
Soliloquiorum., libri ii, I, i,4.
Vranslation by J ,hn Gibbes and James Innes in Nicene Fathers., op. o"ft.,
01 • VII., P• 538.
-

-ro4in reference to the hiat0'!7 of man and the universe, and not
applying 1'l any significant way to God, who :ts eternal"

has meaning only in reference to the b.isto::.-y o:i:>

individual created

Time

c~nttm'.1.lty

of.

things~

Augustine is not so int;eresi;ed in t1;e rnutine cf IJl"eation
as He is in the f'act .')f creation..

ning of things • 11

C:reat:ton :1-s s:trr~ply "the

begin-

When thinking of' the b eginn:i.ng of t.hings

we

must go back beyond their actual occurrence in time as an individual existing thing to their ultimate beginning ln the w:tll of
10
God.
Creation is the ultimate beginning or origin of all
things (other

than God) in God's primal act of creation.

This

10. "When anything is to oome 'into being.. is an eternal in the word of'
God, and it oomes into being at the time when 'it ought to oorne into being, 'it
is in that Word .. in which there is no then and sometime, sinoe this Word in
its entirety is eternal. 11 De Genesi ad l i tteram, I, ii, 6.
Translation by
Pr eywara .. .2.E,• ~ ... P• 113~·
" ••• the will of God., 'who ma.keth His angels spirits, and His
ministers a flaming fire,' (Ps. oiii. 4) presiding among spirits which are
joined in perfect peace and friendship, and oombined in one will by a kind
of spiritual fire o:f ohari ty,, as it were in an elevated and holy and seoret
seat, as in its o'l'Jll house and in its own temple, theno e di ffus 00- its elf through
al~ things by certain most perfect:y ordered mo"Vanents of the oreatures; first
spiritual, then corporeal~ and us (:)5 all according to t:he unchangilable pleasure
of ~ts own purpose, whether incorporeal things or things corporeal .. whether
rational or irrational spirits, ~hethe~ good by His grace or evil through
~?eir own will.- • .,.
And so it comes ·to pass that the will of God is the
Tl.:s~ and highest cause of all oorporee.l appea.ra.noes and motions."
Da
12...~~~ libri quindeoim, III, iv, 9
Translation by Haddan in Nio"ene Fa.them.
0 ~... Vof • III. p;,58"
..!•

"The proposition holds that that which came into being through Him
1
'as to be understood as being life in Him., in vhich life He saw everything when
\made it; and as He saw it, so He made it: not seeing anything exoept Him•
sietr,
He enumerated in Himself all the things that He ma.de.. " De Genesi ad
l te
~"
V, xv, 33. Translation by Przywara, 22.."· 2..!.!•1 p .. 112.
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occurred for all things in the universe in the- samo. primal
creative event " in the

beginning~"

All things were created "in

the beginning11 in God's six era.a of creative actty:'V..:7 ( in one
event) in the sense that the fundamental order of all items of

being was determined altogether in the one,
event.

Augustine does not suggest

ancient~

creative

that we take the Genesis

story literally, with the consequent imolication that everything
in the universe always has been as it now is since
He

creation~

rather suggests that in it there is the figurative meaning

that the world ultimately begins (began) in an act of will on

the part of God in producing everything potentially in both
matter and form, that is to be-realized actually in some individ•
ua1 form in due time.

The fundamental principles or "seeds" as

he calls them ( ratlones ~eminales, rational principles)

determined

are

in creation in the beginning and individual things do

not alter from their seed principles.

Creation is to be thought

ot more in terms of design and basic functioning principle, the
beginning of the ultimate principle of a thing~ than it is in terms
terms

of the specific

occurrence cf a thing in time.

for Augustine, means that the

11

Creation,

seeds 11 or rational principles of

all things that exist were made along with all

11

spiritual matter"

and spiritual beings in both matter and form and all brought
into a meaningful pattern and ordered arrangement by activity

-io6..
on the part of God a:s Iidgos '*in the begihningiii

In no

sense may

out of God.

the universe be thought of as devel0ping

It is not an overflow of God nor any automatic

exnression dr division of God.
world,

Although God is the cause of the

did not of necessity come out of him.

1~

ll

lr..Qm God but it is not

or

God.

The world came

It came out of nothing.

Since

the created universe and God are two separate things there
need to speak of one as being a part of the other.

is no

Perhaps this

.
u.· "Just as in that seed there were together {simul) invisibly all the
things whioh would in time develop into the tree., so the vJorld its elf is to
be _thought to have had. together---sinoe God oreated all things together---all
the things whioh were made in it and with_it when the day was made. not only
the heaven with the sun and the moon and the oonstellations ••• and the earth
and the abyss es•. ~but also those things which the water and earth pro duo ed
Potentially and dausally. before they shold arise in the oourse of time in the
'l'lay vie now know them, through those operations whioh God carries on even
till 'now." De Genesi ad li tteram. V, 23. ·· Translation by William A. Christian.,
in an artioleenti tled-wAurustine on the Creation of the 11orld.," in Harvard
~eological Review., Vol. xLVI. no. l {January, 1953)., P• 16.
«That whole ordinary couree of nature has what one might oall
its own natural laws., aooording to \'.l:ioh even the spirit of life., tmioh is
a 0 reat ed thing., has what one migM oall its own appetite~ determined in
sorne way., so that even the evil will oannot go beyone them.
And the
elements of this oorporaal world have their established power and quality,
defining hov1 much eaoh one rd.11 flourish or not. and what may or may
ft arise• so eaoh in its ov:n time and of its own kind., they enter upon
Ghetr. comings forth and progressions and limits and d eoreasings."
De
__ene~ ad littetam; IX, 17.
Translation, Ibid., P- 17.

-

.

-
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//~
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I

WORLD

\

'~
The world can .never be identified simply

12
v1orld are two dif.:f'erent "things." :

with Ubd ~br God and ·ifue

Yet, the reality

~off.I

1hfu

12. " ••• if God is the soul of the world, and the world is a body to
Him, who is the soul, He must be one living being consisting of soul and body.,
and that this same God is a kind of womb of nature containing all things in
Himself', so that the lives and souls of all living things are taken, aooording
to the manner of enoh one's birth, out of His soul v1hioh vivifies that whole
tnass, and therefore nothing at all remains whioh is not a part of God. And
if this is so, who oannot see what impious and irreligious consequences f'ollow,
suoh as that whatever one may trample, he must trample n part of God, and in
slaying any living creature,, a part of God must be slaughtered? But I am un•
Willing to utter all that may occur to those who think of it, yet cannot be
spoken without irreverence. But if they contend that only rational animals.
~Uch as men,, are pnrts of God, I do not r enlly see hov:, if the whole world is
od, they oan separate that? Concerning the rational animal hims elf,,---that
m~n·••what more unhappy belief oan be entertained than that a pa.rt of God
bs whipped when a boy is whipped? ;'md who, unless he is quite mad, oould
. ea: the thought that parts of God can b eoorne lasoi vious, iniqui tious,
~lllPJ.ous, and r:1ltbgether damnable? In brief, why is God angry e.t those who
C~ ?0 t worship Him, sinoe these offenders are parts of Himselr ••• 211
De
_vitate Dei, IV,, 12,, 13.
Translation by Dods, in Nioen.e Fathers, ~·$.Vol.. II, P• 71.

is,

L

-lo8world lies in the immanence of·-God within it. 1 3 Value in the
world is by virtue

of a richer connection with that which is

more like the nature of God, and ultimately by direct connection
with God himself.

·In the relation of God and the world there

is an identity of causality without an identity of content.

Even though the world does not rise out
the world is still rigidly ·determined by God.
exists in every place does so because

Go~

may

Ef..

God by necessity,

Every thing that

has desired that it

should be as it is and where and when it is.
there is has

or

Everyt~ing

that

meaning within the mind of God, even though man

not be able to see it,.

Most items in the created order have

no possibility of changing themselves from their fixed patterns
and routines of life, but the higher creaters, men and angels,
possess a freedom to will and to act according to their own
decisions.

Both men and angels can sin, that is, they can

refuse to act according to their predestined plan for their
particular lives and histories---they can refuse to follow the
plan that they should follow.

Not only does God have a plan

for all particular things. he also has knowledge of how the
"treeIt creatures are going to choose at each future time when
they, -.under their own free will, make their actual decisions.

th h 13. "I beheld all other things that are beneath Thee, and I saw that
Th: had neither any absolute being, or that they had absolute no b~ng at all.
be not ave a being because they- are of' Thee; and they have no being because thfV
Con:r ~ha.t whioh Thou art. For that truly is, whioh doi?h immutably remain "
-.;;;,:_ession~ libri tredeoim, vu:, xi, 17. Tr., Preywara, op. oit., p. 123. •

--

l
j
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II
~ngels

Augustine.

are the second major

1t~m

fn the

meta~hysics

After Gods they rank next l:U.gheat in order.

are n:ot in any sense equal with God.

of
Angels

They are not co-eternal

with God although they are everlasting.

They are creatures, they

were created by God, yet they do not share in the temporality of
the world in the sense that they will ever nass away.

They are

special creations or a special order different from the exact
nature of God, the world , matter, man or souls.

They exist in

their own order with their own special natures created as such
by God.

Angels are the first of God's creations both in rank and in

order of creation.
11

They came into being by the very pronouncement

Let there be light 1 11 and are to be identified with both the

scriptural ideas of

n day 11 and

11

light."

l4

They were both

14. ttThe angels therefore existed bef'ore the stars: (Job xxxviii~ 7)
and the stars were made the f'ourth day. Shall we then say that they were
!!lade the third day? Far from it; for we know v1hat was made that day.
The earth was separated from the water1 and eaoh element took its own
distinct form, and the earth produced all that grows on it. On the second
day, then? Not even on this; for on it the firmament v1as made between
the viaters above and beneath, and vias: called •Hea~en,' in which firmament
the sters were made on the forth day. There is no question, then, that if
the angels are included. in the ?.Orks of God during these six days, they
are that light which -was called 'Day,' and whose unity Scripture signalizes
~y calling that day not the 'first day,• but •one day.' Fbr the second day.,
he third, and the rest are not other days; but the same •one' day b
~eated to complete the number S'ix or seven, so that there should be
'l'iledge both or God •s 'V.()rks and of His rest.
Fbr when God said, 'Let
there be light., and there was light t ~ if we are justified in understanding
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created and formed at the same instance, coming into form out of
formless matter by the expression of the

~ord

of God.

Because

of their close connection with God they share directly in the
wisdom and knowledge of God.

Their formation is due to their

direct illumination. by the Logos,, for illumination by the Word of

God 1s itself fern gi·1ing. ·Like a light shining on ohosphorous
material, the Word of God, the Divine Logos, deflects itself upon
formless matter, so that it takes on a radiance akin, more than
anything else created, to the order of God.

It is as if God

were radioactive, and having become associated with formless
matter, caused4it to take on a degree of radioactivity.

The

directness of the relationship between God and angels accounts for
their more holy

orde~

and superior condition as a created thing.

15

cont.
in this light the creation of the angels, then certainly they were orea.ted
Partakers of the eternal light v1hioh is the unchangeable Wisdom of God, by
which all things viere made, and whom ·ne oall the only-begotten Son of God;
so that they., being illumined by the Light that created them might themselves
beoome light nnd be oalled 'Day,' in participation of that unchangeable Light
and Day which is the Word of God, by whom both th ems elves and all else were
lll(ade, 'The true Light, whioh lighteth every man that oometh into the world.,
John l, 9)---this Light lighteth also every pure angel, that he may be light
not in himself, but in God; from V!hom if an angel turn away, he. becomes
i~pure, as are all those who are called unclean spirits, and are no longer
1
gh~ in the Lord, but darkness in themselves, being deprived of the partio•
1lat1on
of' Light eternal."
E_! Civitate ~ XI, 9. Translation by Dods;•
.:...10 ~ Fathers, ~s oit., Vol. II, p.210
i
15.
· Likewise has Thou said to me# with a strong voice, in my
T.nner ear, that oreature, v1hos e will Thou alone art, is not co-eternal unto
dhee, and v1hioh,v1ith a most persevering purity drawing its support from Thee,
both, in plaoe and at no time, put forth its own mutability; and Thyself
eing ever present with it, unto ·whom with its entire affection it holds it•
~el!', having no future to expect nor conveying into the past ·what it rememereth, is varied by no ohange, nor extended into any times." Conf'essionum
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Although the inherent· -nature of angels 1e mutable

it is

made less mutable by their direct association with the Word of

God. This is why angels, as created things 1 may be everlasting.
They can, however, suffer change and are free beings, their
freedom being more assured by closer connection with God.
Although they are

everlasting, that is exist with time and

beyond time, they are not themselves conscious of time.

them there is no worry, no striving, no goals, no

Among

su~erior

and

inferior states of consciousness.
Angels possess both bodies and souls.

Their bodies are

unique bodies, existing in greater obedience to their souls than

human bodies in obedience to human souls.

Augustine speaks about

the difference of the bodies of angels from the bodies of men, and
also, ot the difference of the souls of angels from the souls or

men, at various times in his writings.

Angels have bodily

senses superior to those of the human body.

Their sense or

perception is so very keen that perception in man does not begin
to comnare with it.

When angels appear to men they have the

ability to assume a sort of body that is perceptible to man,

sometimes being mistaken for a human body.

Augustine states that

cont.

~ ~redeoim. XII, xi,
lt., o1. 1. P• 178.
u

12.

Translation by Pilkington, Niaene Fathers.

also

~·

·

t For •• He who in the beginning created the vorld full of all visible alld in•
delligible beings • • • created nothing better than those spirits whom He en-

~~ed vrith intelligence, and made capable of contemplating and enjoying Him.••
D in which the materiel of their 6uatenauoe and blessedness is God Himself •
...! £!.!itate ~ .XXII, 1. Tr. by Dods, Nicene Fathers, 2.E.•.2!!•• Vol.II, p.479.

-112there is a difference in the matter

or

angels and the matter of

th~

16;

the firmament, or earthly matter and may be termed "spiritual."

,

He also clearly states that the form of heaven is not the same
form as that of earthly form.

From this the conclusion would log-

ically follow that the form and matter of angel bodies differ from
the form and matt er o.f human bodies.

It will also appear to be

the case that the form and matter of angel souls difi"er 1n

from the form and matt er of human souls.

the form

or

order

Augustine asserts that

souls is always different from the form of bodies.

also makes quite a

~ifference

in the condition

the heavenly order and matter 1n earth.

or

He

matter in

Since he established a

parallel between human body and human soul and the case of angel
body

and angel soul, indicating, among other things, the superior

allegiance of angel body to angel soul, the final result of the
general comparison of angels and men in this respect would appear
to be a rather complex

collection 0£ a number 0£ items each

differing in kind from the other, namely: angel souls with their
special form and special sort of matter, angel bodies with their
unique

form and unique matter, human souls with a form different

16. In De Genesi ad litterum, IV. 2~Augustine explains the creation of
light in terms-Or the fonnation of spiritual matter. Since he has already
i~entified the creation or angels with the creation or light (!!_! ~· ~· -~., II, 8), it follows that the matter or angels is the same as spiritual
matter.·· The designation •purely intellectual creatures' applied to angels
~~ the strong assertion thi'l.t. all created things are composed of some sort
or matte: leave no other alternative than the o~noeiving or a unique kin~
angelic spiritual matter.
In De Genesi ad 11tterum, III, 10# Augustine
Collllnents that angels have "etherea!"" bodies wnereas demons have "aerial" bodies.
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~rom

that of the form of angel souls and with a matter differing

~rom

the matter of angel souls, and human bodies with a form and

~atter

differing as form and matter from any of the other men-

;1oned tYPes.

Thus, there would be eight different items, each

liftering in kind, involved in the comparison of angels and men. ~n

overall': summary description that Augustine uses to distinguish

>etween the heavenly order and the earthly order 1s the assertion
;hat the heavenlt:y order
~he

1s more spiritual than the earthly order.

conclusion would logically follow that the matt er of angels,

10th soul
iat~er

matter~

and body matter is more "spiritual" than the

of men, and that the same suggestion would apply in the

:omparison of human soul and angel soul, the point here being
;hat angels are more like the order of God as pure spirit than are
1en.

Yet, it must be remembered that the overall dualism of

'p1r1t and Matter between Creator ( pure spirit) and Cr~ature
:matter)

does

not n~cessarily a?>ply in the case of the comparison

~t angels and men for then the comparison is between C~eated
~hings1 all

of which are matter (formed matter)4

Angels do not know things by means of their bodily senses,
or at least, not so in their characteristically superior way of
knowing.

If their bodies are keenly sensitive, as Augustine

suggests, their sense knowledge is superior to the sense knowledge of men, but this does not

constitute the reason for the

superior level of knowledge they possess.

Their highest way of

i

L

-114knowing is
of God.

by means

ot their direct illumination by the Word

Through their souls they know in a way su'Perior to that

possible through even their kind of bodies.
The abode of angels is in heaven.

17

In fact, Augustine defines

heaven as the realm where the angels are.

He explains that by

heaven he does not mean the sky of the earth, the natural, or visible firmament of the heavens --- the heaven
11

sidereal heaven. 11

or

this earth or

He rather means the "intellectual heaven"

that was created before our world was created.

18

This hea van·

17. "I run of the opinion that 6Very act of our mind produces some
effect in the body. and that, hoviever heavy and slow our senses may be. they
reel this effeot, in proportion to the intensity of the mental aot. as when
Vie are angry or sad or joyful. From this it may be concluded that, when
we think something uhioh has no apparent effect on our body. it oan never•
theless be apparent to the supernatural and heavenly spirits, whose perception
is so very keen that ours do es not deserve the name of perception in
oomparision with it." t'pistulae> IX. Translation by. Sister Yfilfrid Parsons
in~ ~.'orks of St. Augustine, Letters. Vol.I, (The Fathers or the Church,
Ludwig Schopp;-edi to ii, p. 21.
- ~

·
"Those-holy angels oome to the lmo-;:ledge of God· n6t by audible
'\llOrds, but by the pres eno e to their souls of immutable truth, i. e., oi' the
~nly-begotten ·word of' God •• 0 Thus, too they know the creature also. not in
tself,, but by this better way, in the wisdom of God, as if in the art by
~~ioh it was oreated; and, consequently. they know themselves better in God
. an in themselves, though they have also this latter knowledge."
De
.£:.vitate Dei. XI, 29.
Translation by Dods, Nicene Fathers, op. oit:-;- Vol.II,
p. 222'. 18. 1'This: heaven whioh I see, and this earth .upon whioh I tread (from
~hich is this earth that I carry about me), Thou has made. But where is that
heaven of heavens, O Lord, of which we hear in the words of the Psalm, 'The
eaven of heavens are the Lord's. t but the earth hath He given to the ohildren
or men? {Ps. cxv. 16) Where is the heaven. which we behold not,, in oomParison of' which all this. which we behold, is earth? For this corporeal
~hole, not as a whole everywhere, hath thus reoeived its beautiful figure
t~ these lower parts, of whioh the bottom is our earth; but compared with
at heaven of heavens. even the heaven or our earth is but earth; yea, eaoh
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1e also n creature, suppoeedly a

bo~

only-•

com~ose.d.

ot a

supe•

rior type of formed matter ---- pdssibly the same matter as the
matter of the body of angels.

Augustine does not . make'·. this last

suggestion but it is quite consistent with his teachings on the
subject and a logical deduction from the situation as he describes
it.

An interesting teaching of Augustine in this connection is
that some of the order of heaven laps over into earth.

It is

literally possible to have 11 heaven on earth" in a precise and
technical way as the two orders do not exist in strict isolation
from one another.

It is the case of one order overlapping with

another order, the heavenly order dipping down into the earthly
Order rather than that of one order having two different natures

s1muitaneously. As we shall see laber, this fact shows up prominently in his mystical theory.
cont.
these great b~dies is not absurdly called earlh,, as compared with that,,
I know not what manner of heaven; which is the Lord's; not the sons of men."
~nfessionum libri tredecim, XII, 2, Translation by Pilkington, in Nicene
!!,thers, op. oit., Vol. I,. p. 176.
.
,
-n-••";Tiiat heaven of heavens, which Thou in the Beginning didst
create, is some intellectual oreature, which, although in no wise co-eternal
unto Thee, the Trinity, is yet a partaker of Thy eternity, and by reason of
the sweetness of' that most ha:i;py contemplation of Thyself doth greatly restrain
its own mutability, and without any failure,, from the time in which it was
~:eatea, in clinging unto Thee,, surpasses all the rolling changes of
imes. Ibid.,, p. 178.

or

-
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III

Physical bodies are the third item in Augustine's system.
According to Augustine, after God made the angels he made the
physical world and all that there is within it.

Three elements

were made in creation: (1) angels (day, light), (2) the firma-

ment, and (3) men.

The creation of all physical bodies is to be

identified with the formation and development of the firmament
involving all of the remainder of the days of creation from the
second through part of the sixth.

In the teachings of Augustine, the whole of creation essentially involves the creation of "matter."

It is not the situa-

tion of the creation of form and matter as such or the creation
of spirit and matter.

It is a situation of the creation of

different sorts of matter.
Augustine speaks of the

11

As it has already been indicated

spiritual 11 matter of angels.

sort of matter is involved in the nature of souls.
always creation of matter.

A. certain

Creation is

The case at issue in reference to

the firmament, however, is the specifically physical kind of
rnatter.

or

The second day of creation wa.s given to the formation

bodies out of the same primative

matter from which angels were made.

11

formless 11 or

11

unformedtt

That which takes place

during the thtrd through the sixth days, with the exception of
the making of man

1

is but a further more detailed specification
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in the formation of corporeal matter.

19

This physical matter is simply our common sense concept of
matter, the physical universe all about us: earth, air, stars 1
fire

(aether) water, planets, bones, seeds, flesh, etc.

Some

of it undergoes a process of rapid change and some of it appears
19. "Hast hot Thou taught me, 0 Lord, that before Thou didst fonn and
separate this formless matter, there was nothing, neither colour, nor figure,
nor body, nor spirit? Yet not altogether nothing; there was a certain formlessness without any shape.••·•
i'Vhat, in all parts of the world, can be
founder nearer to a total formlessness than the earth and the deep? Fbr, from
their being of the lowest position, they are less beautiful than are the other
higher parts, all transparent and shining. Why,, therefore, may I not consider
the fonnlessness of lnatter----whioh Thou hadst created without shape,, whereof
t~ make this shapely v.'Orld---to be fittingly intimated unto men by the name
of earth invisible and formless • .,.? That heaven of' heavens was for Thee,, 0
Lordj but the earth, which Thou has given to the sons of' men (Ps. cxiv.16),
to be seen and touched,, was not suoh as now we see and touoh. For it was
invisible and "without form," (Gen.i.2) and there was a deep over which there
'\'las not light; or darkness was over the deep, that is, more than in the deep ••
•• But the entire deep was almost nothing, sinoe hitherto it was altogether
fonnless; yet there was then that whioh oould be formed. For Thou, 0 wrd,
hast made the world of a formless matter, which matter,, ou'b of nothing,,. Thou
hast made almost nothing, out of vhich to make those great things which we,
sons of men, oonder at.
For very '"'Onderful is this corporeal heaven,, ot
whioh finnament, between water and water, the s eoond day after the creation
of light, Thou s0.dst, Let it be made,, and it 't'1as made, (Gen. 1.6-8.) Which
finnarnent Thou oalledst heaven, that is, the heaven of this earth and sea,,
'nhioh Thou madest on the third day, by giving a visible shape to the formless
matter which Thou rnadest before all dn.ys.
For even already hadst Thou made
a heaven before nll days, but that vms the heaven of this heaven; because in
;he beginning Thou hadst made heaven and earth. But· the earth itself which
hou hadst made was formless matter, beoause it was invisible and without
fonn, and darkness was upon the deep.
or which invisible and formless earth,
~f ·which formlessness, of which almost nothing, Thou mightest make all these
~lngs of '~hi oh this changeable world consists, and yet oonsisteth not;
"1 ose very ohane;eabl eness appears in this, that times can be observed and
;umbered in it."
Conf'essionum libri tredeoirn, XIII,, iii. vii.
ranslation by Pilkington, in Nioene Fathers, .2E_• 2.!,!• .. Vol. I, P• 176-177.
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The whole of

the physical universe was created within the six days of creation
but this does not mean that everything in it was formed at that
time in its present

state and condition.

As has already been

suggested, creation is to be thought of more in a potential sense
than it is in an actual sense.

Some of the items of the physical

world undergo a development in time of their potential orders and
and other items were completely produced in creation.

Those

things created first in the routine ( although there was actually

no routine) were usually finished at creation, eg. the Seas,
trees, seeds, stars, planets, etc.
com~lete

Some of the species seem to be

at creation.and some do not.

Trees remain as they

were

but there is room for variation as to the various types of trees.
However, even the technical variations among the types of trees
was so constituted potentially in creation that its actual realization

in time is but a development from its seed principle

(~ationes seminales).
principles themselves.

There is no variation among the seed
20

20. "And, under these names heaven and ee\rth:t the whole creation is
signified, either as divided into spiritual and material, which seems the
tnore likely. or into the two great parts of the world in whioh all oreated
things are contained so that, first of all. the creation is presented in

sum, and them. its pa~ts are enumerated according to the mystic number of days."
~ .£2.vi tate Dei, XI, 33.
Translation by Dods, Nicene Fathers, 2.E,• ill·•
Vol. II,

P• 224.

"For neither at that time {{creation)) were those seeds so drawn
forth into products of their several kinds, as that the power or production·
Vlas exhausted in those products; but oftentimes,, suitable combinations of'
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As has already been suggested, the physical world exits
within time only, or more technically, along with time, so that
it both comes into being in Creation and passes away in some

final consumation.

History only makes sense in reference to

physical things for history is but the record of the continuity

or

the change of a thing.

As has already been suggested,

.r-.

Augustine considered the firmament of the heavens, the sidereal
heavens,as physical.
Generally speaking, Augustine seems to be able to
rate souls as a part· of physical bodies.
is Man as a soul.

incorpo-

The one major exception

The creation of man, however, as we shall

see~

is quite a specialized kind of creation and it may well be argued
that the soul of man does not fit in with Augustine's
understanding and meaning concerning "soul•"
have life and are directed by souls.

Some

general

bodies

He readily grants the

existence of rational souls in or with bodies and even

ex~resses

his own uncertainty as to whether the world as a whole is animated by a world-soul.

In any case, such is not God.

He

cont.
Oircumstanoes are wanting, whereny they may be enabled to burst forth and
0
~lnplete their species. For consider, the very least shoot is a seed; for ii'
~ltly consigned to the earth, it produces a tree •••• But of this grain also
here is further still a seed, which al though we are unable to see it with our
~es, yet we oan conjecture its existence from our reason; because,, except
ere viere some such power in those elements, there would not so frequently be
r~d~oed from the earth things which had not been sovm there." De Trini tate,
~ ~~ iii., a. Translation by Haddan, Nicene Fathers, 2l?,• cit., Voi.III.p.60.
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the existence of animal soul and further indicates that

plants do not have souls even though they possess an immanent
principle of life.

He even points to the similarity or the souls

of men and the souls of brutes in his process of contrasting their
differences, one difference being the dependency of the brute soul
unon its body in contrast to the independency of the human soul.
He indicates that botn man and beast have a higher faculty of

reason.

In short, Augustine seems to take soul for granted as a
21
part of the physical universe.

. 21-.
"Come now, and let us s-ee where lies,, as it were,, the boundary
line between the outer and inner man •• For whatever vie have in mindl common with
the beaata, thus much is rightly said to belong to the outer man. For the
outer man is not to be oonsidered to the body only,, but v1ith the addition also
ot a oertain peouliar life· of' the body, whenoe the structure of .the body derives its vigor, and a>ll the senses which he is equipped for the perception
of outward things; and when the image of these outward things already percehed, that have been fixed in the memory, are seen again by recollection,
is still e. matter pertaining to the outer man. And in all these things; we
bo not diff'er f'rorn the beasts, exoept that in shape of body we are not prone,
upright. And the beast,, too, are able both to perceive things corporeal
~lll "lithout, through the senses of the body, and to fix than in the memory,
~ remember than, and in them to seek after things suitable" and shun things
noonvenient. But to notice these things, and to retain than not only as
~aught up naturally but also as d·eliberately committed to memory, and to
0~~rint than again by recollection and conoeption ••• to combine again imaginary
thi eots of sie;ht. •. to examine after vihat manner it is that in this kind,
a dngs like the true are to be distinguished from the true •• ---these aots,
""~' the like, ail.though performed in reference to things sensible, and those
~ 0 1 ~? the mind has deduced through the bodily senses, yet,, as they are
p ~ ined with r ea.son,, so are not common to men and beasts:. But it is the
1~0 or the higher reason to judge of "-hes e corporeal things aooording to
Tr~rporea.l and eternal reasons." De Trinitate, libri xv, XII, 1,2.
slation by Hadd an.
for t
"Many animals surpass us in sense perception, and the reason
God hhis is not to be gone into just now, but in mind and reairon and knowledge
as Placed us over than. The sense perception of animals, aided by the
.
(oont. on next page}

!t
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Lite is connected directly with light, as Augustine sees
it. The degree of life posseased by a created thing is determined
1

by

the degree of lignt (angel nature) in which they participate.

Life in plants is more static or sluggish than it is in animals
·22
and men, since it is not then related in with soulLight does
not reach the level of

11

knowledge 11 until the higher animal level.

There is further distinction in the manner in which an animal has
knowledge, namely, from phjsical things themselves, and the way

men gain higher knowledge, namely via revelation.

cont,
great force of habit. enables them to piok out the things that satisfy their
souls, and this is done all the more easily because the brute soul is m:>re
closely bound to the body, and, or course,. the senses belong to the body,
the senses that the soul uses for food and for the pleasure that it derives
from the body. But, beoaus e reason and knowledge, of v1hioh we are treating
now, transcend the sens es. the human soul. by means ot reason and knowledge.
withdraws itself as: far as it oan from the body and gladly enjoys the delights of the interior life. The more it stoops to the sens es, the greater
its similarity to the brute. 11 De Quantitate Animae. XX.VIII. 54. Translation
by John J. lioMahon. in The Father's of' the Ohu:roh, op. cit. Vol. II of The
Writings of Augustine.p. 121.
"This can be said, also, of the irrational soul or life, that the
rational soul oannot be converted into the irrational. If the irrationtrl
soul itself were not subj eoted to the rational by reason of its interior
rank, it would assume a fonn in an equal way and be like the latter." De
~ortalitate animae, XVI. 25. Translation by Ludwig Schopp.. in The Fathers
~
Churoh, op. cit. Vol. II or The Writings of Augustine.p. 45':"

!fu?

22.
The superior qualities of animals and/or animal souls over
t(hat of plants seems to reside in the fact that some greater degree ot light
,,angelic nature) was involved in their creation. Animal souls do not
know" as do human souls, however, the superior sensory and sentient
oapaoities of animals over plants give evidenoe to the existenoe o:r some
greater degree of incorporation of light in their peraen:t; order.
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IV

Men constitute the fourth item in Augustine's metaphysics.
Man was cl,"eated

11

in the image of' Ged" in the latter phase of

the creative event, the last nart of the sixth day of creation.
There is strong intimation that the animal nart of man had been

created already in an earlier stage of creation, but man as an
animal is not the point at all·
until he is created

11

Man is not considered as

in the image of God."

image of God and to be created in the image

0 me.n"

Only m!!!! is in the

gf God is to be man.

Man was completely created on the sixth day of creation.
He was created both male and female on the sixth day for all

creation ceased at the end of the sixth day.

The story of the

special creation of woman is but an example of "Hebrew parallelism
23
1sm" •
It is a renetition of the same situation that has e.1.~

ready been described but with more details added.
really arises concerning the dffference in

No problem

creation of male

and female as the story of the creation of Eve is but dealing
With the special creation ot' sexual differences

same order

er

man which had already been created.

within the
Apparently,
.•

23. Trriters statement, not Augustine's,, yet Augustine says essentiallythe same thing in his emphasis that a.11 seven days are to be taken as but
o~e day---the latter days being but a oontinuity for the sake of explanation
~ btha.t whioh really happened apart from time. Augustine did not knov1 the
~ rew language very well, and it is doubtful if' he we.Er avmre of the "par~ lel'' oharaoteristic of Hebrew literature,, yet his teaohing on the creation
naorporates the same idea.
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the implicati·on is that in his earlier stages

or

etteation man

(mankind) was either non-sexual or else bi-sexual.

The story

of the creation of Eve is to be taken as a more detailed descr1pt1on~or-that·-uh1ch

occurred 1m" lihe latter phase of the sixth day

of creation.

Man is composed of body and soul.

possesses two kinds
matter.

~f

Like the angels he ·

matter: spiritual matter and physical

His physical matter is a part of the physical universe

of the order of animal nature •

His sniritual matter is his

soul, a unique sort of· soul not the same sort

or

soul as animal

soul or the same sort of matter as the spiritual matter

angels.

24

25

Human soul is immortal.

or ·

Animal soul, as a part

or

24!. 't.ir matter be used as a term denoting everything which in any :tonn
has a separate existence, ·whether it be called an essence, or a substance, or
by another name, the soul is material. Again, if you ohoosa to apply the epithet immaterial only to that nature which is supremely immutable and is everwhere present in its entirety, the soul is material, for it is not at all endowed with such-·qualities. But if matter be used to designate nothing but that
Tihioh, whether at rest or in motion, has some length, breadth, and height. so
· t~at with a greater part of itself it oocupies a greater part of space, and
With a smaller pa.rt a smaller spaccJ and is in every part of it less than the
'l'lhole, then the soul is not material,. ••Whence it is perceived that the soul,,
'l'ihether it be termed material or immaterial, has a certain nature or its own,,
oreated from a substance superior to the elements of this world,•••a substance
'Vlhioh cannot be truly conceived of by any representation of the material images
Peroei ved by the bodily sens es, but which is apprehended by the understanding
and discovered to our consciousness by its living energy." Epistolae, CLXVI.4e
Translation by J •. G. Cunningham, in-Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. I.. P• 524.
25. "The soul of mah is in a sense proper to""'!tseI1' immortal. It is
?lot absolutely immortal, as God is ••• but because when alienated from the life
~1' God it so dies as not wholly to cease from living in its own nature, it ia
ound to be from a certain oause mortal, yet so as to be without reason ~alled
at the same time immortal. 11 Ibid, P• 523

-

the universe,is not immortal.
Although man was created completely in the sixth day of
creation

the meaning is not necessarily that he was then formed a

as now.

Both the body and the soul of man were completely

created, at the same time, on the sixth day of creation, but body
2b
undergoes a process of formation in time.
This is contrary to
the creation

or

angels who were created completely formed in

both spiritual and bodily natures at the original creative act.
Augustibe notes that man was formed (not created) from the
dust of the earth.

This, he believes, refers to the formation

of man's body in time according to its potentialities of creation.
Although Augustine is not very specific on this point, the likely
conclusion is that something special occurred in the case of the
formation of the body of man that did not occur in the formation

or

the bodies of animals.

The implication is that there was

some further direct activity on the part of God in the formation
Of man's body, unless, perhaps, it might be concluded that a

substantial portion of man's formation occurred also at the
time of his creation.

Certainly the formation of sexuality

1n bodies required some special activity on the part of God~
but again, much of this, if not all

or

it, might have occurred

26. In De Genesi ad litteram, VI, Augustine explains in some detail ·
!Us opinion that the formation of man from the slime of the earth took plaoe
in the time and does not refer to his oreation in a technical or ultimate
sense.
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at .the time of creation.

27

The formation of the soul of man, on the other hand• occurs
itself in creation at the breathing of the breath of God into
man.

Hence, the soul is formed before the body is completely

for~ed

and must be united with the body in time.

man in nowise arises out of the bodily order.

The soul ot

Its nearest

or

kin is angelic nature, yet,. it was created after angels were

created and is more changeable in its order being situated
not as close to God as are angels,
the soul is the same

a~

The manner of the creation of

that of the creation of angels, namely

the acting upon matter by light, the Word of God, however, the
' net result is different due to the difference in order and time
of the matter.

28

Matter acted unon by the Word of God in its

primordial formless state results in the formation of nearly
unchanging angelic matter and form.

Matter acted upon by the

Word of God later in time, after a certain formation has
results in a type

occurred

soul-matter nearly like angelic matter but

considerably mgre changeable.

27. It is difficult to rspeoify how much of fonnation may have occur
in the creation. Fbr example. it is not clear whether sexuality is a
created. or fo nned difference in man.
28. The mode 0£ the creation or angels and the human soul seems
to be similar but the material out of '·1hioh they were created vms: diff'erent.
The resulting matter of s:ouls and matter of angels is different. See De
~nesi ad litteram, VII, 27.39.
-

-------
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Although the soul of man is composed or a unique sort of
soul-matter different from angel matter, it is distinctively
spiritual and in no wise similar to the corporeal souls of
animals.

It is 1 yet, distinctively a creation or creature, not

itself a part or God.

It was specially made, both

cr~ated

and

formed, exactly as it is with no process, change, or evolution
' whatsoever occurring in its own case.

29

It was created not out

of God but out of nothing, yet is itself everlasting (immortal)
like the angels.

Man is like God only in his soul.

Apparently, the conclusion from Augustine is that the union

of

the soul of man and the body of man occurs 1n time after

creation.

He explains that the soul of man, although already

formed lies hidden in the worka
human body.

of God until united with a

Between the human soul and the human body there is

a rigid dualism.

·either caused the other.

However, this is

not reason to assume that they exist in opposition or conflict
With one another

in any necessary sense.

The body is not

29. " ••• Thou has not said~ •Let man be bade after his kind,• but.
'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness'•.• .And therefore this
b~ng said in the plural, •Let us make man,' it is yet subjoined in the
.
singular, 'and God made man; 1 and this being said in the plural, 'after our
likeness,• is subjoined in the singular, 'after the image of God.' Thus is
lll~n renewed in the knowledge of God, after the image of Him that created
~rn; (Col.iii,10) and being made spiritual, he judgeth all things,--... all things
Chat are to be judgeds---•Yet he himself is judged of no man.' (I. Cor.ii.15).
~essionum libri tredeoim, XIII, xii, 32. Translation ~ Pilkington, in
~Fathers, op.-cit., Vol. I., P• 200. See also .B.!• Genesi ~ litteram,
v!I, 28, 40.

-

-
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necessarily negative toward the soul and neither 1s the soul
negative toward the body.

To the contrary., Augustine advances

the very interesting doctrine that the human soul has a natural
desire to be united to the human body.

30

30. "Finally,, united vdth the body (and this not in space,· although
the body occupies spao e) the soul is affected prior to the body by those
highest and eternal principles. ohangeless and not contained in spaoe1 and
not only prior. but also to a greater extent. For,the prior affect in the
soul occurs to the extent that the soul is nearer to these principles, and.
by the srune token, the soul nis more greatly af.feoted in proportion to the
superiority over the body. This nearness is not one in space. but in order
or nature. In this order, then, it is understood that a form is given by
the highest Being through tne soul to the body---the form whereby the latter
m::ists ,in so f a.r as it existssa
Hence, the body subsists through the soul and exists by the very
fact that it is animated, whether universally,, as is the world, or individual•
ly, as is eaoh and evecything that has life within the ioorld.
This yields the conclusion that the soul, through the soul, oould
become a body, and that this would be possible in no other way at all. Be·
cause this does not happen~--as the soul ranains soul in that through whioh
1t is soul, mid the body subsists through the soul, whioh gives,, but do es
not take away, its fonn---the soul oannot be changed into a body.
Fbr, if the soul does not give the form whioh in turn it receives from the supreme Good,, the body is not formed by it, and, if body
1s not formed by it, :i!t is either not forried at all,, or it assumes a form
as olos e to the Supreme Good as the soul. , it would be like the soul. But
the important point here is The soul is the more excellent the oloser ((to
the Suprane Good)) the form is wh.:i.ch it assumes. But, the body also 'Wt>Uld
have assumed a form close ((to ti1e H:'..ghest)) i.f it had not received its form
fro:rn the soul. Fbr, ii' there were not an intermediate oause, the body
~'OUld have assumed a form close ((to the Highest)) if it had not received.
bts form from the soul. -·For, ii' there were not an intermediate oause, the
ody ~~uld have assumed a form quite as olose as the soul.
w
There is nothing between the supreme Lire. whioh is immutable
1
; sdom and Truth. and that which is brought to life as the last one, i.e._
i he body, except the vivifying soul. If the soul gives a i'o:nn to the body
tn so far as it exists,, it does not, throught this transfer, take away
he f'onn; however,, by a transformation of the soul into a body the soul
V:OUld lose· its form.
.
(continued on next page)
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AugUstine is himself uncertain about the creation or production of individual souls as individual souls.

He suggests

that it is nossible that individual souls come from individual

individual souls just as individual bodies come from individual
bodies and it is also nossib1.e that each soul is St>ecially
created as an ind5.v!.d·;id.l whenever it comes into existence.
Traducianism would apnear to be more consistent with his general
teaching about creation, namely that all things were created"in
the beginning."

On the other hand, it would seem that souls

ttiust be "specially created" it' there is no prior existence to

their individual form and materiality.

The main point that Augustine seems to be emphasizing is that
man.!§. a soul.

Man is more distinctively to be identified with

~the image of God 11 nart of his order than with any other part.
Ot course, man is something else than his.·-soul part, but he is

most distinctively and characteristically to be identified with
his soul order.
In summary 1 the metap.l:lysics of .ri.ugustine incorl'.>orat es four

..

.

I

Henoe., the soul does not beoome body: neither by itself, because the
body is only made by the soul-" when the soul remains soul: nc.r by another
soul., because the body is made by the soul only through transfer of a i'onn ..
~d only by privation of its form would the so·u1 be converted into body,,
lf' it were oonv ert ed. 11 De immortali·aa1iY animae,XV. 24. Translation by
Sohopp, op$oit. p.43. ~.- - · -

--

-129-

main ideas: (1) God, (2) angels, (3)physical bodies, and (4)
man.

All of these items, except God,, are created things and

material •
as such a

God alone exists apart from a material order and is
~ure

spirit.

The matter of souls is different from

physical matt er and 'the mat:·i;; er of angels iB. different from the
matter of souls.

A.J..J. cf the items,, except God, undergo some ·

degree of change, w!:bh the angels changing the least, and almost

not changing at all; physical bodies, including the body of man,
changing a great deal; and human souls changing more than angels
but not nearly so much
utterly changeless.

a~

physical bodies.

God alone is eternal,

Angels e.nd the soul of man are everlasting

and immortal --- like the number series they come into being but
do not pass away.

P~ysical

bodies come into being in time (with

time) and pass away in time ( along with time).

History is

mainly in reference to the continuity of physical bodies although
1t can in some sense apply to angels and human souls in reference
to the degree of change ·!:;hat they do have.

The over-all dualism

1s not between form and ma·Gter or body and soul --- these are only

secondary dualisms.

The basic dualism is between Creator ahd

creature, God and the universe, Spirit and matter.

Perhaps his metaphysics can be comnositely diagramed as follows:

G
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W 0 R L D
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Chapter V
The Religion of Augustine
The religion of Augustine is tho religion of an intellectual
who was not convinced that religion is solely an intellectual
.matter.

His religion is~ not a religion within the limits of

renson alono for tho anpeal
in religion is over and beyond
-'

reason.

Yet, he is characteristically analytical and critical

in his outlook even when dealing with reltgion.

Although he

appeals to reason in establishing his philosophyJ his basic
religious meaning is established on the basis of revelation.
He sees religion ~s

existing in its own right apart from a

formal system or philosophy, more universal and less technical

and specialized than philosophy.

Rather than conceiving of

r<;)ligion as a "system, 11 he sees it as the broader raw material

out of which systems are produced.

It is an experience, a

feeling, an inner meaning, rather than a f orma.l philosophy or
a science.

l

i

Religion, for Augustinel is a faith.

It 1e a testimony

to certain beliefs »ather than an argument for the establishment
of beliefs.

It is more a report of a discovery than it is a

quest for a faith, moreor a witness than an argument.

Yet,

Augustine did not hesitate to argue about religion and always
seems willing to give an apology for the faith that he asserts.
It must be understood, however, that the faith is not necessari:cy'
established on the grounds of the arguments used in its defense.,
His appeal is always ultimately to revelation.
In the strictest sense, the philosophy of Augustine is
an outgrowth of his religion,

As has been indicated, hia meta-

physics is really "founded upon his religious concepts---upon
revelation.

Augustine can see no clash between philosophy

and religion·ror he will not adrl:it the right of philosophy to
stand on its own grounds apart from revelation.
never views philosophy as an end-in-itself.

Augustine

It is merely an

aid·of religion, and in some instances a tool of.religion,
always entirely subordinate to religious meaning. The problems
or philosophy are not the same as the problems of religion.
To solve the problems ·of ph1losoph:t is ·not to·. ~oltie .tl'le·•p~oelems

or

~&ligton

and the solution

of distinctively religious

problems does not necessarily mean the solution of philosophical
~roblems.

Since his philosophy is

sep~rated

rrom

and_subjug~ted

to his religion, Augustine is more properly termed a philosophical religionist than a religious philosopher.

-133Although Augustine does not appear to have been intoxicated
with the idea of God, as has been suggested about Plotinus,
his idea of God is tha key to the whole of his thought.

Just

as it was the key to the understanding to his metaphysics ,so it

is also the key to the uno.erstanding of his religion.

However,

Augustine's religious moaning of God is somewhat different from
his metaphysical meaning of God.

In his philosophy he attempts

to speak of God in a technical, systematic, and objective way. ·
In his religion
ive way.

h~

speaks of God in a more intimate and subject-

Whereas he waxes

11

intellectual 11 when he talks about

metaphysical matters, he becomes "emotional 11 when he talks about
l

distinctively religious meanings.

He seems to feel that it is

1. A.'•good exa111pl e of this is in the Soliloquies 1
"God,. who art loveci.,, wi t·cingly or un·wi ttingly,. by everything that is
oapable of loving.
-whom
God,. in whom are all things,, to/nevertheless neither the vi1mess
or any creature is vile_, nor its wickedness harmful, nor its error erroneous •
God,. who hast not willed that any but the pure should know the
truth.

God,, the Father of truth, the Father of wisdom_, the Father ofihotiru o
and orov,ning life,, the Father oi' blessedness,, the Father of that whioh is
good and i'uir,, the Father of intelligible light_, the Father of our awak• ·
ening and illumination,, the Father of the pledge by which we are admonished
·to return to Thee • .., 11
Solilcquioru.."n, libri~,_ii, I,i_, 2. Translation of John
Gibb and James Innes, inASele5FII'Sr~r uf tEe :Hioene and Post-Nicene Fatlns
~-tho'Christiar.-. £:huroh,,· pt:rr;p-·fc-1i:'.'"a$t, 'f"0t.1±~~:r;;-Fi~t'S;o~s-;:-:v6L.'•Vf;J;,,::p.53.7 •
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, '"God_, whom alf bh.i.ngs ·serve, that serve_, to whom is comph.ant GVf!rY
Virtuous soul. By whose law13 the poles revolve, the stars fulfill their
courses, the sun vivifi cs the day., the moon tempers the night: and all the
framework of tr~ngs. day nfter day by vicissitudes of light and gloom,, mor.rt;h
after month by waxings and wanings of the moon, year after year by orderly
successions of spring and s.unmer and fa.11 and winter,. oyole after oyole by
(continued on next page)
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-134one matter to define God categorically as the pivot within a
metaphysical system, and another to speak of him as Saviour
and Redeemer.

The first is a function of philosophy; the

latter is a function of religion.

Augustine's idea of God

does not appear to have changed very much after he became a
Catholic Christian.,

As he went from religion to.religion,

he appears to have been really going from idea of God to idea
of God1 and it might also be suggested that changes in his idea
of God were the reasons for his changes of religion.
As has been

suggest~d,

Augustine conceives of God metaphysi-

cally as pure spirit, mind, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent,
and creative.

He is not a soul or the soul of the worldJ yet,

he exists over the world and beyond the world in a manner so
as to be both apart from the world and also with it, and even
to some extent in it.

In his religion, however, Augustine

cont.
aocomplished oo nourrenoes of the solar oourse, and through the mighty orbs
of time. folding and refolding upon themselves, as the stars still recur to
their first oonjunotions, maintains, so far as this merely visible matter allows, the mighty oonstanoy of things. God, by whose everduring laws the strble
motion of shifting things is suffered to feel no perturbation, the thronging
00
urse of' oiroling ages 6Ver recalled anew to the image of immovable quiet: by
whose laws the ohoioe of the soul is free, and to the good reward and to the
e"lil pains are distributed by necessities settled throughout the nature of
e,,erything. God, from v,hom distil even to us all benefits, by whom all evils
are Withheld from us. God, above whom is nothing, beyond whom is nothing,
~thout whom is nothing. God, under whom is the whole, in mom is the whole,
~~h whom is tho whole •• ••''
Soliloquiorum, libri ii, I, i, 4. Translation#
~., P• 538.
-

•l35
emphasizes the nature of God as complete goodness, complete
justice, and complete love.

Perhaps

his teaching concerning

the love of God may be considered his ma.jor rP,ligious emphasis.
Around it is focused his doctrines of Christ, mediation, redemntion, election; sanctification, and his mystical theory.
The theology o:r Augustine is unified around the cone ept of'
the triune

God~

IDhe whole Trinity: Father, Son and Holy Spirit

were involved in Creation.

God, the Creator, exists eternally

as the Trinity, the unity of the Godhead and the multiplicity
of deity.

Augustine suggests that the term

an exactly correct one to anply to the

11

peraon" is not

~rinity

but that it is

the nearest term we have to describe the situation.

2

Augustine

thinks of God as a person and usually ref'ers to him as a mind
or a will.

Augustine sees God's relationships as essentially

2. "Ylhy ••• do we not call these three together one person. as one
essence tmd one God~ but say three persons. while we do not say three Goda or
three essenoes; unless it be beoause we wish some one word to serve for that
lll?aning whereby the Trinity is urE1e:rstood, tha:t we might not be altogether
~llent, when asked, what three$. while ·we confessed that they- are three? For
if' essence is the genus, and substance or person the species, as some think,
then I must omit what I just now said, thot they ought to be oalled three
essenoes. as they are called three substances or ptlrsons; as three horses are
called three horses,, and the same are called three animals,, sinoe horse is
the species, animal the genus. For in this oase the species is not spoken
0
~ in the plural, and genus in the singular, as if we were to say that three
hors es were one animal; but as they are three horses by the special name,
130 they are three animals by the generio one.
But if they say that the name
of' substanoe or person does not signify species, but something singular and
individual; so that ary one is not so oall ed a substanoe or person as he is
Called a man, for man is common to all men, but in the same manner as he is
Called this or that man, as Abraham, as Isaao, as Jaoob, or anyone else who,
(continued on next page)

per!onal, and even

11

1ntimate. 11

cont.

This is why he emphasizes

-- - -·

if present, could be pointed out with the fingeri so will the same reason

reaoh these too. Fo.r as Abraham., Isaac, and Jaoob are called three individuals
so are they called three zr. en, and three souls. Why th en are both the Father
and the Son and the Holy Spirit~ if -we" are to reason about them also aooord•
ing to genus and species and individual, not so called three essences, as
they are called three substances or persons? But thiS.- as I said, I pass
over: but I do affirm,, that if essence is a genu's, then a single essenoo has
no species. Therefore the Father, Son, and Roly Spirit are not three species
of one essesce. But if essence is a species, as man is a species, but those
are three whioh Y1e call substances or persons, then they have the same specie
in common, in such . as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have in common the species
whioh is called man; not as man is subdivided into Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob~
so oan one man also be subdivided into several single men; f'or this is altogether impossible, since one man is already a single man. ~ihy then is one
ess enoe subdivided into three -substances or persons? For if' essence is a
species,, as man is, th en one essence is as one man is: or do we, ·as we say
that any three human beings of' the same sex, or the same oonstitu'bion or body,
of' the same mind, are-one nature,---for they are three human beings, but one
nature,--•so also say in the Trinity three substances one essence, or three
persons one substance or essenceH.? Heither do we so call the Trinity three
persons or substances, one essence and one God, as through three somethings
subsisted out of one matter (leaving a remainder, i.e.); although whatever
that is, it is urfolded in these three. For there is nothing else of that
essence qesides the Trinity. Yet, we say three persons or the same essence.
or three persons of one essence; but we do not say three persons out of the
same essence, as though therein essence were one thing,, and person another., a
as, we o an say three st a tu es out of the same go Id; for th ere it is one thing
to be gold, another to be statues. ~\nd when we say three men of one
nature, or three znen of the s nme nntue., they also can be call eel three men
out of' the same nature , sinoe out of the same nature there can be also
three other suoh men. But in that essenoe of the Trini "1?11 in no way oan any
other person TJhatever exist out of the same essence. Further, in these
things, one man is not as much as three men together; e.hd two men are something more than one man: and in equal statues, three together amount to
znore of gold than eaoh sin~iy, and one amounts to less of gold than two.
But in God it is not so; for the Father,, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
together is not a gre9.ter essenoe than the Father alone or the Son alone;
but these three substances
persons, if they must be so o~lled, together
are equal to eaoh singly: which the natural man does not comprehend •••• "
~ !;initate, VII, vi. 11. Translation by Arthur Vlest Haddan, in the
2._oe1l! Fathers, tt>p. ~' Vol. III, P• 112, 113.

or

"They ((the Greeks)) indeed use also the word hypostasis
); but they intend to put a dii'i'erenoe,, I know not what.between
(continued on next page)

the love of God, for in love there is the expression of will in
intimate relationship.
The whole of the Trinity exist eternally in itself ar.d is

both apart from the world and immanent within it.

Father, S_on,.

and Holy Spirit are three equal orders of the same thing, being

compared to memory, understanding and will---or memory, understanding and love---instaad of to three men. 3 The Father is the

cont.
r
ousia (6~c;{a) and hypostasis (U4ri"orlt~0 ~t.S ): so that most of ourselves who
~reat these things in the Greek language, are aooustomed to say,.,'-8v(J'f,n•,-rl'trs
tirroutM-i1s , or in Latin, one essence, three substances. But because with
us the usage has already obtained, that by ess enoe we understand the same
thing Which is understood by substance: we do not dare to say one essence,
three substances, but one essence or substance and three persons: as many
'Writers in Latin, who treat of these things, are are of authority, have
said, in that they oould not find any other more suitable vmy by 'Vh ioh to
enunciate in words that whioh they understood vtithout VK>rds. For, in truth.
as the Father is not the Son,, and the Son is not the Father, and that Holy
Spirit who is also oalled the gift of God is neither the Father nor the Son.
certainly they are three ... 0 Yet, when the question is asked, w:hat three?
human language labors altogether under great poverty of speeoh. The answer
however, is given,. three "persons," not that it might be ((oompletely))
spoken, but that it might not be left ((wholly)) unspoken." De Trinitate
V, viii, 10. Translation, Ibid., p, 92
-

-

3. "But in these three, VJhen the mind knows itself and loves itself',
there renains a trinity: mind, love, knowledge; and this trinity is not oonfounded together by any commingling; although they are eaoh severally in the~
~elves and mutually all in all, or each severally in eaoh two, or eaoh two
in eaoh. Therefore all are in all.... Therefore these three things are
marveously in separable from each other, and yet eaoh of them is severally a
substance,
all together are one substance or essence, whilst they are
mutually predicated relatively." De Trinitate, IX~ v) s. Tr. Ibid., P• 128.
-

'

*

.........,_

t
"Putting aside, then, for a little while all other things, of whioh
the mind is certain concerning itself, let us especially oonaid·er- and disouss
hese three---memory, understanding, will.... Sinoe, then, these three,
llleniory, understanding, will, are not three lives, but one life; nor three
(continued on next page)

11

beginning 11 of the distinction between Father, Son and Holy

Spir:it~

''Father'nhas meaning only in relation to "Son, 11 and vice versa.
The Son proceeds from the Father only in a categorical sense of
a comparison of persons or substances, not in time or rank.
Since the essence is the same in all of the Trinity, there is
no "beginning" in the sense of source;

there is only beginning

and subordination in person and relation.

Just as the Father

cont •
. ·minds ,but one mind; it follows certainly that neither are they three
substances, but one substance. Since manory, which is called life. and
mind. and substance is so called in respect to itself; but it· is called
memory, relatively to something. And I should say the same also of understanding and of will, sinoe they are called understanding and viill relatively to something; but each in respect to its elf is life, and mind, and ess enoe.
And hence these three are one, in that they are one life. one mind, one
essence; and whatever else they are severally called in respect to thanselves.,
they are called also together, not plurally, but in singular number. But
they are three, in that v1herein they are mutually ref erred to each other;
and if they were not equal, and this not only each to each.. but also eaoh
to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each other; for not only
is each contained by each,, but also, all by each • ., •• .tmd, therefore, while
all are mubually comprehended by each, and as wholes, each as a whole is
equal to each as a whole, and each as a whole at the same time to all as
whol~:t ·and these three are one.• one life, one mind, one essence •••• "
~ Trinitate. X xi,, 17, Trans-latio~ Ibid .. , P• 142.
uBut we have oome now to that argument in which we have undertaken
to consider the noblest part of the human mind, by whioh it knows or oan
know God, in order that vie may find in it the image of God. Fbr although
the human mind is not of the same nature with God, yet the image of that
nature than v1hioh none is better. is to be sought and found in us, in that
which our nature also has nothing better..... This trinity ((memory, understanding, love)), then, of the mind is ••• the image of God ••• beoause it
oan also remanber, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. And in
so doing it is made wise itself.... " De Trinitate, XIV, viii, ltI., and
Xii. 15. Translation. Ibid., P• 189, 191.

"begets" the Son, so do ~ the Father and the Son beget the

Holy Spirit.

The Holy Spirit nroceeds from both Father and Son

in one beginning.

4

Although the persons of the Trinity are the

same in essence, there is a literal or actual distinction in
person.

This difference is an eternal difference, for the God-

head is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit eternally.

Never was there

any adoption of the Son as Son by the Father, and the relation-

ship is in no senses figurative.
The three-in-one and one-in-three relationship is quite
consistent with the doctrine of the fundamental separateness of
God from the World, of Creator from creation.

It allowatbhc

4. "As therefore, the Father begat, the Son is begotten; so the Father
sent, the Son was a ent. But in like manner as He who begat and He was be•
gotten, so both He who sent and He 'Who was sent, are one, since the Father
and the Son are one. So also the Holy Spirit is one with than, since these
three are one • libr as to be born, in respeot to the Son, means to be from
the Father; so to be sent, in respeot to the Son, means to be known to be
from the Father. And as to be the gitt of God in respect to the Holy Spirit,
means to proceed from the Father; so to be sent, is to be known to proceed
i'rom the Father. Neither oan we say that the Holy Spirit does not also proceed from the Son, for the same Spirit is not without reason said to be the
Spirit both of the Father and of the Son •••• For the Spirit of God is one, the
Spirit or the Father and of the Son,, the Holy Spirit, who worketh all in all
( I. Cor. xii.6). 11 De Trinitate, IV,.xx,29. Translation.~· P• 84.
"For theSpirit came forth, not as born,, but as given; and so He
is not oalled a son, beoaus e He was neither born, as the Only-begotten, nor
made so the by the graoe of God He might be born into adoption, as we are.
For that which is born of the Father, is ref erred to the Father only when
oalled Son, anCl so the Son is the Son of the Father. and not also our Son;
but that whioh is given is referred both to Him who gavO".- and to those to
whom He gave; and so the Holy Spirit is not only the Spirit of the Father
and of the Son who gave Him, but He is also called ours, who have rloeived Him
E.2 Trinitate. V, xiv, 15. Translation. ~._. P• 94.

possibility:or··~od..to:have

self-existence as a

three persons may form their own community.

personality,.for:fu~

Will, understanding,

and love could not exist within themselves in utter isolation.
Understanding, for example, must be of another object or relationship.

In order for God to be adequate within himself and

at the same time of the order of personality, he must possess
a community within his one essence.

Augustine suggests that this

II

is what Paul means by tho;·fullnmsof Godhead" (Colloss. I.9) ~
The personality
but by revelation.

or

God is established not by logic or reason

Starting with the revelation that man is in

the image of God, he deduces the conclusion that God must be
perfectly what man in his highest state is imperfectly, namely,
a self-conscious mind or will, capable of me.mory,

understan~d

love. 5 It is the very distinction of persons or substances within the Godhead that makes the personality of the one essence
possible, as has been suggested.

To be personal is to be self-

conscious and to enter into knowledge about the nature of the
self and of other objects in relation.

Communion, for example,

must be between person, between item which exist in distinction

from one another.

The multiplicity of God within his own unity

allows him to distinguish himself from himself and hence to enter
into all the relationships necessary in personality.

5.

-----

This is his basio line of argument in De Trinitate.

·

~t!God is love is also established.by Revelation.6 That
God is a will can be easily eatablished from the principles of
Greek philosophy.

Plato also argued that God should be conceiveo.

of as love on the grounds that anything possessing the complete,_.
ness of God without the quality of love must be considered of
the order of a devil, granting that once will be added to the

order, unless that will be a good will.

The scriptures tell of

the love of God and explain that love is from God, and this

witness of the scriptures is made effective in human experience
by the work of the Holy Spirit. Augustine strongly insists that

-the fact that God is love is from logic or from the experience

of Nature.

It does come, however, from the nature of experience

for revelation itself occurs within experience as also does
direct knowledge of God.

Augustine attempted to interpret the

6. "1'1herefore,, if Holy Scripture proclaims that God is love, and that
love is or God, and works this in us that we abide in God and He in us,
and that hereby we know this, because He has given us of His Spirit, then
the Spirit Hims elf is God, who is love. Next, if' there be among the gifts
or God none greater than love, and there is no greater girt of God than the
Roly Spirit, what follows more naturally than that He is Himself love, who
is called both God and of God? :And if the love by which the Father loves
the Son. and the Son loves the Father. ineffably demonstrates the communion
or both, what is more suitable than that He should be specially oalled love,
who is the spirit common to both? For this is the sounder thing both to
believe and to understand,, that the Holly Spirit is not alone love in that
Trinity, yet is not specially called love to no purpose, for the reasons
we have alleged: just as He is not alone in that Trinity and both the
Father is holy, and the Son is holy,,--as piety doubts not. And yet it is not
to no purpose that he is specially called the Holy SpiritJ for because Ho
is common to both. He is specially oalled that which both are in common.
(cont. on the next page)

Justice of God, so !:'.tron[)ly elilpha.sized in the Old Testamcnt;in
te~ns

the

of the

iJoi.7

actu~l

'l'esto.mont.

love of God, accordin3 to the revelation of
he \"Jrit es:

u ••• the end of every corruuandmcnt is charity •••• every
cor:liULtndrnont hat'1 love for its aim. (I.Tim.1.5)
7

I.Ian

le~.i..

a.nd the

ns that G-od. is love
ScriTr~urcs.

Oj,1ly

throuGI1 the (,'hurch, the Gos,,cl,

Usuc..lly \-:hen .n.usustine snealts of' the love

of God, he snecks nooticnlly rathor thon deductively or analytical'
ly.· Y0t, he usually incornoratcs a subjective

"hiloso~hical

meanin,s. 8

oo~t.

othenrl1 .. if' in that Trinity the Holy Spirit alone is love, then-aoubtless
the Son too turns out to be the Son, not of the Father only, but al:o c£ ·the·.
Holy Sp11"it. For He is both said and read in oountless places to be so,-the only-begotten Son of God the Father••••" De Trinitate, r.T, xx, 37.
Translation, Ibid., p.220.
7. 'Enolirrrdion, CJ0lII, 121. Translation J. F. Shaw, in Nioene Fathers.
22.• cit. ~ol. iif. P• 275.
--W. "Inchoate love, therefore is inchoate holiness; advanced love is
advanced holiness; great love is great holiness; "perfect love is perfeot
holiness, "·--but this •love is out of a pure heart, and of' a good oon•
soienoe, and of' faith unfeigned,' (I. Tim.i.5) •Which is this lite is--then
the greatest, when life itself is oontenned in comparison with it.' (apparent•
cited from Pelagius))I 17l'Onder,,hoi'1ever, whether it has not a soil in whioh to
~:ow after it has quitted this mortal lifel But in what place and at what
tlllle so ever it shall reach that state of absolute ~erfection, which shall
admit or no increase, it is certainly not 'shed abrouad in our hearts•
by any energies either of the nature or the volition that are within us,
but by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us,' (Rom.v.5} and whioh both
helps our infirmity and oo-operates with our strength. For it is itself'
indeed the grace of God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom, with
the Father and the Hold Spirit, appertaineth eternity, and all goodness,
for ever and ever ••• " De natura et gratia, LXX. Translation by Peter Holmes
and Robert 'E. \'Iallis, inNicene Fathers, 2.f •2.!!• P• 151. wl. V.
" tflhat' I say, •is man.' a creature going astray from the Creator,
(oont. on the next page)

The love of God is most significantly demonstrated in the
fact of' the Incarnat1.on and Atonement.
to by the fact that he saves.

his mediatorial

function~

of a way of Atonement.

That God 18 'love.is attest3d

Christ, as Mediator, was love in

God's love 1s shown by his provision

Perhaps it is the case that Augustine

puts more emphasis upon the love of God than he does upon Christ
and the work of Christ because he sees Christ and the Atonement
a~

but an example of that _which is greater even than ... the atone-

men~

namely• the love of the Father, .. the-ultimate source of the

Atonement.

The personality of God is broader than the person

of Christ and the meaning of God is more than the meaning of
.\

Christ.

-

As crucial and cataclysmic as was the Atonement, it is

the message and meaning of God as love behind the fact of the

Atonement tha~ is to be em~hasized.
to

b~

In a sentence Augustine seems

saying that the meaning of Christ involves the concept that

the power behind the universe is steady, kind, and affectionate---

. even intimate-•-in meeting the deep needs of the human spirit.

The personal character of God is not only in Christ Incarnate,
but continues ever active within human experience through the

cont.
Unless his. Creator 'be mindful or him., t (Ps.viii.4) and choose him freely 1
~d love him freely? Because he is himself' not able to choose or love., un•
ess being first ohosen and loved he be healed. because by choosing blind•
~ess he perceived not. and by loving laziness he peroeiveth not; and by
OVing lazines5 is soon wearied••• In good men it is the love of God which
(cont. on naltt page)
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Holy Sp1r1 t •

Although Augustine does not give man the same

~eminence

within the system of the universe as do most later Greek philosophers, he does consider man an object of worth both in body
and in soul.

Augustine courteracts the possibility of idolatry

by insisting that man is not the ultimate center or item of worth

within our world as we know it, and that there are items andiiu:fs:'
within the world more important and more valuable than man .. The
worth of man lies in the fact that he was created good---both
in body and soul. However 1 'the unique worth of man lies in the
fact that he is a soul; and in the fact that he, in his soul, is
in the image of God..

As a spiritual,being, man's worth exceeds

everything else that was created, with exception of angels.
cause man is inherently worthy, he is to be loved.

Be-

Such love

does not mebll the acceptance of every aspect of any man, but
rather love for the order of mankind as an order.9

oont.
endureth all things, as bad men the lust of the v\urld. But this love is in
Us by the Hold Spirit whioh was given us •• u" De Patientia, 19,20.
Translation by H. Brown, in Nicene Fathere, op. oit.;-111,p. 53{.

---------

-

9. "row he is a roan of just and holy life who forms an unprejudiced
estimate of thinGs• and keeps his affections also under strict control, so
that he neither lo11es what he ought not to love, nor fails to love what he
ought to be loved less, nor loves: that equally whioh ought to be loved
either less or more, nor loves that less or more which ought to be love
equally.
No sinner is to be loved as a sinner;
(cont. on next page)

Augustine suggests that all

11

things" may be divided into three

Classes: (a) things to be enjoyed, (b) things to be used, and
(c) things which use and enjoy.
It.tl~-:quit-e

ls he to be used.

to enjoy man.

God alone is to be enjoyed.Never

proper to use man, however, but not

Such use that is made of man must be consistent

with the fact that he is a spiritual being.

There must be no

disrespect to his existence as a will, and he must be respected
as a soul.
ly

This fact not withstanding 1 there· ·is · x.iothingi· inherent ...

wrong!~witlli.·0:.man' s

is not offended.

use of man so long as his inherent nature

Man can not be enjoyed as an end in himself'

because all enjoyment is, in the final analysis, enjoyment of
God.

That which is seen to be of' value in man exists only by

virtue of the image of God within him.

In the case of' God,

however, God both uses and enjoys---he uses man and enjoys himself•

Ma-o • s ·-si£itat1on is reversed:

lie uses himself' and his ·

and f1Very man is to be loved as a man or God 1 s sake: but God is to be
loved for Hie own sake. And if God is to be loved more than any man, eaoh
lllan ought to love God more than hfmself. Likewise we ought to love another
111 1\n better than our om body, beoaus e all things are to be loved' in ref'erenoe to God, and another man oan have fellowship with us in .the enjoy•
ment of God, whereas our body oarmoti for the body only live~ through the soul.
e.nd it is by the soul that we enjoy God." _!?! Dootrina Christiana, 1.:,! libri,

I, xxvii, 28.

Vol. II, P• 530.

Translation by J.F. Shaw, in Nicene Fathers, op. oit.,

follow man und enjoys God. lO

Augustine's idea of man is actually rooted iri his doctrfn.e
concerning the love of' God.

If man is in the image of God, he

may be considered of such inherent value that he should be
regarded as a worthy

~bject

of love.

The very capacity to love

man is itself an outgrowth of the love of God made effective
within experiece.

Man is converted by the experience of the

love of God into a new man: he is endowed with a new appreciation
of the human order in general as a value object worthy of love.
Love for mankind finally leads to a new appreciation of one's
self, of one• s neighbo1'.;1 and of the na.tur·e

.or

.

.

s.elf-hood ..in·

10 .. "Among all these things,, then, thos~ only are the true objects. of· ·
enjoyment which we have spoken of as eternal and unchangeable. The rest
are for use, that we may be able to arl'ive at the full enjoyment of the
former. We, however,, who enjoy and use other things are things ourselves.
Fbr a grearo thing truly is man, made after the image and similitude 0£ God,,
not as respects the mortal body in which he is clothed, but as respects
the rational soul by which he is exalted in honor above the beasts. And so
it beoomea an important question, whether men ought to enjoy, or to use,
thenselvea, or to do both. For we are commanded to love one another; but
it is a question whether man is to be loved by man for his own sake, or for
the sake of' something else. If it is for his own sake,, vie enjoy him; if it
is for the sake of something else, we use him. It seems to me,, then, that
he is to be loved for the sake of something else. For if' a thing is to be
loved for its own sake, then in the enjoyment of it consists a happy life,
the hope of whioh at least, if not yet the reality, is our comfort in the
Present time. But a ourse is pronounced on him who places his hope in man
(Jer.xvii.5). Neith~r ought any one to have joy in himself, if you look
at the matter clearly, beoaus e no one ought to love even hims elf for his own
sake, but for the sake of Him who is the true object of enjoyment. For a man
is never in ao good a state as when his whole life is a journey towards the
unchangeable life, and his affections are entirely fixed upon that. If, however, he loves himself' for his own sake, he does not look at himself in
relation to God, but turns his mind in upon himself, and so is not occupied
with anything that is unohangeable." De Dootrina Christiania, iv libri,, I,
JCtii,, 20, 21. Translation, Ibid, P• 527.

generai. 11

Augustine teaches that Revelation indicates 1 via the Sc:r.:tptures, that both parts of man are legitimate value objects wort:r.y

of love.

The body is inherently good, just as is the soul, be-

cause the body was created good.

Only a perversion of its created

nature (sin} can cause either body or soul to loose their "good.,_ . · ·
ness. 11

Such perversions are more likely to come from the nature

and influence of the soul than they are from the natural order
of the body.

Perhaps the most significant fact about man, from Augustine's
'point.of view, is the fact that he is a will.

or

in terms of

wil~

God is conceived

as a pure spirit. Man, being in the image of

11,
"Seeing, then, that there is no need of a command that every man
should love hims elf and his own body,---s eeing, that is, that we rove our•
selves, and what is beneath us but conneoted vtl th us, through a law of
nature whioh has never been violated, end whioh is common to us with the
beasts, (for even the beasts love thanselves and their oun bodies), it
only remained necessary to ].e.y injuotions upon us in regard to God above us,
and our neighbor beside us. ''Thou shalt love," He says, "the Lord thy God
with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; and thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself~ On these two commandments hang all the
law and the prophets." (Matt.xxii. 37-40)0 Thus, the end of the commandment
is love, and that two-fold:i the love of God and the love of our neighbor.
M:>w, if you take yourself in your entirety, ---that is, soul md body togebher,--- and your neighbor in his en.tirGty, soul and body together (for
rnan is made up of soul and body), you will find that none of the classes of'
things. that are to be loved is overlooked in these two commandments. For
though, when the love of God oomes first, and the measure of our love for Him
is prescribed in such terms that it is evident all other things are to find
their center in Him, nothing seans to be said a.bout our love for ourselves;
Yet when it is said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,' it at once
becomes evident that our love for ourselves has not been overlooked." De
.E2_otrina Christiana, iv libri, I xxvi, 27 Translation, Ibid. P• 529. --

-

-

God to the extent

or

exemplifying something of God's spiritual

nature inoorporates in his soul order God's gift of will.

Man's

rationality, being d:tr·eotly··a::·r.esult of his being a soul, grants
him the capacity of being a will.

Metaphysioally, Augustine

argues for the case of the nature of the Trinity from the nature
of man as memory, u11derstancU,ng-.:and:w111.

Religiously, Augustine

nroclaims that man possesses will by virtue of the revelation of
'·

his being in the image of God.
Man's free will makes him a responsible being.12 To some

12. "There is, to begin with, the :f'aot that God •s preoepts themselves
'\\"Ould be of no use to a man unless he had free ohoioe of will, so that by
performing them he might obtain the promised reTiards. For they are given
that no one might be able to plead the. exouse of ignoranoe. as the Lord says
concerning the Jews in the gospel: 'If I had not come and spoken unto thElll,
they would not have sin; but now they have no exouse for their sin.' {John rJ,
22)". De Gratia ot Libero Arbitrio,2. Translation by Holmes and Wallis,
Nicene Tethers, op." cit.,, Vol" P• 444.
11
Hhatis the import of' the faot that in so many pass ages God
requires all His commandments to be kept and fulfilled? How does He make
~his requisition, if there ie no free ·will-..? Novi wherever it is said,.
do not do thisl and 'Do not do that, t and wherever there is aey requirement
in the divine admonitions for the work of the will to do aeything, or to
refrain from doing anything, there is at onoe a sufficient proof of free
Will. Mo man, therefore, when he sins, oan in his heart blame God !'or it,.
but every man must impute the fault to himself. Nor does it detract at
all from a man's own will when he performs any aot in aocordanoe with God.
I~eed, a work is then to be pronounced a good one when a person does it
'l'll.llingly; then, too, the reward of a good work be hoped for from Him oonoernin~ whom it is writt.en, 'He shall reward every man aooording to his
works• h'.(Markxvi.27) Ibid, P• 444-445 •
"Now it was expedient that nmn should be at first so created, as to
have it in his povier both to 'td.11 what was right and to will what was wrong;
(oont. on next page)

extent man is more responsible than the angels and freer than the
angels, for he more tYPically operates as a will than do angels,
even though, they, also, possess a will.

Angels, being so closely

connected with that which is changeless, mirror or absorb something of the changeless quality of God.
use their

freedom~

Hence, they rarely ever

13

Men, being further from God, are more likely

to misuse their freedom.
Granting free will, Augustine still believes that more than
free will is necessary in religion.

Free will can make man re-

sponsible before God for his actions but the mere situation of
free will, in itself, does not afford the extra sunport and
encouragement that man needs in order to choose the way he knows
that he should choose.

Here. it is that g1"ace 1s important in

religion. It-!Ls an aid to man, an extra contribution of God

Cont.
not without reward if' he will- the i'orm·er,-·: 'and not witbout·:punishment:: ii'
he willed the latter. But in the future life it shall not be in his power
to will evil; and yet this will oonstitute no restriotion on the freedom of
his will. On the oontrary, his will shall be rnuoh freer when it shall be
\'/holly impossible for him to be the slave of sin.'t Enohiridion, 105 Translation, by Shaw in:Nioone Fe.thers, opo oito, III,p. 271.
13. ", • .,That there may be anevil will even without ney spirit either
seduoing or inciting,, is suffiently olear in the instance of' the devil himself,, who is found to have beoome a devil, not through some other devil, but
of his own proper will." De Patientia, 21. Translation by H. Brown ~
in filoene Fathers, E.E·~·III,,p. 534.

to man as a means of encouragement in leading a moral 11fe• 14
The entrance of grace into religion makes guilt for sin even
worse than before man realizes God's grace, for in the latter
instance sin is also a rebellion against love.

Men who sin in

the face of grace are greater sinners than men who sin without
grace under the law alone.
Augustine is quite convinced that man is a sinner.

He is

a sinner in two senses, one of which he cannot help, the other
as a result of his own deliberate action.

He ·1s a sinner by

. virtue of· the original sin in Adam, the ancient "fall" or entrance
into depravity of the human order, and by virtue of his rejection
of love and grace.

Original sin is to be interpreted as an

14. • ...What,, indeed,, affords clearer evidence of the grace of God
than the aooeptance ·or prayer in any petition. If our Saviour had only
said,, "Yfatoh that ye enter not into temptation,, 11 He would appear to hs.ve
done nothing further than admonish man's will; but sinoe He added the
wor~s. ''and pray,," He showed that God helps 1.1s not to enter into temptation.
It is to the free will of man that the words are addressed: "~ son,,
remove not thyself' from the chastening or the Lord." (Prov.iii.11).
And the Lord said: "I have prayed for thee,, Peter,, that thy faith fail
not,," (Luke xxii.32) • So tho:t a man is assisted by grace in order
that his will may not be us el es sly comnanded. De gratia et libero arbitrio,
3, 5,, 9. Translation by Nicene Father,, op3 cit. • Vol. V,, PP• 444, 445,

447.

- ........--
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i~efection

in the

order~

a flaw, blemish, or affliction

or

the nature of man .15 It is transmitted by physical generation.
Associated with it are shame and sexual lust (concupiscence).

16

15. "Man's nature, indeed, was orented at first faultless and without any sin; but that nature of man in which every one is born from Adam.,
now wants the Physician, beoause it is not sound. All good q~alities., no
doubt whioh it still possesses in its make, life, senses, intelleot, it has
of the Most High God, its Creator and maker. But the flaw, whioh darkens
and weakens all those natural goods; so that it has need of illunination
and healing, it has not oontraoted from its blameles-s Creator---but from:
that original sin, which is committed by free will,." E! natura ~ gratia,
III, Translation in Nicene Fathers, op. oit. Vol. V.pp. 122.
"From the moment .. ,when TSy one man sin entered into the world,
and death by si~ and so death passed upon all men, in whom all sinned,•
(Rom.v.12) the entire mas-a: of our nature was ruined beyond doubt, and fell
into the pos:aession of its: destroyer." De peocato originali., contra pelagium,
34(xxix). Translation by Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis., in Nioene
Fathers, op. oit. Vol. V. P• 249.
l6.-.'H0\'(Pelagius)) ••• makes one and the same root productive both
of good and evil fruit, in opposition to gospel truthand apostolic teaching.
For the Lord declares that •a good tree oannot bring forth evil fruit.,neither
can a oorrupt tree bring forth good fruit.• (Matt. vii.18) and when the
Apostle Paul says that covetousness is 'the root of all evils.,' (I. Tim.
vi. 10) he intimates to us, or oourse, that love may be regarded as the
root af all good thingso On the supposition, therefore, that two trees, one
good and the other corrupt., represent two human beings, a good one anp a
bad. what else is the good man except one with a good will., that is,
a tree with a good root? And what is the bad man except one -w:i.th a bad
Vdll, that is, a tree vii th a bad root? The fruits whioh springs from suoh
roots and trees are deeds,. are words, are thoughts, which prooeej,, when
good, from a good will. and when evil, from an evil onea. ... The 'oapaoity',
then, or whioh we speak is not ., • , the one identical root both of good
things and evil. For the love whioh is the root of good things is quite
~ifferent from the oupidity whioh is the root of evil things--as different,
indeed, as virtue is from vioe. But without doubt this 'capacity' is
capable of either root: beoause a man is not only able to possess love,
Whereby the tree becomes a good one; but he is likewise able to have cupidity,
~hioh makes the tree evil. This human cupidity. nowever,. which .ia.a ..vioe,
as for its author man, or man's deceiver, but not man's Creator. It is
indeed that 'lust of the flesh, and the lust or the eyes, and the pride of
lire, which is not or the Father, but is or the world.' (I John ii.16) De
ifatia Christi, 19,21. Translation by Pete?_' Holmes and Robert 'E. Wallis-;11 !fci'ene Fathers, op.cit. Vol. v•• p~224~ 225.
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which he is propagated. 17 H'Uillan nature, even though created
perfect I nas been changed by the Fall and goes the way of self-

will, toil, and death.

Baptism is necessary to the cleansing of

all men from this original sin.

17. "Where God did nothing else than by a just sentence to oond ernn .
the man who willfully sins, together vii th his stock; there also. as a matter
of course, whatsoever was even not yet born is justly condemned in its
sinful root. In this condemn stook carnal generation holds every man; and
from it nothing but spiritual regeneration liberates him ••• The fault of our
nature remains in our offspring so deeply impressed as to make it guilty,
even when the guilt of the self-so.me fault has been washed away in the .parent
by the ranission of sins---until every de.feet which ends in sin by the consent
of the human will is consumed and done away in the last regeneration ••• Infants. although incapable of sinning, are yet not born withput the oontagion
o:f sin.---not,, indeed. because of what is lawful,, but on account of that
which is unseemly: for from what is lawful nature is born; for what is
unseemly,, sin. Of the nature so born .. Gld is the Author. who created man.
and who united male and female under the nuptial law; but of the sin the author
is subtley of the devil who deceives. and the will of the man who consents, ••
The guilt, therefore, of that corruption of which we are speaking ¢1I remain in the carnal off spring of the regenerate,, until in them also it be
washed away in the laver( (bath)) of regeneration. A regenerate man do es not
regenerate, but generates,, sins according to the flesh; and thus he transmits to this posterity. not the condition of the regenerated, but only of
the generated., •• The very sacraments. I say, of the hold Church show plainly
enough that infants, even when fresh from the womb. are delivered from the
bondage of the devil through the grace of Christ .... " ~ peooato originali,
contra Pelagium. 43,44.42.45(xxvii,xxxix,xxxvii,xl). Translation by Holms
and 17allis in Nicene Fathers.op.cit •• Vol.V. p.253-4)

-------Augustine considered sexual intercourse, except for the direct purpose of

Propagation, an evil, calling sexual desire a 'disease.' In the Soliloquies
he v1rote: "I perceive that nothing more says the citadel oi' manly strength.
'Whether of mind or body, than female blandishments and familiarities. Therefore. if (which I have not yet discovered) it e.pportains to the off'ioe of a
'~ise man to desfre offspring, whoever for -this reason only comes into this
00 nnection, may a pp ear to me wort~ of admiration, but in no wise e. Irodel
f'ot- imitation: for there is rnore peril in the essay. than f elioi ty in the
(cont. on the next page)

-1sr
Augustine

f~§her

and "actual sin."
the case of

Adam~

distinguished between

"o:r.ig~.nal

sin"

Free will alone, although it npr;.J ies in
or mankind-in-general, does not; aecount

entirely for man's guilt as an individual.

In the s·trlctest

sense, the infant is not a sinner, but still is ga!.J.ty"'of sin;
for actual sin is always a result of an act of will.
sin is always the result of a free choice.

Actual

Sin is not the

result of a mere natural functioning of the body; it is by
definition an act of will.

Even original sin is an original

act Of will, the guilt or which is transmitted to the individ•
ual apart from his will in individual instanceso

Human

individuals are under the guilt of original sin by virtue of
their being sons of an order which exercised an act of will
in "falling"from the perfection of the created state and
by virtue of the guilt which the specific individual amwulatoe":"

by having been sexually generated·

Human individuals are

under the guilt of actual sin by virtue of a rebellion
against the expressed love of God---the free choice of a
lower good in the place of a higher one.

One of the examples

Cont.
'lcomplishment.u Soliloquia,I, 17. Translation by Charles Starbuck, in
Uicene Fathers, ope oit11 Vol VII1 P• 543.
He defended the polygamy of' the Old Testament; on the grounds that it
allowed greater oontinenoe for the wives. E!, nuptiis ~ conoupisentia,10.
18 • 11 gain, in the olaus e whioh followa, 'In whioh all have sinned,
(oont.on next page)

of our

11

damaged 11 human nature as a result of original sin is

our defective will.

To counterbalance this defect .:>::':' will

in us there is the impact of the grace of God in
Punisbmen~

future life.

Ch~ist.,

for sin occurs both in this life and in the
'

God does not directly take the initiative in

administering nunishment for our sin.
our sins to ounish us•

Instead, he allows

The tragic result of the consequence

of a lower value when there is a higher value nossible is
itself a nunishment.

Since it is the soul (human soul) that

sins, it is the soul that will be rewarded and punished, both
now and in the future, everlastingly.

Heaven is the place

near God where the human soul shall be rewarded at a future
time for its earthly righteousness, sacrifice, and love.
Heaven is of the order of the snirit or soul, a creation,
made the first day.

It is somewhat material, but in a minor

way, as its spirit nature overshadows it existence as a body.
Since this is the case, the location of heaven in space is
of minor importance.

We must be satisfied with the rather

loose conclusion that it is not of the order of this world,

oont.
{Rom.v.12) how cautiously, right, and unabiguiously is the statement
expressed& For if you understand that sin to be meant whioh by one man
·entered into the world. 'in which {(sin)) all have simed,' it is surely
clear enough. that the sins which a.re peculiar to every man, which they
(oont. on next page)

and is located near to

. .t9

Go~.

The Kingdon of God on earth,

which is the Church, is a part of heaven; heaven on
Heaven is the final place of rest, reward, and

earth~

happiness~-

the everlasting abode---or the true sons of God; a

nrepa~ed

cont.
themselves commit and which belong simply to them. mean one thing; and
that the one sin. in and by ·which belong simply to them. mean one th!ng;
sinoe all were that one man.... " De peooatorum meritis et ranission3,,
I, II, (x) • Translation by PeterHolmes and Robert E. Wallis, in
Nicene Fathers. op. oit., Vol. v. P• 19.
19. "we behOldao great an interval between heaven and earth, there
is so wide a separation, and so great a space of regions between: we
wish to climb thither, we see no ladder; do we deceive ourselves,, because
we sing the Song of Degrees, that is, the Song of ascent? We ascend U:.J.'f;o
heaven, if' we think of God, who hath made ascending steps in the heart ...
Yras is to ascend in heart? To advance towards God.•.. If ••• we understand
by heaven the firmament which v1e see '"i th our bodily eyes,, we shall
indeed so err, as to image that we cannot ascend thither without ladders,
or some soaling machines: but if we asoend spiritually, we ought to
•nderstand heaven spiritually: if ~he ascent be in affection, heaven is
1~ righteousness. 'i!hat is then the heaven of' God? .All holy souls,
all righteous souls. For the Apostles also, al thought they were on
eat-th in the flesh, were heaven; for the Lord,, enthroned in them
tl'aversed the whole 1'.orld. He then dv_ielleth in heavem. How?
••• How
long al"e they the temple according to faith? i\s long as Christ dwelleth
in then throu,~h faith; as the r.postle saith, 'ThaQ Christ may dwell in
your hearts through faith. t
But they are already heaven in whom God
already dwelleth visibly, who see Him faoe-to faoe; all the holy Apostles,
all the holy Virtues, Powers, Thrones,Lo.2'dabipa that heavenly Jerusalem,
'Wanderers from whe:r:ioe we groan, and for Y.hich we pray with longings and
there God dVJell eth~
Thither hath the Ps~lmist lifted up his faith,
thither he riseth in affection with longing hopes: and this very lonzing
oauseth the soul to purge off the filth of sins, and to be cleansed from
every stain, that its elf' also may become heaven; beoaus e it hath lifted
up its eyes unto Him "l'lho dwelleth in heaven. For i.f' we have determined
that that heaven whioh we see vii th our bodily eyes is the dwelling or God,
the dwelling or God will pass away1 for 'heaven and earth will pass: away.•
(Hatt~xxxiv.35) Then before God oreated heaven and earth, where did He
dwell? But some one saith: and before God made the Saints, where did
He dwell? God dwelt in Hirns elf" he dwelt vvi th Hims elf, and God is with
Himself •••• "
Ennarotiones in psalmos, CXIII (Lat. CXII), 2, 3.
Translation by Cleveland Coxe;-in 1'J'1ttene Fathers, 2£_• 2.!!• Vol. VIII.p.596.

place for prepared peonle.

H\llllana

do not enter into the

fullness of heaven until the morning of the resurrectj.on when
the souls of the faithful will again be united with

namely, bodies that are sniritual bodies.

bodlen.~

The souls of tho

true sons rest in "Paradise 11 (the bosom of Abraham) from the
20
time of doo.th .. until.:thebdily· :9r~ .the·, Re.surrection• ·

20. "• •• The souls of departed saints are not affected by the death
whioh dismisses than from their bodies, because their flesh rests in ho~oa
no matter what indiginites it reoei ves after sensation is gone. For ·chErJ
do not desire that their bodies be forgotten, as Plato thinks fit, b:rt
rather beoause they remember what has been promised by Him v~ho deoilives
no man, and wro gave them s eourity for the safe keeping even or the hairs
of their head,, they ,-.:i th a longing pati eno e wait in hope of the resur..
reotion of their bodies, in whioh they have suffered many hardships,, and
are now to suffer never again.... The bodies of the righteous,, then, such
as they shall be in the resurrection, shall need neither any fruit to
preserve them from dying of disease or the wasting deoay of' old age, nor
any other physical nourishment to allay their cravings of hunger or of
thirst; f'or they shall be·.invested with so sure and every way inviolable
an immortality, that they shall not eat save when they choose, nor be
under the necessity of eating, while they enjoy the power of doing so •• •.
And so they will be spiritual, not because they shall oease to be bodies,,
but because they shall subsist by the quickening spirit.... Fbr as those
bodies of ours, that have a living soul, though not as yet a quickening
spirit, are called soul-informed bodies, and yet are not souls but bodies,,
so also those bodies are oalled spiritual,--- yet God forbid we should
therefore suppose them to be spirits and not bodies,---whioh, being
quickened by the Spirit, have the substance, but not the unwieldiness
and corruption of flesh. Man will then be not earthly but heavenly,, --not because the body will not be that very body which was made of earth,,
but because by its heavenly endo\mient it will be a fit inhabitant of
heaven, and this not b~r losing its nature, but by changing its quality • .._."'
De Civitate Dei, ;x:i,i, !O,, 22,, 23.. Translation. Ibid .. , PP• 255-257.
·

-

-

-

"But I suppose every one must see it is to be absurd to imagine
that only two,, namely, Abraham and Lazarus, were in that bosom of w;>ndrous
repose before the Lord deoended into hell, and that with reference to these
tV\O alone it was said to the rich man, •Between us and you there is a great
gulf fixed, so that they which would pass from he11oe to you oa.nnot, neither
(continued on next page)

.-157...
Hell is to be distinguished from "Hades. 0

Hell is a

place of everlasting nunishment for sin, a place prepi:ired
for the unprepared---a state or condition in whioh both
oont.
oan they pass to us that wo11J.d pass from from thenoe.' (Luke xvi,,.26)
•••What benefit was ccnferred in that oase on them by Him who J.oosed the
pains of hell,, in whioh ·i;hey were not held,, I do not yet understand»
especially as I have not been able to find anywhere in Sordlpture the namo
of hell used in a goo:i sen.Seo
And if this use of the term is nowhere
found in the di vins S~riptures, assuredly the bosom of Abraham, that :i.s.:o
the abode of a c artain secluded rest, is not to be believed to be e par+.
of hell. Nay, from these words themselves of the great Master, in vi!~:l.c~1
He says that Abraham said., 'Between us ond you there is a great g'!lJ.f
fixed,,' it is, as I think, sufficiently evident that the bosom of thr>"t
glorious f elioi ty was not any integral part of hello,,..., Whe:refo res :i.:i'
sacred Scripture had said., v.r.i.thout naming hell an:l its pains., tha~ C!ni::t
VJhen He died went to that bosom of .Abraham,, I wonder if any onE1 w0ulc. have
dared to say that He ldescended into hell.' But seeing that plain
scriptural testimonies make mention of hell and its pains., no reason oa:..i
be alleged for believing that He who is the SE>viour went thither., exo0p·b
that He might save all whom He found held in them, or' some whom He judged
worthy of that favour., I still ask: that He was,, however, in hall, and
that He conferred this benefit on persons subjected to these pains, I d::>
not doubt ••• • On that very day on which He died, He promd.sed tha~ ti.1e ·
thief should be vdth Him in paradise at the time when He was about to
descend to loose the pains of hell. Most certainly,, therefore. He was,
before that time,, both in paradise and the bosom of •..\.brahrun in Hie
beatific 'Wisdom,, and in hell in His condemning power; for since the
Godhead is confined by no limits, where is He not present? At the same
time, however, so far as regarded the created nature, in assuming whioh
at a certain point of time,, He, while continuing to be God, became man--that is to say, so far as regarded His soul, He v.•as in hell: this is
Plainly declared in these words of' Scripture,, v1hioh were both sent before
in prophecy and fully expounded by apostolical interpretation: ~Thou
Wilt not leave my soul in hell.' (Ps .:x:vi.10) eon••y nto,,
Epist~°.:!,
~LXIV, ii, 5; ii, 6., 7. a. Translated by J. Ge Cunningham, rnNioene Fathers., ~· ~.. , Vol. I ... pp. 516-517.
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ahd soul are tortured.

Hadee is comparable to Paradise,

being the place of punishment where the damned remain until
the day of judgment.

Neither Paradise nor Hades are themselves

Heaven or Hell, being places where human souls remain on
denosit until a future union with bodies at the time' of the
Resurrection.

Augustine believes in a literal hell, physical,

and eternal; with a material fire in which both the souls and
bodies of men and devils (if devils have bodies) are burned
~21

as a nunishment for sin.

-----------------------------~-----------------------------------------21• "So the;i what God by His phophet has said of the everlasting
punishment of the daIIll'led shall oome to pass---shall without fail come to
pass--- 'their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched.'
In order to impress this upon us most forcibly; the Lord Jesus Hims elf•._
did not shrink from using the same words three times over in one passage
(Mark ix.43-48). Now they who would rofer both the fire and the worm to
the spirit ••• affirm that the v1ioked ••• shall be burned by the anguish of
•••spirit: But they who mnke n~ doubt thut in that future punishment both
bod~.. and soul shr.tll· surfer, af'f'irin that:.the body shall be burned with fire
while the soul shall be, as it were, g:1awed by a v~10rm of anguish. Though
this view is more rer-1sonable,---for it is absurd to suppose that either
body or soul will escape pain in the future punishment,--- yet,, for my
O'Wll part, I find it easier to understand both as referring to the body
than to suppose that neither does; and I think that Scripture is silent
regarding the spiritual pain of the damned, beoaus e though not expressed,
it is necessarily understood that in a body thus tormented the soul also
is tortured with ::A fruitless repentance.... Here arises the question: it
the fire is not to be immaterial. analogous to the pain of the soul, but
material, burning by contact, so that bodies may be tormented in it. how
oan evil spirits be punished in it? For it is undoubtedly the same fire
which is to serve for the punishment of men and of devils ••• (Matt. xxv.41)
Unless, perhaps,, ••• the devils have a kind of body made of that dense and
humid air ii'hich ·we feel strikes us when the wind is blowing •• •• But ii'
any one maintains thnt the devils have no bodies, this is not a m~tter
either to be laboriously investigated,, or to be debated with keenness.
For why may we not assert that even immaterial spirits may, in some extraordinary we.y. yet really be pained by the punishment of material fire,, if
(oontinued on next page)

Augustine's ideas of life and death are related in a
qualitative way to his ideas of heaven and hell.

To enter

into the fullness of life is to narticipate in the kingdom
of heaven on earth, the church;

that is, it is to share in

the redemption of Christ which the church channels.

To be

apart from the heavenly order is to be dead, cut off from

cont.
the spirits of men, 'Vi1hich also are certainly imnaterial, are both now
contained in material members of the body, and in the world to come shall
be indissolubly united to their Olin bodies ••• ? I would indeed say that
these spirits uill burn vdthout ~ny body of their o''IIl as thnt rioh man
wris burning in hell when he exclained., 'I am tormented in this flame,,--.
(Luke xvi.24) were I not aware thnt it is aptly said in reply that that
flame was of the same nature as the eyes he raised and fixed on Lazarus,
as the tongue on which he entreated th'.'tt a little cooling water might be
dropped, or as the finger of Lazarus, with which he asked that this might
be done,---all of which took plaoe where souls exist without bodies. Thus,
therefore, both tht flame in whioh he burned and that drop he begged were
immaterial; an<.l res em bled the vis ions of sleepers or persons in an eostasy,
to whom immaterial objeots appear in a bodily form. For the men himself
who is in suoh a state, though it be in spirit only, not in body, yet sees
himself so like to his own body that he cannot discern any difference
whatever. But that hell, which also is called a lake of fire and brimstone
(Rev .xx.10) will be material fire, and will torment the bodies of the .
.,,,
damned, whether men or devils, the solid bodies of the one, aerial bodies
or the others; or if only men have bodies as well as souls, yet the evil
spirits, though without bodies, shall be so oonneoted with the bodily fires
as to reoeive pain vii thout imparting life. One fire o ertainly shall be the
lot of both, for thus the truth has declared... But eternal punishment
seans hard and unjust to human perceptions, because in the weakness of our
lllortnl oondition there is wanting that highest and purest ·wisdom by which
it oan be perceived how great a ~dokedness was committed in that first
transgression. The more enjoyment man found in God, the greater was his
Wickedness in abandoning Him; and when he destroyed in himself a good which
lllight have been eternal, he became worthy of eternal evil •• ••"
De
.£.!vitate Dai, XXI, 9~ 10, 12,
Translation, Ibid., PP• 460-463-;-

-

-

-
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that which is of genuine worth and satisfaction.
direct product ot sin (rejection of God).

Death is a

Without sin there

would never have been any death, for man would have continued
in direct association with the heavenly order.
Life, in a more technical sense, is more directly related
to the idea of light.

To be alive is to embody spiritual

qualities to some degree:

eome mental activity, some self-

movement, some registration or expression of wisdom.

The

degree of life nossessed by a thing is determined by the
sort of light in which it

~articipates.

Plants share in

light but not in the same manner or degree as do animals
and men, the latter two having a more direct and innnediate
connection with wisdom throu£2;}; the capacities of their souls.
Life is directly dependent upon the Logos in Creation, for
Creation occ'TIU'red when Eternai Wisdom came into expressive
movement.

Life was produced first when light was first

separated

from darkness, when the void became illuminated

by the spiritual quality of deity---the beginning of the
first day•

To be alive is to share in the qualities poss-

essed in narty by human souls; angels, and in their ultimate
degrees by God•
is an

expression~

Lire; whenever and wherever it occurs,
at least to some degree ,

ot the order

of the Eternal Logos~

22

Death is the opposite of Life.

Whereas life is that

which results from close connection with the Logos: death ia
that which results from senartion from the Logos.

Human

and animal bodies die when they become separated from the
souls through wb.:1.ch they subsist i> ·Tne death of human bodies

is a direct result of the fall of man and the sin of Adam.
Sin always causes death, and all death is a product of sin.
Death comes from

11

darkness, 11 and the Devil (fallen sniritual

22. "But what Thou ·a0;i.dst in the beginning of the creation. 'Let
there be light 1 and there was light~' (Gen. 1.2)
I do not unfitly underst!l.nd o.f' the spiritual oreature; beoaus e there was even then a kind of life1
·which Thou mightest illuminate., But as it had not deserved of Thee that
it should be suoh a life as oould be enlightened, so neither when it aJ.reAdy wos, hath it deserved of Thee that it should be enlightened. For
neither could its formlessness be pleasing unto Thee, unless it beoame
light,---not by merely existing, but by beholding the illuminating light,
and oleaving unto it; so also, that it lives,, and lives happily ..... "
Conf'essionum 1 libri tredeoim, XIII, iii, 4.
Translation by Pilkington,
Iii Nicene Fathers, .£.E." oi t .. , Vol. I.1 P• 191.
" .... They live r'.1ther in Him than under the sun who do not heed•
lessly hear wha.t the Apostle saith: 'Seek the things that are above,, where
Christ is sitting t'lt the right hand of God. i.;ind the things that are
above, not the things that are upon the earth.. For you are dead: and
Your life is hid with Christ in God' (Col.iii, 1-3). There,,if our life
is there where Truth is, our life is not under the sun,, rihere is vanity..,.~ 1
,!lnarationes in Psalmos, c2~-III, Sermon xiii,, 1. Translation, Ibid. p.205.

-

-

"The life of beasts is exoited with earthly ple"lsure,, seeks
earthly pleasures alone, and grovels after them with immoderate desire:
the lif' e of angels is alone heavenly; the life of men is midv.n}y between
that of angels and of beasts. lf man lives after the flesh,, he is on a
level with the beats; i.f' he lives after the Spirit, he joins in the
i'ellov,•ship of angels ..... " In Joanis Evangelium traotatus. XVIII, 7.
Translation by Jorhn Gibb 1 aiid James Innes. in Nicene Fathers,, op. cit ••
v,0 1. VII, P• 120.
- -

being)

is the ultimate source of it, having insnired man

to rebellion by means of his superior intelligence.

One of

the tragedies of the situation of death lies in the fact
that the soul desires to be related to a body.

Death is

th~

simnle dissolution of soul from body, not the deterioration
2
of' the soui. 3

23. "And neither the first death, which takes plaoe ~hen the soul
is compelled to leave the body, nor the second death, which takes place
when the soul is not permitted to leave the suffering body, would have
been inflicted on man had no one sinned •••• 11 Enchiridion., XCI, 93.
Translation by J. F. Shaw in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol.III, p. 26fl.

--

"Although the human soul is truly affirmed to be immortal., yet
it also has a oert_3in death of its own. For it is therefore called iml(O}
mortal,. because,, in a sense., it does not cease to live and to feel; while
the body is cnlled mortal, because ii; can be forsaken of all life, and
cannot by itself' live at all.. The death, then of the soul takes plaoe
when God forsakes it, as the deri.th of the body when the soul forsakes it.
Therefore the death of both.. --that is, of the whole man---occurs when the
soul, forsaken by God,, forsakes the body. For, in this case., neither is
God the life of the soul, nor the soul ·i:;he life of the body. And this
death of the whole man is followed by that which, on the authority of the
divine oracles, we call the s eoond den th. This the Saviour referred to
when He said, •Fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in
hell.' (Matt. x. 28) ouoWherefore we must say that if the first men were
indeed so created, that if th6Y had not sinned, they would not have
experienced ftJUkind of death; but that, having become sinnerQ, they were
so punished .~ith death, that whatsoever sprang from their stock should also
be punished ini th the same death. For nothing else could be born of them
than that which they thems elve had been. Their nature was deteriorated in
Proportion to the greatness of the condemnation of their sin, ~o that what
existed as punishment in those who first sinned, became a natural oonsequenoe in their children.... For neither by sin or its punishment was
he himself ((Adam)) reduced to that infantile and helpless infirmity of'
body and mind whioh we see in ohildren• For God ordained that infants
should begin the \\'Orld as the young of beasts begin 1 t, sinoe their parents
had fallen to the level of' beasts in the fashion or their life and or their
death: as it is written, 'If.an when he was in honor understood not; he
beoame like the beasts that have no understandinc.• (Ps.xlix.12)
•••:"lhere.:f.'ore, as regards bodily death, that is, the separatiQn of the
(continued on next page)

Augustine's philosophy of Salvation is also an outgrowth

oont.
soul from the body, it is good unto none while it is being endured by
those whom we say are in the article of death. For the very violenoe with
whioh body and soul are wrenched asunder,, v~hioh in the living had been
conjoined and olosely intertwined, brings ~ith it a harsh expe?'ienoe •
• • •Death, proceeding by ordinary generation from the first man, is the
punishment of all who are born of him, yet., if it be endured for ri.ghteousness sake,, it becomes the glory of those who are born again ••• ~"
De
Civitate Dei, XIII,, 2, 3,, 6. Translation by Marcus Dods in Nicene Fathers,
op. cit., Toi. II. PP• 245-247.
-

--

u.••• Every man is afraid of the death the flesh; few,, of the
death of the soul. 'In regard to the death of the flesh, vhich must oertain,.
ly oome some time, all are on their gu.ard against its approach: this is
:
the souoe of' all their labor. Man, destined to die, labors to avert his
dying; and yet man, .destined to live for (J!ler, labors not to cease from
sinning. And when he labors to avoid dying,, he labors to no purpose,, for
its only result will be to put off death for a while, not to escape it; but.
if he refrain from sinning, his toil will cease, and he shall live for
ever •• ••" In Joannis Evangelium traotatus,, XLIX,, xi, 2.
Translation by
Gibb and Innes, in Uicene Fathers,, op. cit.,, Vol. VII., P• 270.

--

'Like sheep laid in hell,, death is their shepherd' (Ps.
xxx1i* 14) ••• Yea, death is either the separation of the soul .from the
body,, or a separation of the soul from God, and that indeed whioh men fear
is the separation of the soul from the body: but the real death, whioh
men do not fear,, is the separation of the soul from God. And oft ~s
when men rear that which doth separate the soul .from the body, they fall
into that wherein the soul is separated from God. This then is death.
But how is 'death their shepherd'? Ii' Christ is life,, the devil is death.
But we read in many places in Scripture, how that Christ is life. But
the devil is death, not because he is himself death, but because through
him is death.... They who belong to him have death to their shepherd:
but we who think of future im:nortality, and not without reason do wear
the sign of the Cross of Christ on the forhead, have no shepherd but life.
or unbelievers death is the shepherd, of believers life is the shepherd.
Ir then in hell are the sheep, whose shepherd is death, in heaven are the
sheep, whose shepherd is life. What then? Are we now in Heaven? In
heaven we are by faith. For if not in heaven, where is the 'Lift up yo6r
heart'? ••• In body we walk on earth; in heart we dwell in heaven•••• "
!_nnarationes in Psalmos, XLIX, (Lat. XLVIII) Part III l. Translation
by Coxe, in Nio ene Path ers, 2.E,• .2!i•• Vol VIII. P• 174.
tt·

of his doctrine of God.

God, not man, is the hero in the

saga of human salvation.
man.

Salvation is from God, not from

It is a gift of God, an act of God made possible by an

event in history.

It is a happening, the major part of which

has already o:ccw:>red and been comnleted in the past.
not a present process or technique.

It is

Man does not make or

produce Salvation; he merely shares in the Salvation that
God has made man entirely on his own initiative.
activity in

S~lvation

Man•s only

is that of simple acquiuesence.

Augustine's general doctrine of Salvation is made
necessary by his doctrine of the Fall of man.

Since man was

-

created comnletely good and pronounced good in the beginning,
it is quite obvious that something has haopened to make him

otherwise since that time.

Augustine feels that there is

little need to argue for the depravity of man, for the fact
of man's depravity appears to be universally established.

It

is rather the case that he needs to apneal to Revelation in
order to posit the fact of man's

orig~alcomnlete

goodness.

As has already been suggested, Augustine did not believe in a
literal Adam, but rather took the term to signify the whole
order of human nature, particularized in the singular for
purposes of granhic usage.
specifically concerned about

Augustine, furthermore, is not
11

\lvhen" man fell, or how long

it took for him to fall, whether instantaneously or through

-165- '
:a ·lengt.hy -process;; :~:·he•·is·.oonu:!zlb.oed that behind it all
there is the free choice of man in deliberate rebellion
against God, in the deliberate and intelligent choice of
a lower good in

th~

place of a higher one.

This "Fall.,;"

whenever it happened, has left its mark on man.
we now find him, is signi.f"icantly "corrupted."

Man, a's
In his

current natural state (but not in his true natural state)•
2
he is immoral and guilty in his sins. 4

24. "•••BY them((lidam and Eve)) so great- a sin was oommittedsth';?.·tcy- ·
it the human nature was altered. for thJJ worse,, and was trmsmitted also
to their postel"ity,, liable to sin and subjoot to death.
And the kingdom
of' doa.th so reigned over men,, that the deserved. penalty of sin would have
hurled all headlong even into the second death,, or which there is no
end,, had not the undeserved graoe of God s~ved sc>me there rrom ••• "·£2.
Civitate Dai,, XIV.I. Translation,, pods, Nicene Fathers, op. oit.Vol.

II,, P• 2627"°

.

-

-

"But it is a fair question, whether our first parent or first
parents ••• , before th6y sinned, experienoed in their animal body suoh ,.
enotions as we shall not experience in the spiritual body when sin hasb&sn
purged and finally 2b'olished ••• Their love to God ·was unclouded,. and their
mutual affeotion was thim; of faithful and sincere marriage: and from this
love flowed a wonderful delight. beoaus e the.y always enjoyed what was lov'.,_
ed. Their avoidance of sin ·was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintain..i
ed., no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorr~w•••• As happy
then,, as 1·1ere these our first parents, who 1;1ere agitated by no mental
perturbations;· and annoyed by no bodily discomforts, so happy should the
whole- human re.oe have been, had they not introduced that evil which they
have transmitted to their posterity, and had none of ·th©.r descendants
committed iniquity worthy of damnation ••• eur first pa.rents fell into
open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the
evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And
what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For •pride is the beginn•
ing of' sin'(Ecolus.x. 13) • .And what is pride but the oraving for undue
exaltation? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to
whom it ought to ol eve as its end,, and become a kind of end to its elf.••"
~ Civitate E!!.• XIV, 10,13. Translation, ~· P• 273.

The answer to man's depravity is God's graoe.

Specific-

ally 1 the ansvirer lies in the Mediator who bridges the gap
between man's guilt and God's justice.

The Mediator is

Saviour, Jesus Christ 1 who by incarnation communicates the
fact of God's love to man.

By being a worthy sacrifice, He

pays man's just and unavoidable penalty for his crimes of
rebellion.

25

The Incarnation is necessary in order to effect

25. " ••• The highest Wisdom of God designed to assume this wound, by
means of a wonderful and ineffable sacrament, when He took upon Hims elf
man ·without sin, but not VJithout the condition 0£ sin. For He was willing
to be humanly born, to suffer, and to die. None of these things was
accomplished by our merit, but by this most excellent goodness,"•••
.£.!musica, VI,7 (4). Translation by Robert c. Taliaferro, in Vol. II,
}!.itings of St. Augustine(Fathers of the Church), P• 332.
_,,.Ano limae that true Med'iator, in so far as, by assuming the form <.
a. servant, He became the Hediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus,
though in the form of' God He received sacrifice together with the Father,
with ·whom He is one God, yet in the form of a servant He chose rather to be
than to reo eive a sacrifice, that not even by this instance aey one might
have occasion to suppose th:i:rt sacrifice should be rendered to any creature.
Thus He is both the Priest vJho offers and the Saorifioe offered. 111 De
Q!vitate Dei, x. 20. Translation, Dods, in Nioene Fathers, op.cit. :-vol.
II, p. 193':'"9
- 1
tAnd so the human race vias lying under a just condemnation, and
all men were the children of wrath. Of which wrath it is written: 'All
our days are passed ai:my in Thy v1rath; •wo spend our years as a tale
that is told.' (Ps. eo.,9) Of which "Wrath also Job says: •Man that is born
of a woman is of few days, and full of trouble,• (Job.xiv.l) Of which
wrath also the Lord Jesus says: •He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but
the wrath of God abideth on him. t {John iii. 36---really spoken by John
the Baptist.) He do es not say it will come, but it 'abid eth on him•' For
every man is born v:ith it; VJheref'ore the apostle says: •we were by nature
the children of wrath, even as others.' (Eph.88.3) Now, as men were lying
U~der this wrath by reason of their original sin, and as this original
sin was:.:ithe more heavy and deadly in proportion to the number and magnituae
(oont • on the next page)

a complete revelation of Holy.illod to unholy man.

The sacrifj.ce

was necessary to allov1 an adequate justification of theatvu!:tied.:
relation between man and God, that is, to bring man nnd God
into harmony and direct communion of one accord of will--At-one-ment :26 Again, it is the case, that this, another

oont.
'
of the actual sins which were added to it,, there was need for a );ediator,,
that is, for a reconciler,, ·who by the offering of one saorifice, of whioh
all the sacrifices of the law and the prophets were types, should take
a\'•ay this wrath. 1''herefore the apostle says: 'For if, when we 'were enemies,
we were reconciled to God by the death of Eis Son,, much more, being reconoiled, we shall be saved by His life.' (Rom.v. 10) Now when God is said
to be angry, we do not attribute to Him such a displeasure against sin
by the name 'anger,,-·' a v10 rd tra.nsf erred by analogy from human emotions.
But our being reconciled to God through a Eediator, and receive th·e Holy
Spirit, so thnt rrn who were enemies are mand sons ••• : This is the g_race of
God through Jesus Christ our Lord." Enchiridion,, XXX:II,, 33,, Transl~tion
Shaw, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit. Vol.III,, p.248.
'
26. "The grace Of GOd could not have been more r;raoiously OOIIllil€Jllded
to us than thus, that the only Son of God, remaining unchangeable in \Hims elf, should asstune humanity, and should give us the hope of His love~
by means of the mediation of a human nature,, through which we, from th.e
condition of men. might oome to Him who wc.s so far off,--.. the irrmortal ',
from the mortal; the unchangeable from thG ·changeable; the just from the
unjust; the blessed from the wretohea. ••• m De Civitate Dei, X, 28. Translation, Ibid,p. 199.
11

• • •.If,, as•• .it must needs be that all men, so long as they· are
mortal,, are also miserable,, we must seek an intermediate who is not only ',
man,, but also God,, that by the interposition of His blessed mortality,, He·
p}ey bring men our of their mortal misery to a blessed immortality ••• I do
not say that Re is Eediator because He is the Word, for as the word He is
supremely blessed and supranely immortal,, and therefore from miserable
rnortals; but He is 1.:ediator as He is ma~ for by His humanity He shows us
that,, in order to obtain that blessed and beatioio good,, we need not seek
other mediators to lead us through the successive steps of this attainment,,
but that the blessed and beatific Go\l, having Hims elf become a partaker of
'
(cont. on the next page)

-168phase of Augustine's theology can be resolved finally into
his idea of the love of God.

The very coming of a Mediator

is but an example of the love of God for man.
tbe'.S~crifice,,

The fact of

the Justification,, and the Reconciliation are

but manifestations of the order of a divine love which passes
into man's order and redeems man's rebellious will, frames
new value-objectives, and leads towards Sanctification and
Everlasting life.

27

The Mediator is the technical means of

cont.
our humanity. has afforded us ready access to the participation of His
divinity •••• Therefore, when He chose to be in the .form of a servant end
lower than the angels, that He might be our I.1ediator, He remained higher the.:
the angels, in the form of' God.---Hims-eli' at once the way of life on earth
and life itself in heaven.tr De C'ivitate Dei, IX, 15. Translation, Ibid ••
P• 174.
27. This is the universal way of the soul's deliverance, which the
holy angels and the holy prophets formerly disclosed where they oould
among the few men who found the grace of God. and especially in the Hebrew
nation ••• In some explicit statement, and in raany obscure foreshadowings,
this WlliW was declared; but latterly c::ime the llediator Himself in the flesh.
and His blessed apostles, revealinG how the grave of the New Testament
more openly explained what had been obscurely hinted to preceding generation, in conformity with the relation of the ages of the human faoe •••
This way purifies the whole man, and prepares the mortal in all his parts
for immortality. Fbr, to prevent us from seeking for one purgation for
the part which Porphyry calla-. intellectual, and another for the part he
calls spiritual, and another for the body itself, our most mighty and
truthful Purifier and Saviour assumed the whole human nature. Except by
the way, which has been present among men both during the period of the
promises and of the proclamation of their fulfillment, no man has been
delivered, no man is delivered, no man shall be delivered." De Civitate
E_e_!, X,32, Translation, Ibid., P• 202.
"It was therefore truly said that man is ol eans ed only by a
Principle, although the Platonists erred in speaking in the plural of
Principles. But Porphyry, being under the dominion of these envious powers,
.
(cont. on the next page)

man's Salvation.

The love of God is its source.

By placing the main focus of attention upon the work done

by the Media:t-or in human Salvation, Augustine removes the
possibility 9f thinking of Salvation as a human accomnlishment.

cont.
refused to recognize that Christ is the Principle by '\vhos e incarnation we
are purified. Indeed he despised Him, because of the flesh itself which He
assumed, that He offer a sacrifice for our purifioation,---a great nystery,
unintelligible to Porphyry's pride, which that true and benignant Redeaner
brought low by His humility, manifesting Himself to mortals by the mortality which He assumed, •• ,., Thus the good and true Mediator showed that it is
sin vvhioh is evil, and not the substance or nature of the flesh; for
this, together with the human soul, could ·nithout sin be both assumed and
retained, . and laid dovm in death, and changed to something better by
resurrection. He showed also that death its elf, al though the punishment
of sin, was submitted to bv Him for our sakes vii thout sin, and must not be
evaded by sin on our part,~ but rather, ii' opportunity serves be borne for
righteousness' sake. For he '"Jas '.\ble to expiate sins by dying, beoause He
both died, and not for sin of Eis own •••• The Principle is neither the
flesh nor the human soul in Christ, but the Word by which all things were
made. The flesh, therefore, does not by its own virtue purify, but by
virtue of the 1'\brd by which it w::i.s assumed, when' the Word became flesh and
dwelt among us.' (J~hn 1:14) For speaking mystioally of eating His flesh,
when those who did not understand Him were offended and went away, saying,
'This is a hard saying,who can hear it'?' He answered to the rest who remained, •rt is the Spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing.•
(John vi. 6·64) The Principle, therefore, having assumed a human soul and
flesh, cleanses the soul and flesh of believers. Therefore, when the Jews
asked Him who He was, He answered that He was the Principle (or 'the beginning' John viii. 25) And this we oarnal and feeble men, liable to sin,
and involved in the darkness of ignorance, aould not possibly understand,
unless we were cleansed and healed by Him, both by means of what we were,
and of what we vJere not. For we v1ere men, but we were not rie;hteous; whereas in His incarnation there was a human nature~. but it was righteous nnd
not sinful. This is the mediation whereby a hand is stretched to the lapsed
and fallen; this is the seed 'ordained by angels,' by whose ministry the
law also was given enjJining the worship of one God, and promising that
thia Mediator should come" De. Civitate Dei X, 24. Translation, Ibid.,
p. 194.
-

The work of man in working out his own salvation.is meager in
comparison with that which has already been done.
the way is clear and comparatively easy.

Futhermore,

No formula must be

deduced and followed from process to process.

God has al-

ready done all that needs to be done to make salvation

~osaible,

Man needs only to narticipate in that which has already been
provided.

Salvation is not to be thought of as man's affair.

It is entirely God's affair.
These teachings are consistent with Augustine's doctrines of nredeatination and election.

God saves whom he

wills to save, because he has already elected that it will
be the plight of some to be lost and some to be saved.

Yet,

Augustine attempts to preserve the free choice of all individual sou]sby insisting that each individual soul does have
freedom 1n its choice of the nature it is to assume in this
life, and hence, in the next.

Augustine does not negate free

will by his doctrines of predestination and election.

The

latter are to be understood in the sense that God does allow
some to be lost and some to be saved, and in his wisdom, knows
how each individual soul will choose during the time of choice.
Salvation never occurs in any complete sense during
earthly existence.

It has been made possible in the past,·

and it begins in the nresent, but it does not come to its
fullness until its fruition in heaven.

There are degrees of

its realization on earth, however, in the sense that Sanctifir•
cation is a genuine human possibility.

Salvation, 1tse}.f, is

conceived of as a positive value---the addition of other
higher values to existence---rather than as a negative one,
namely, the removal of disagreeable factors from human existence ••• None of the negative elements of human existenoe are
removed when Salvation occurs on the human scene.

They ·exist

as potently as ever, if not more so, along with the positive
values acQured.

Salvation on earth can be thought of only

as a meager sort of Salvation in comparison with Salvation
in heaven.
It is

inte~esting

that Augustine does not think of

Salvation in heaven simply as

11

going to heaven," but as the

unlimited and complete beatific vision of God: supreme joy,
happiness, and satisfaction, both soul and body (a new body)
recognizing the knowledge and love of God forever.

Augustine

conjectures that something of this sort must have been the
condition of Adam and Eve before sin and the Fall.
To summarize the development of Augustine's idea of
Salvation to this noint, it has been suggested that Augustine
attributes human salvation solely to the work of the Mediator,
Jesus Christ, so as to rule out human works or merit as its
basis.

Salvation occurs when the soul becomes aware of the

love of God in Christ and allows that order of love to effect

a transformation of human nature,
human will.

and significantly,

or

the

Some men are acted upon directly by the Holy

Spirit so as to come under the revelation of the nature of
God in Christ as channelled by the witness of the scriptures
through the Church.

The degree of response to this revelation

determines the degree of Salvation, and also, the degree of
Sanctification.

Salvation is never adequate or c9mpletely

certain in earthly life, being decidedly hampered by the
depraved condition of both body and the soul (the .flesh).
Passing from a consideration of Augustine's ideas as to
how Salvation is obtained, we now consider in more detail
what Augustine means by Salvation.
It is significant to note that Augustine apnears to
reduce man to the status of a spectator in his entire religious
outlook on life.
never not

As Augustine sees the situation~ man should

religiously on his own initiative.

Religious

situations are those in which the individual is acted upon
by some force or personality outside of himself, a force that_
is larger and better than he is.
response to God's overpowering

Religion is man's meek
majesty and goodness.

is essentially "aggressive" in his apn:roach to man;

Qod
taking

the initiative, he must overpower man with his love before
man can be saved.

Salvation is effected by the adjustment

of the human will to the will of God.

The major efforts and energies of the individual are to
be directed not toward the laying hold of Salvation but
toward the exnanaion and development of it to its fullest
degree.

"Works" are not for the purpose of atta1n1n.g

Salvation, but rather for the purpose of enhancing the
degree of Salvation once it has been attained.

The develop-

ment and expansion of Salvation is identical with what
Augustine means by Sanctification so that the degree

or

Salvation is the same thing as the degree of Sanctification.

28

It can be said, then, that the method of Salvation,
il)llSO'tla.ras the individual can do anything about it, lies

-

simply in "faith."

29

Christ is

~

way of Salvation, and

28. Augustine thinks of Sanotifioation in terms of perfection. To
some extent the stages of his mystioism may be considered as degrees of
perfeotion and degrees or perf eotion.
29. "It was by faith in thid mystecy, and godliness of life, that
purifioation was attainable even by the saints of old, whether before the
law was given ts the Hebrews ••• or in the periods under the law.•••''~
Civita.te Dai,, X1 25, Translation.. Doda, in Nioene Fathers,,_2f.-._ cit.,
V. II 1 P• "'m.
11
• • • Faith1 by whioh men believe in God .. is above all things necessary
in this mortal life, most full as it is of errors and hardships." De
.Trinitate, XIII, vii. (10) Translation, Haddan in Nicene Fathers,~· 2.!!•

Vol. III, P• 171.

"~t this part or the human raoe to whioh God has promised pardon
and a share in his eternal kingdom, oan they be restored through the merit
of their own works? God forbid. For what good work can a lo.st man perform,
except so far as he has been delivered from perdition? Can they do any•~·
thing by the free determination or their own will? Again I ~ay .. God forbid.
For it was by the evil use or his free will that man destroyed both it and
hirnself....1'fhat kihd of liberty, I aslc, can the bond-slave possess., exoept
when it pleases him to sin.

man's means of attaining unto Christ is by faith and faith
alone.

Augustine's meaning of Salvation, however, incor-

porates .. more than this.

Contrary to many of his

contempor~ry

Christain theologians, Augustine gives a positive meaning
to Salvation.

~ot

only is Salvation saved from a dire con-

sequence in the future life, it is being saved to partication
in positive joys and satisfaction.

Salvation begins in the

present, at the time of initial faith and realization of
God's love, continues all through this life, and then
flourishes into an even greater nositive effect in heaven.
Salvation is the positive value of the direct narticipation
in the knowledge anci love of God, the intellectual delight
of living under a more or less continuous beatific vision of
God.
Augustine suggests that there are seven degrees, or
levels of perfection, unto which the soul may attain •..The
first degree renresents no great amount of success or accomnlishment for human souls, as it is the bare nrinciple of
animation or life in bodies, the existing of bodies as a
unity in the midst of their changing circumstances.

It is

the rudimentary unity of all organisms, common to men, animals,
and

plants~

growth, germination, preservation, adaptation, etc.

merely for the nurnose of continuing to exist as an organism.
The second degree of' the soul is that of sensation,

...:17sthat degree significantly possessed by animal organisms.
Augustine writes of this level:
"..,cNotioe in the higher living organism how great is the
soul's power in the senses and in looomotio~, which those
things that are fixed to the earth by roots ca!mot possihly
share with use. The soul applies its elf to the sense of
touch; through it feels and distinguisheJ. hot and cold,
rough and smooth, hard and soft,, light and heavyei "° eto. 30
.!!2. quanti tate animae,, .X,"'{XI!I,, 71.

In this level the body itself becomes utilized for some other
objective.

It attains a function beyond the level of its own

mere existence as an organism.

For example, in this level

there is more than the automatic generation of offspring.

Here

care, protection, and nourishment is provided for the offspring.
(

In this level the soul functions by habit or in-

stinct, and is directly affected or determined in some measure
by its enviroment.

The third level of the soul may be called the "Artistic"
level.

It is the level of memory, measurement and speculation.

It is the first level that is a distinctively human level,
for the animal lower than man cannot participate completely
in this level.

Out of this level develops expression, honors,

the state, peace and war, and social institutions.
level of reason, poetry, play and music.

30.

It is the

It is the heritage

Translation by J. J. lfolfa.hon, s. J. in Vol. II of' the Works
of ~1ugustine in Fathers 2.£. ~Church,, op. oit.,, P• 138.

shared by all rational souls, both the learned and
the good and the wicked.

unlearned~

Herein the soul onerates not of

the body' or 'through the body' as in the first two i!'l.stun11e1:1
but 'about the body.'
The fourth level of the soul is the level of Virtue.
plane of

develo~ment

occurs.

Augustine writes of this level:
11

~his

is the level in which moral goodness

From this point the soul dares to rank its elf not only
before its own body, if it is a part of the material world.
but even before the whole material world itself, and it
dares to think that the good of the world is not its good
and to distinguish and despise the countfeits or its ovm.
power and beauty. Henoe, the more it becomes the cause of
its ovm. delight, the more it dares to withdraw from baser
things and wholly to ol eans e its elf' and to make its elf'
spotless and stainless •••• The soul perceives mare and more ....
how great is the difference between itself purified and
itself defiled." 31
~ quanti tate animae, XXXIII, 73.

In this level the soul begins to become concerned not about
its body, as was the case in the previous level, but about
itself.

It is the level in which the soul enters into the

warfare against evil both against evil on the outside of it
and the evil inside its own nature.

It undergoes a heroic

struggle to avoid attachment and allegiance to lower values,
the various

11

the world.

In

31.

alurements 11 of the lower, inferior orders--short~

this level is the level of the battle

Translation,-liid •• P• 139.

for justice.

Virtue is an action of the soul in establiehing

the good instead of the bad.

No divine intervention is

necessarily needed at this level.
The fifth degro6 of the soul is the level of peace, or
tranquility.

After the soul succeeds in cleansing itself from

all its stains, it "settles within itself" in joy n.nd pco.ce
without fear, and is not disturbed at all for any reason of
its own.

This is the level in which the soul attains con-

fidence in itself, that is, its own inherent worth and greatness No lonber does it fight to nurity itself but rather fights

to keep itself pure.

In this level the soul grasps the truth

of its own innate or natural dignity (before the fall) and
bounds forth in ecgerness, with a yearning desire to know more
truth •.
The .aixth degree of the soul is the highest level of
11

act1vity 0 in which the soul may participate.

it the level of "o.pnroach. 11

Augustine terms

He writes concerning it:

"Now, this «ctivity. the yearning to understand '°;hnt things aro
true and best, is the soul's highest vision. B~ond this it has
nothing more perfect, more noble, nnd moro true. This. therefore,
v.ri.11 be the sixth degree of ootivity. For# it is one thing to have
tho eye of the soul so clear that it does not look nbout idly or
incautiously and s eo 't'.rhnt is unseemly, and onothe:r thing to protect
nnd strengthen tho her:ilth of the eye; and it is another thing,. ngai~
to direct a calm nnd stondy gaze upon thnt whioh is to be seen. Those
who msh to do this before they are cleansed nnd healed are so driven
back by the lir;ht of truth that they m~ think there is in it not
only nothing good, but much of evil. They deey it the name of truth
and by reason 0£ piti~ble yeilding - - - oont~nued --

to onrnal indulgence, the;y draw back into the cavern or their
own darkness,, enduring it b eoasue th6y are ill and cursing
the only remedy of their distemper. Whence, divinely inspired,
the prophet most fittingly prays~ 'Create a clean heart in
me,, 0 Lord, and renew a right spirit in my breast.' (Ps. 50:12)
The spirit is right, I believe, if it keeps the soul in its
quest for truth from losing··the. •m.y and ·going wrong• :Suoh a
spirit is not re:.1ev1ed in a man unless his heart fires shall
have been m3do clean, that is, unless he restrain his thoughts
and dra•N thEm off from all mundane attachment and defilanent." 32
~ quantitate animae, XXXIII, 75.

This is the level in which the soul focuses itself awri:.y from
itself and toward God.

It should be noticed that here is a

difference between soul turning away from sin, evil will, or
the depravaties of the body into itself and soul turning sway

from itself.

In order to get to God the soul has to get away

-

not only from the certain evils of the body but from the inherent positive value of the soul itself.
,The seventh and last level of the soul is the level of
the vision and contemplation of truth which Augustine called
the level of "Contemplation."

Augustine's own words in des-

cription of this level are important:
" ••• we have oome to the seventh and last step, not really
a step, but a dwelling pla.oe to which the previous steps have
brought us. Vlhat shall I say are the delights, what the
enjoyment, of the supreme and true God; what breath or
undisturbed peaoe and eternity? These are the wonders that
great souls have declared, so far as they brought themselves
to speak of' thes a realities, great souls or incomparable
greatness, who, we believe, beheld and now behold these things.
This I now d~re say to you in all simplicity, that, if we
hold vdth all perseveranoe to the course that God lays dovin
for us and which we have undertaken to hold, we shall come
by God's power and wisdom to that highest Cause, or Supreme

-

32. Trans!ation, Ibid., P• 139.

-179 ...
Author, or Supreme Pri11oiple of rdl things, or whatever other
name you would deem worthy of so great a Reality."
£!:. quantitate animae, XXXIII, 76. 33

Augustine's idea of the meaning of Salvation, or union with God,
is, of course, idonticalwith his doctrine of Contemplation,
the seventh and highest level of the soul.
in v1hich the soul becomes

11

words a.bout the situation.
only the soul.

It is the level

in God 11 to quote Augustine's own
The soul still i i the soul and

It has not changed its nature from that

nature with which it was created; it has only nurified that
nature from its defilement.
As for the exact meaning, or inner meaning of

thee~r1onc()·

of contemplation itself, Augustine thinks that one word will
express iG: joy.

In the experience of communion, or union with

deity 1 the soul knows the highest ecstasy possible to man--It is a complete abandonment of itself, i.e. its self-direction, within the control of God.

Augustine comments on his

own feelings when in the state of Contemplation, viz.:
that I .... loved Thee. and had no phantasm
inst0ad of Thee. And yet I did not merit to enjoy my God
but vias transported to Thee by Thy beauty, and presently
torn away from Thee by mine om weight, sinking with e;-i'ief
into these inferior thine;s •••• Yet was there a romembranoe
of Thee with me; nor did I any v1 . . y doubt that there was one
to whom I might cleave,, but that I was not yet one who oould
oleave unto Thee •••• lmd most oertain I was that Thy 'invisible

u ••• I marvelled

33,

Translation. ~., P• 142.

things from the creation or the ,,,:orld are olearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even Thy tit.crl:lar ·power and Godhead.'
(Rom. i.20) Fbr., inquiring nhence it was that I admired the beauty
of bodies whether clestial or terrestrial, and what supported me in
judging correctly on things mutable ••• inquiring then, wheno e I so
judged, seeing I did so judge, I had found the unohaneeable and 34
true aterni ty of' Truth above my changeable mind ..... "
..C.nnfAssiopum l.ilU:i tredecim. VII,16(23)

In another passa3e, in which Augustine is recounting a conversation he had with his mother shortly before her death, he
reports an experience that might be considered the experience
of Contemplation.

He writes:

" ••• we then 'were conversing alone very pleasantly; and, 'forgetting
those things whioh are before' (Phil.3 :13) we wet-e seeking between
ours.elves in the presence of the Truth •••• We opened wide the mouth
of' our heart after those supernal streams of Thy fountain, t the
fountain of life,' whioh is ' vdth Thoe:' that being sprinkled
with it no cording to our capacity. we might in some measure weigh
so high a mystery. And when our oonversation had arrived at that
point, that the very highest pleasure of' the carnal senses, and
thnt in the very brightGst material light, s eetned b~r reason of the
sweetness of the.t life not only not worth of' comparison, but not
e-·.rnn of mention, we. li:N::inc; ourselves ,·1ith a more ardent affection
towards 'the '3 elfsame.' did gradually pass through all corporeal
, thinGs, an<l even the heaven itself. r:hence sun, and zr.oon, and
stars shine upon the earth; yea, we soared hit;her yet by inward
musing, and discoursing, and admirine; Thy '\\urks; and we came to our
oYm minds* and vJent beyond them, that we might advance ns high as
that region of' unfailing plen.ty. where Thou deed est Israel for ever
vrl. th the food of truth, nnd made, both whioh have been, and whioh
are yet to come ••• lmd while we were thus spe~king, and straining
after here, vve slightly touched her rdth the whole effort of our
heart; and we sighed, and there left bound •the first-fruits of the
Spirit;• and returned to the noise of our own mouth, v-1here the 35
word uttered has both beginning and end • 11
Conf essiopum libri tredeoim, IX,x, (26)

34.

P• 111.
35.

--

Transb.tion by Pilkington, in Nio ene Fathers, op. oit., Vol .I

-

Tt-anslation, Ibid., P• 137.

Perhaps still another

exami~.3

in which he

dedic~tes

e.t the time of Contemplation would be instructive.

his feeling
~vhile

writing

on the subject of God's vlisdom, he exclaims:
"Y..1hnt is that which shines through me,, and strikes my heart vd. thout
injury, and I both shudder and burn? I shudder inasmuch as I run
unlike it; and I burnina.s cuohe.s I run like it. It is 'disdom it•
self that shines throue;h me,, clearing rey cloudiness •• •"
36
· Conf'esaionum libri tredooim, XI,, ix (II)

The primary feeling at the time of the experience is joy•• supreme mental elation which is intellectual rather than
sensuous in character.

Connected with this joy is a certain

feeling of satisfaction, or temporary peace of mind.

There

is also a feeling of incompleteness the inner knowledge that
the intensity of the joy experienced is not of the final level
of the full potentialities of the mind to experience joy.
The evidence seems to be adequate to prove that the experience itself is solely an intellectual experience.

Augustine

does not attempt to explain union with God except in terms of
a mental awa:ren.ess of other mental life.

In the strictest sense

it can readily be seen that no actual union between man and

God can take place if God and man are to be regarded as existing
in relation to one another but with quite different essences.
There can be no real merger between the two because there are

36.

Translation.

~.,,

P• 166.

no identical entities.

The difference is a difference in

kind, the difference between that of Creature and

Creator~

matter and spirit, matter plus form(body and pure form.
"Union with God" in Augustine's mysticism can only be the
existence in close relationship of two distinctively different
substances, one of which exists as pure snirit, the other
existing as matter somewhat spiritualized so as to be able
to appreciate and enjoy the order of the spirit.

It is as

if some radium were brought near a piece of copper so as to
·affect its nature by radiation---the copper still remaining
only copper and the radium remaining radium.

Yet, it will also

be seen, that there must exist a certain similarity between
the two different essences in order for there to be any basis
of

unde~standing

and appreciation.

Man must be enough like

God intellectually to be able to perceive an intellectual
being.
Augustine's own comments in refer0nce to his experience
of the nature of God are important at this point to illustrate
his doctrine of the •Otherness' of the nature of God and the
essentially intellectual character of the experience of union:

:x

entereid, and with the eye of my so~l (suoh as it was) saw
above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Unghangeable Light.
Not this oomrnon light, whioh all flesh may look upon, nor as it were.
a greater one of the same kind, as though the brightness of this
~hould be muoh n:ore resplendent, and r:ith its greatness fill up all
;hings. Not like this was that licht, but different,. yea,. very
different from all these. Nor was it above my mind as oil is above

f· • •

Tiater, not as heaven above earthJ but above ii: we.a; becauso it made
me,, and I below it, because I was made by it. He who knows the1:.:.~ll
·'.,and true Love, and loved Eternity& Thou art my God; to Thee c1.r.:
I sigh both night and day. rrhen I first knew Thee, thou lifted~t
me up,, that I might see there was that whioh I might see, and tl.et
yet it was not I that did see. .And Thou didst beat baok the ini'i:t:"111•·
ity of my sight, pouring forth upon me nost strongly Thy beruns of
light, and I trembled with love and fear; and I f-pnr; and I found
myself to be far off from Thee, in the region of dissimularity, as
if I hear this voice of Thine from on high: '! am the food of
strong men; grov1, and thou shalt feed upon me; nor shalt thou
convert me, like the food of thy flesh, into thee, but thou
37
sho.l t be converted into me.~••• • 11
Con£essiontun libri. tr~deoim, VII,x., (16) .

It should be noted that throughout this passage the in' it!ative comes from God in the sense that God's light shines
on man making man different, and not in the sense that man's
light shines on God illuminating his nature.

Thia is the

doctrine of "Revelationn in its purest form---the simple asser •tion

th~t

God illuniines man by the force of his own. energies,

not that man illumines himself.

Our suggestion is that

Augustine uses the seven stages to

ex~lain

what in effect does

happen when man is saved by the forces of God acting unon him
from without.

All of the seven stages take place in the Sal;

vation or man, even though Salvation is to be thought ot in
terms of what God has done.

Man must cooperate with God in the

process of working out his own salvation on, the basis of that
Which has already been done, and the seven processes are the

-

31. Translation,

-Ibid., P• l09.

:··

.

-

changes that the soul undergoes in thie process.

In a rather

loose sense, these processes may be termed either Sanctification
or Salvation,, for the consequent practical meaning of Salvation
in its latter stages of
by Sanctification.

~evelopment

,is the same as what is meant
, .. .'°

He writes:

"We ~e inquiring of' course, about the power of' the soul, ( r ef'erring
to the seven stages) and the soul has the power to perform all these
aots simultaneously, although it may think that it is really doing only
that aot which implies some effort, or, at least, some fear. For it
performs chat aot with greater attention than the rest.-·. • • In no aot
does God abandon the soul either tor punishment or reward, for Re has
judged it to be the most beautiful, so that it is the eiplemplar ..of' all
reality. • • • To the soul,indeed, 1s given free ohoioe • • • and the
gift of free ohoioe is suoh that, making use of it in any way whatever,
the soul does not disturb any portion of the divine order and law.
It is conferred by the all vdse and all prevailing Lord of all""oreation.
But, to see these things as they should be seen is the gift or· a-·· few
and one becomes fit for the gift only by true religion. For1 true
religion is that by whioh the soul is united to God so that it binds
itself again by reconciliation toHilni"ram whom-it had broken off, -as it
were by sin. Religion, then, in the third aot forms · ~ link with the
soul and begins to lead it1 in the f'o'llrth, it purifies; in the fifth,.
reforms; ·in the sixth, it leads into; in the seventh, it feeds. And
this is done rather quickly, in some oases; in others slowly --depending upon the worth or each one 16 lov·e ana merits. • • • 11
38
E! quantitat~ animas, XXXV- XXXVI, 79-80.

In this passage Augustine clearly indicates that the seven
processes are not to be taken in any,scient1f1c sense as a
formula to follow as a way of salvation, but rather are to be
seen as the manner in which the soul cooperates with God in
the nrocess of allowing its salvation to become an actualized

:a.

TransTatTon, MoMahon, in m.oene Fathers.

2.f.•

~··

·'

P• 146-147.

or practical reality.

It is a situation in which man neither

saves himself' solely by himself, nor is saved from without
totally and completely without any cooperation on his part.
Augustine realizes the need for a harmony between the two extremes of either God doing everything in salvation or man doing
everything.

In this manner he preserves his basic emnhasis

that Salvation is to be thought of in terms o.t' Gas's action,
and yet brings the free will of man into the situation in a
significant way.

He states in the above passa3e that both the

initiative and providence of God and man's free will apply in
the situation.
Two other examnles from his W?'iting illustrate our theory.
In the Confessions he clearly indicates that the vision occurs
as the result of an essentially introspective process.

Yet,

he insists that it was not merely an ordinary instance of selfintrospection.

He was deliberately lead and directed into the

process by the initiative of God.

He writes:

"And being thenoe warned to return to myself, I entered into my
inward self,, Thou leading me on; and I was able to do it,, for
Thou wert become my helper • • • • "
Confessionum libri
tredeo:izn,, VII. x. (16) 39

In the same book, after describing the
joy of

hi~

intensity of the

the contemplative experience he attempts to explain the

39. Translation, Pilkington,, in Nicene Fathers; op.

Vol., l. P• 109.

!.!.!::

psychological routine leading up;to it as followsF
"• •• thus by degreea, I passed from bodies to th~ soul, which makes
use of the senses of the body to peroeivei and thence to its inward
faculty, to the bodily sens es ( which) represe¢ outward things, and
up to •1hioh reaoh the capabilities of beasts; and thence, again, I
passed on to the reasoning faculty, unto which whatever is received
from the senses of the body is referred to be judged, whioh also,
finding its elf to be variable in me,- raised. its elf up to its'"own ·
intelligenoe1 and from habit drew away my'thoughts, withdrawing itself
from the oro,·:ds of oontradiotory phantasJnSJ that so it might find out
that light by which it v1as besprinkled, when without all doubting, it
cried out , •that the unchangeable was ·to 'De preferred before the
changeable: t whenoe also it knew that unchangeable , whioh, unless it
had in some known it could have had no sure ground for preferring it to
the changeable. And thus, with the flash oi' a trembling glance, it
arrived at that whioh is. And then I saw Thy invisible understood by
the things tnat are made (Rom. i. 20). l3ut I was not able to fix my
gaze thereon; and my infirniity being beaten baok, 1 was thrown again
on my aooustomed habits. carrying along with me naught but a loving
memory thereof, and an appetite for what I had. as it were smelt the
odor of, but was not yet able to es!; • 11
Coni'essionum libri
40
tredeoim, VII, 16 (23).

40. Translation, Ibid., p. 111. Augustine also describes this prooess
in another passage:
'"V'Tith my external senses, as I could. I viewed the -world, and
noted that life whioh my body derives from me, and these my senses. Thence
1 advaned im1ardly into the recesses of my memori;.·--the manifold rooms,
wondrously full of multi tudionous 't'ieal th; and I considered and was afraid,
and oould discern none or these things without Thee, and found none oi' then
to be Thee. Nor was I myself the disoovere~ of these things,•--!, who went
over them all, and laboured to distinguish and to value everything aooording
to its dignity, accepting some things upon the report of my senses, and
questioning about others whioh I felt to be mixed up with myself, distinguish•
ing and numbering the reporters themselves, and in the vast storehouse or my
memory investigating some fhings, laying up others, taking out others.
Neither was I myself when I did this (that is, that ability or mine whereby
J: did it), nor was it Thou, for Thou art that never-failing light whioh I
took counsel of as to them all. whether they were what they were, and what
was their worth.... Nor in all these whioh I review v~hen consul ting Thee,.
find I a secure plaoe for my soul, save in Thee, into whom my scattered
members may be gathered together, a:1d nothing of ine depart from Thee. And
sometimes Thou doest introduce me to a most rare affection, inwardly, to an
inexplicable sweatilesa, whioh, ii' it should be perfected in me, I know not to
what point that life might not arrive •••• '' Confessionum libri tredeoim, X
xl, (65) Translation, Ibid., P• 161.

-

.

Continuing in the same vein of argument, he reaches a near
poetic level of language in indicating that the same experience
is possible to everyone:
" ••• Ir to any man the tumult of the flesh were silenoed,---silenoed
the phantasies of earth, waters, and air,•--silenoed, too the poles;
yea, the very soul to be silenced to herself, and go beyond herself
by not thinking of herself--·silenoed fancies and imaginary revelation~
every tongue, and every sign, and wh'.'.'tso ever exists by passing away •• •
having only quickened our ears to Him who created them, and He alone
speaks not by them, but by Himself, that Yle may hear His word, not
by fleshly tongue, nor angelic voice, nor sound of thunder, nor the
obscurity of a similtude,, but that vre might hear Him-·-Him whom in
these we love---without these, like as we two now strained ourselves.,
and with rapid thought touched on the Eternal Y:iisdom which remained
over all. If this could be sustained, and other visions of a far
different kind be withdrawn, and this one ravish and absorb, and
envelope its beholder amid these inward joys so that his life might
be eternally like that one moment of knov;ledge which we now "'i.~heil
.
after, were not this 'Enter thou into the joy of Thy Lord?'
41
(Matt. xxv. 21) 11 Confessionum libri tredeoim, IX,, x. {26)

Man must do something in order to hear the voice of God, in
order to allow the light of revelation to shine unon him.

A

41,. Translation, Ibid., 137. Augustine comments in no re detail oonoerning the nature of the mjstio insight:
" . 0 Al though we see some things with the body, others w.i th the
mind., the distinction between these t~~ sorts of sight is seen by the mind,
not the body. The objects which are beheld by the mind have need of no senses
of the body to let us know thElt they are true, but those perceived through
the body cannot be included in our knowledge if there is no mind to which
these incoming messages can be referred. 21.nd it is a fact that those incoming
messages, which it is said, in some wise, to receive, are left outside, but
it fonns imagGs of them, th1t is, incorporeal likenesses of physical things,
whioh it com.~its incorporeally to the memory, so that from there, when it
has the will or power, it may give judgment on them, after bringing them out
of oustody and displaying them in the sight of its thought.. And men it
has its full powers, it also makes a distinotion between these two: what it
left outside in its corporeal aspect, what it beholds within as a likeness.,
and it discerns that the fonner is not there,, but the latter is. In the same
·
(continued on next page)

Certain purification and discipline is demanded but such is not
the sole determining factor in the situation.

The greater de-

termination lies outside of what man can do.
It is the distinctive mystical doctrine of Augustine that
man is not made moral by his own actions in themselves alone
but by the permeation of his natural and now depraved order by
something superior in value and essense to that which he knows,
and ever may know as his own nature.

The love of God in pro-

viding redemption through the Mediator is t:t e ultimate source
of the mystical experience.

By this love the individual is con-

verted from a depraved evil self willed and self-seeking individual into a person who wills and acts according to the will and
love of God.
The conclusion would

peverthelesa, to follow that

appear~
~

the soul does work to some extent in order to receive the full
ble~sing

of Salvation.

The degree of benefit attained from

cont.
you think of my corporeal faoa •. while I am absent; the imago is. present to
you,. but the faco whosG image it is absent; the one is body, the other the
inoorporial likeness of bodyu .. Not all the .Apostles saw Christ. Therefore
He says: 'So long a time have I been with you, and you have not known me?'
But he who knew 'what is the breadth and length mid height and depth, and
the ohority of Christ which surpasseth all kmwledge,' saw both Christ and
the Father. For ,,-,,e do not now know Christ aooording to the flesh, but
aooording to the spirit. Fbr •our breath, Christ the Lord_, is taken before
our .face • and may He in His mercy deign to fill us unto ru.1 the fullness
, we may be able to See Him.• " Epistolae CXLVII. 31, 38, 52.
of God that
Translation by Sister Wilfred Parsons, in The Work;; of Augustine_, The Letters,
Vol. III, ~Fathers of~ Church, ~· oit., pP;-~~,206,221. v~ay

Se.lvnli10n appears to vary in
and devotion given to God.

~ccorda.nce

with the sort of ·love

In this manner human free will is pre-

served in his own choice of Salvation, the final judgment being
based upon the individual's resnonse to value, knowledge and love.
Human works in Salvation become the works of religion rather than
the works of Salvation or the works of morality.

Faith is of

continual importance in Salvation for it is by the initial response of Faith that the soul allows itself to be laid hold of
in Salvation and it is by the continued response of faith that
Salvation is allowed to be made continually effective.

Faith

accounts for the growth of the soul through its various nossible
degrees of development along the way of Sanctification and hence
leads directly to the occence of the
.. ,\;j-.£:.:t,!~ vision.42

42. "I think you now agree, after considering all these arguments,
that it is correct to say that •God is not seen in any locality, but in the
olean heart; He is not sought by bodily eyes, nor limited by our sight, nor
held by touch, nor heard by his utterance, nor peroeived in His approach.'
If there is anything of this whioh we do not understand, or about which we
are •otherwise minded, this also God will reveal to us if, whereunto we are
OOI!le, we continue in the same. 1 (Phil. 3:15-16) •For we have oome to believe
that God is not body, but spirit.• (John 4:24); and that 'God is light and in
him there is no darkness' (I. John 1:5) and 'with him there is no change nor
shadow of alteniation' (James 1:17); and that ' He inhabiteth light inaooes•
sible, whom no man hath seen nor can see' (I. Tim. 6:16); and that the Father
and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, (I. John 5:7,8) without any di•
varsity or separateness of nature, and the olean of heart will see Him
(Matt. 5:8); and that 'we shall by like to him, beoaus ewe shall see him as
he is' (I. John 3:2); and that 'God is charity and he that abideth in charity,
abideth in God and God in him' (I. John 4:16); and that we ought to 'follow
Peaoe and holiness, without whioh no man shall see God' (Heb. 12:14); and that
this corruptible and mortal body of ours--shall be ohanged at the resurrection,
and shall put on inoorruption and immortality (I. Cor. 15:53), and that 'it is
·
·' ··.· (Con:t;. ·on next page)
:

...

It must also be pointed out that the various .levels of the
soul do not constitute an exact parallel to a way or ascent in
the way or Salvation.

As has already been mentioned a number

of times, according to Augustine there is only one Way of Sal-

vation, Christ the Mediator.

Life on earth is not to be inter-

preted as a journey on the road to Salvation, for the journey
of human life on earth is not the same as the entrance into the

Cont.
eown a natural body. it shall rise a spiritual body.' (I. Cor. 15:44). when
the Lord will •reform the body of our lo-vvness' and make it 'Like to the body
or his glory' (Phil. 3 :21); and that God •made man to his image and likeness .
(Gen. 1:26-27); and that we are renewed in the spirit of our mind unto the
b:lowledgeof God 'according to the image of him that created us.' (Col.3:10)
Those who walk by, faith (II. Cor. 5:7) according to these and other similar
authoritative pronouncements of the holy Scriptures who have made spiritual
progress by an understanding divinely given or strengthened, and who have been
able to assess the value of' spiritual things, have seen that the' mental sight
is superior to the bodily e!ght... and that the objeots of this mental vision
are not limited by space; they are not separated from each other by intervenli.
1ng spaoes and their parts are not less than the whole •••• But. in order to
attain that vision by which we see God as He is,, He has warned us that our
hearts must be cleansed. As then objects are oalled visible in oUl" fashion
ot speaking. so God is called invisible (I. Col 1:15; Tim. 1:17) lest He be
thought to be a material body, yet He will not deprive pure hearts of the
contanplation of Hes substance,, sinoe this great and sublime reward is promised on the Lord's own word, to those who worship and love God. At the time
when He appeared visibly to bodily eyes, He promised that His invisible being
also would be seen by the clean of heart: 'lie that loveth me shall be loved
ot my Father. and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him' (John
14:21) It is oertain that this nature of His. whioh He shares with the Father
is equally invisible as it is equally incorruptible, (I. Tim. 1:17) whioh,
as was said above, the Apostle at once set forth as the divine substance,
oommending it to men vdth what words he could. But, i:f' bodily eyes behold it~
in virtue of the changed nature of bodies at the resurrection, let those who
can assert this look to it: for M'/ part, I am more impressed by the statement
ot him who attributes this to clean hearts, not to bodily eyes, even at the
resurreotion. " Epistolao CXLVII, 46, 48. Translation, Ibid. PP• 214-216.

-191various level of the soul.

4;

As Augustine has already stated in

the previous quotation, all of the various seven stages may

occu~

within a very short time, almost at the same instance, and do
Oo¢Ur.

before there is any knowledge of Salvation at all.

Signif-

icantly, in Augustine they occur when the soul first really ''find.a''~'
God, in the initial dramatic encounter with the Mediator--- when
the individual bas his first genuinely 11 relig1ous 11 experience.
43. 11 As to these three modes of life, the contemplative, the active,
and the composite, although, so lon& as a man's faith is preserved, he may
choose any of than without detriment to his eternal interest, yet he must
never overlook the claims of truth e,nd duty. No man has a right to lead suoh
a life of contemplation as to forget in his own ease the service due to his
neighbor; nor has any man a right to be so immersed in active life as to nogl.:eat ..· the contemplation of God. The charm of leisure must not be indole:r...
vacancy of mind, but the investigation or discovery or truth, that thus e~~ry
man may make solid attainments without grudging that others do the smne. And,
in aoti~e life, it is not the honors or power of this life we should covet.
since all things under the sun are vanity, but we should aim at using our
position and in:f'luence, if these have been honorably attained, tor the welfare of those who are under us •••• 'Accordingly no one is prohibited t.rom the
8earoh af'ter truth, for in this leisure may most laudably be spent; but it is
unseemly to covet the high position requisite for governing the people. even
though that position be held and that government be administered in a seemly
manner. Lnd therefore holy leisure is longed for by the love or truth; but it
is the neoessity or love to undertake requisit-o business. If no one imposes
this burden upon us, we are free to sift and contemplate truth; but if it be
laid upon us, we are necessitated for love's sake to undertake it. And yet:
not even in this case are we obliged wholly to relinquish the sweets of contemplation; for were these to be withdrawn, the burden might prove more than
we could bear.... But the aotual possession of the happiness of this life,
iwithout the b:>pe of what is beyond, is but a false happiness and profound
misery. For the true blessings of the soul are not now enjoyed; :f'or that is
no true wisdon which does not direct all its prudent observations, manly
actions. virtuous self-restraint. and just arrangements. to that end in which
God shall be all and all in a secure eternity and perfect peace. De Civitat·e
XIX, 19-20. Translation by Dods. in Nicene Fathers, 2l'_• ~., Vol7""II, p.413.

As such, Augustine interprets Salvation as something that may and
should occur in the beginning of human life on earth, something
designed to serve as an aid in the journey of 11fe---not a.a a reward for the successful completion of the journey.

Religion, as

he understands it , is but a series of beatific visions.

It is

not a search to f:i.i..1d Gcd---to discover what and how he is 1 but
a relation of more or less continual communion with God---quite
incompletely so on earth under the limitations of the flesh, but
completely so in heaven.

44

In sunnnary, we have seen that the religious approach of
Augustine is one of humility and wonder in his apnroach to the
idea of God, to the existence of things of value in the universe,
and to the phenomena of life and being in general•

Beyond the

world as we know it he sees God and the phenomena of God is more

44.· "But the peaoe whioh is peculiar to ourselves we enjoy now with
God by faith, and shall hereafter enjoy eternally viith Him by sight. But the
pea.oe "·1hioh \-~e enjoy in this life, whether common to all or peculiar to our ...
selves, is :bather the solaoe of our misery than the positive enjoyment of
felioity. Our very righteousness, too, though true in so fnr as it has respeot
to the true good, is yet in this lii'e of suoh a kind the.t it consists rather
in the ranission of sins than in the perfeoting of virtues.... In this, then,
consists the righteousness of a man, that he submit himself to God, his body
to his soul; and his vioes, even when they rebel, to his reason, vhioh either
defeats .or at least resists them; and also that he beg from God graoe to do
his duty, and the pardon of his sins, and that he render to God thanks for all
the blessings he receives. But, in th~t final peaoe to whioh all our righteous•
ness has ref'erenoe, •• it will not be neoesaary that reason should rule vioes
~hioh no longer exist, but God shall rule the man, and the soul shall rule the
body, with a sweetness and !'aoility suitable to the f'elioity of a life whioh
is done with bondage •••• ; and thus the peaoe of this blessedness and the
blessedness of this peaoe shtXll be the supreme good."~ Civitate Dei, XIX, 27.
?ranslation by Marcus Dods, Vol. II ot Nunber Four of Hafner Series, p.341.

-193profound to him that the phenomena of the natural world.

More

than he is interested in system, he is interested in the hiJ.n:.an
heart.

When thinking about ultimate values, he tends toward

~~o

practical, functional, immediate, common-sense meaning ratheI'
than towards speculation as the theoretical unity of things in
relation.

His as au.ranee comes from the heart rather than from

the head.
As such, Augustine has every right to be called a mystic.
Instead of placing the numinous in the technique or phenomena
of mystical experience, he places it one step removed in the
nature and being of the God behind the experience•

Once the

mysterious is incorporated within the nature of God, the techniques and process of mystism become less profound than they
would otherwise appear.
What is Augustine suggesting as to the meanine; of mysticism?
He is suggesting that the main concern in religious life should
be that of a humble response to the evident goodness of God as
it now appears naturally and normally to every man, and in a
special way to certain men.

He is suggesting that the fact of

Salvation should be separated from the joy or degree of Salvation---that the joy of Salvation should be the object of human
discipline rather than the fact of Salvation.

Starting from

his serious view of the necessary nature of ultimates, he concludes that man is quite incapable of causing his own salvation,

..1~..

that such never could be the case for salvation is a issue
broader that the capabilities of man.

As such, then, man

cooperates with God in the Salvation that God has
through the gracious action of the Mediator.

muc~
Jl'.l.era~i.7

provided·~ ... ,.,

Salvation belr..g

essentially that which God has done for man, no tremendous ef·:'ort
is required to attain it---merely the acceptance of that which
has been provided---an act of will·
in the past.

Salvation has already occurred

It is a thing done, an act accomplished.

By his

act oi will man makes a loving response to the impact of the love
of God in Christ---action quite capable to every man regardless
of the depths-of his depravity.
The joy of Salvation comes, at least, at first---in the
initial divine

encounter-~-in

the realization that a way has

already been provided, that the labor for salvation has already
been undergone by Christ in the Sacrifice.

It continues as the

same order of love is expanded by the training of the will into
a greater degree of harmony with the will of God---hence further
purification and moralization.
The high peak of joyous union of God is entirely God controlled unmerited by man---entirely a gift of God.

It is not a

payment but a reward, and not so much a reward for righteousness
as it is a response for love•

This high peak is the comm.union

of man's highest nature, which is still quite meager compared to
God, with God's nature.

It is a communion possible only to men

-195and angels as only angels and human souls are in the image of

God.
In the final analysis, the mysticism
to be entirely a product of revelation.

of

Augustine

appear~

It is something that

comes to man, not because of what he does or what he
but because God desires to reveal his .Q!a! nature.

deserves~

Nothing of

the dignity of man is violated by the outreaching and willf'ul
action of God.

To the contrary, that which is highest in man

recaptures something of the order of the angels, some of the
elevated order of life on which the soul must have existed before it entered into its current evil state.

As the light of

God shines on man, man is once again illuminated, so that his
value becomes more apparent just as man is: not God, but a
creature of the dust formed so as to incorporate within his
being values and meanings that image that which is Ultimate
Value.

Chapter VI
Comparisons and Conclusions
I. Metaphysics
Although there are no exact parallels between the items of
'

the systems of the two men, there does appear to be an undertone
of the teachings of Plotinus throughout the writings of Augustine.
As has been indicated their world views differ considerably both
in the nature

of the items within the system and in the way of

their relation to one another.

They do not have the same ideas

of the nature of God, or of ultimate reality, or of the world,
or of the origin or life, man, and being.

Yet, there is some

similarity in the,ir doctrines of' being, their meanings of value,
and their descriptions of the practical life of man on the earth.
Perhaps the major points of difference in the metanhysics
of Plotinus and Augustine rest

in their difference of opinions

concerning the nature of ultimate reality and in the difference
between emanationism and creationism.

Augustine's idea of God

-197appears to the writer to be a merger or the Creator-Yahweh of
the Old Testament with the One of Plotinus.

There is a vague

simularity in his insisto.ice that God is really the meaning anu
force behind the meaning of reality1 with the Plotinian doctrine
of the resolution of all being into the One.2

Yet, Augustine

must make one dramatic difference: God is not just the world and
the world is not of the same nature aa is God.3

God is assen-

tially different from the nature of the world in his own fundamental order of being.4

He is self-existent apart from the

same order of our physical universe, which is by definition in a
state of change, deterioration, and general denravity.5

Whereas

Plotinus defines ultimate value within our own known scheme of
things and insists that we may see it if we but clear our vision~
Augustine insists that it.is located outside of anything that
may be termed human or ~hysical or matter.7
and reality one and the same thing.

Plotinus makes God

Augustine thinks of reality

in terms of God but does not see all reality to be of the same
kind.

1. See P• 98, 101.
2. PP• 18-19.
~· PD• 106-108.
4• P• 107•
5• PP• 97, 151-161.

b • p'O • 18 I 94 •
7• PP• 107-108.
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rate certain ideas and meanings involved in the One,, the Dlvi:".10·..
Mind and the World-Soul, yet,, his trinity is not at all ps.re.110:..
to the trinity of

·Plotinus.-·-The.tSOn1~incorporates.
:

. ·.·

.

many:·_mtJm.d:ng:-;

and conce'Pts found in Pl.otinus' ideo. of the Divine-Mind,, namely,,
Light, Life, Truth, and in some sense, Being.

The Divine-Mind

is almost identical with the concept of the Logos. , One major
difference is love.

Plotinus never speaks;of the Divine-Mind as

benevolent or conpassionate.

Augustine's doctrine of the Holy

Spirit's dwelling in the heart of the believers is reminiscent
of Plotinus' doctrine of the indwelling of the World-Soul within
the life of the world.

Augustine's idea of the Father incorpo-

rates ideas found in all three items of Plotinus' trinity.
Augustine's God apnears to be more directly involved in and
concerned with the personal affairs of men.

VJbereas the One of

Plotinus is beyond knowledge, beyond truth, and beyond human
feeling, 8 the God of Augustine is capable;of being felt and
known in the heart and mind of man.9 Augustine considers God
to be a mind,lO

and there 1a little or no evidence to show that

he ever thought of him as existing_ as anything beyond the level
or mind.

Augustine also thinks of God as spirit, an idea in-

-199corporated within Plotinus 1 idea of the Divine-Mind.

Augustine

seems to enlarge the idea to include something of Plotinus 1 idea
of pure unity.

Augustine teaches that only God (entire trinity)
is purely spiritual---the only pure spirit. 11 This would make

God as a mind superior to Plotinus' idea of mind.

Apparently

Augustine broadens the concent of God as a mind by developing
the concept "spirit" into proportion similar to Plotinus' One
rather than restricting himself to Plotinus 1 idea of mind.
Plotinus' God is identical with the total reality of the
natural order, 12 Reality exists only as a superficial division
of the being of God;
everything that is

Everything that is real is God and God is

real~

There is a vague mention of this latter

doctrine in Augustine's insistence that the reality of the world
is to be associated with God, and in some vague sense considered
as God, 13 but he also asserts a fundamental difference between
the nature of the world and the nature of God. 14 Instead of one
essence in the universe, there are two basic essences, according
to Augustine, spirit and matter.
is spirit.

God is spirit, and God alone
All else that is, is matter. 1 5 Betweon matter and

spirit there is an everlasting difference and never are the two

-

11. P• 124•
12. P• le footnote 2.
l;. P• 96 1 footnote l; P• 98, footnote 3•
14. PP• 100, 117 1 118, footnote 20.
15• PP• 116-117.
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the same.

Spirit cannot be

or natural order.

ex~lained

in terms of our material

Plotinus, on the ;other hand, considers our

natural order to be in actuality of the order of spirit and at•
tempts to explain the natural order in terms of the spiritual.
Plotinus makes the natural and the spiritual one and the same
order.

16

The differences in the idea of God and ultimate reality
makes other differences in the metaphysical order.

It the world

is identical with God, and hence eternal, as Plotinus teaches,17
its beginning does not need to be explained, because of course,
it would have no beginning.

Only the basis for its maintenance,

or continued existence, would need to be expiained; and this
Plotinus does by his theory of emanations.

18

On the other hand,

if the essence of the world is fundamentally different from the

essence of God, the beginning of the second essence must be accounted for. This Augustine does in his theory of creation. 1 9
There is a certain sense in which both are somewhat similar
in their doctrines of the maintenance of the world---both teach
that it is sustained by God, or the ultimate reality in the universe.

Plotinus teaches that the One is the power behind the

16. PP• lB, 57•

17• PP• 19•
18. P• 17.
19. P• 101 ff.

being of the lower orders, mind, soul, and matteri 2 0 and
Augustine suggests that if God were to withdraw his support of
the world it would collapse into nothingness. 21 Augustine seems
to see God as continually sustaining the being of the world as a
world.

But the routines _of emanation are quite different from

the routines of creation.

Neither emanation nor creation is

particularly connected with the question of time.

Time makes

no difference in reference to emanation one way .or the other,
since the universe is eternal.

It does make a difference, in

the case of the historicity of the world, according to Augustine,
for time came into being at the time of the coming;into being of
the world.
1toce1:11n'•~

However, even the creation did not involve time as
before time came into being.

22

Emanation is primarily a process, an eternal nrocess involving the relation of eternally fixed orders of being. 2 3
Creation occurrod all at one

tim~ 1 ·at

one instant.24 Creation is

more to be cone ei ved of as an event that!. as a process 1 al though
it is an event that incorporated a process---a process that began
and ended in the same one day, or seven days, of creation. 2 5

20.
21.

18~.

22.

102.

~:

25.

9b.

17.

101.
101.

~
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If things were created all at one time, no process other than
creation is needed to explain their realations.

Things are as

they are simply because they were created in their now fundamentally fixed relationso

The practical result of emanation and

creation in .this

:;ap:t:Jears to be nearly the same, the

res~ect

issues of the eternality of the universe and the precise nature
of God's role in accounting for the worldo

He is the cause of

the world in both instances.
Emanationism and creationism make a difference in the consequent order of the items within the world.

According to

Plotinus, the whole world is ensouled and possessed with a mind,
and is the One in all its reality.

Technically, according to
Plotinus., the world is a soul, is a mind, and is God. 2 6 He
suggests that _the world in which we live and move and have our

being is really a spiritual world, in actuality beautiful, noble,
and good.

He further suggests that we may be able to see the

true inner value of the world if we but scrape;off its ugly
crusts in order to be able to see its true value at its center.
Augustine, on the other hand,,doaa

not;b~lieve

that the world is

ensouled except in the loose sense in which God might be considared aa the soul or directing power of the world.

Then, it

is not the case _of the v.o rld it self being a soul, as is the case

-

26. P• 43; PP• 18, 22, 32.

•

in Plotinus.

Matter and soul nature are never considered iden-

tical in Augustine.

Rather, it is the case that souls have their

own unique form and matter apart from the form and matter of
bodies.

27 Since God made both matter and form both are good,

according to Augustine not just form only, as in the case ;ot
Plotinus.
good.

Contrary to the thought of Plotinus, bodies are also

All created things have bodies, including angels.

Grant-

ing the separation of matter from spirit Augustine still considers matter and bodies to be items of value, but secondary to
the value of spiritual things.

It is not necessary that all

bodies be souls or have souls associated with them.

Further-

more, in the thought of Augustine. all souls are not;of the same
kind, human souls being different in kind from animal souls, and
angel souls being different in kind from human souls. 28 Life is
a property of souls, in Plotinus, 29 but it is a quality of deity,
in Augustine,30 being directly connected with the meaning of
light.
Although Plotinus and Augustine aooear;to be rather similar
in their common sense opionions about the life of man, they vary
somewhat in their interpretation of human life.

Essentially,

Plotinus makes man a part;of God, a participant in that which

27. P• 111-112.
28. p. 112.--29. P• 37•
30• PP• 109, 110 1 121~ 160.
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Augustine finds

this idea repulsive, but yet admits that man mirrors or images
the nature of ultimate value and reality, specifically in his
soul, even in some minor sense in his body, as we11.3 1 Augustine
does not consider ma n as distinctively a soul, as does Plotinus,
but rather considers him a combination of soul and body.

Both

admit that ma n is prominent in his position within the universe,
poised essentially midway between its extremes of value and disvalue.

Both agree that the soul of man (or man as a soul) is

immortal, but Augustine also thinks that body is in some sense
immortal.

32

Augustine thinks of death as the separation of the

soul from the body~3

whereas Plotinus thinks of it as but the

generation of another individual body.

Contrary to the teaching

ot Plotinus, Augustine teaches that souls desire normally and
legitimately to be united with bodies.34
There is some similarity in their teachings concerning
angels and demons, both granting them as spiritual beings, more
spiritual than man.

Plotinus considers them purely intellectual

beings, or nossibly minds only, since they are not souls,;5
whereas Augustine oonsideres them spiritual in the sense of

31.

P• 122.
32. P• 127: P•

3,. P•
p
34.

35.

P•

158, footnote 21.
159, 168.
i27.

46.

-205purer wills and holier actions than men, and regard angels
as having souls and bod1es3 6 of their own kind.

hav~ng

Metaphysically, Plotinus appears to be most concerned about

ontology and cosmology, whereas Augustine is concerned about
psychology and theology.

Plotinus attempts to give a strictly

systematic total world view that will account for all our experience in a strictly rational way.

Augustine, on the other hand,

does not seem to be quite so technically concerned, preferring
rather to apneal to the nature of psychial life and revelation
for the grounds;of the formation of his world view.

Perhaps,

Augustine was not;so much rebelling against the metaphysics of
Plotinus as he was enlarging unon it.

We conjecture that he

would think that Plotinus' system was not adequate in the sense
that it was designed to sat1gfy the head instead of the heart.
Starting from the inner life;of man, Augustine would attempt to
construct a system based unon the greatest and richest meaning
man can affirm, namely, '!God11

From a God-centered core he would

reconstruct all other meanings and

s~

values relative to the meaning of God.

make all other ideas and
Whereas Plotinus would

make psychology subordinate to a particularly suggested rational
ontology and cosmology, Augustine would be willing to forego a
rational ontology, and cosmology in favor of psychial reality.

36.

PP• 111 ff.

---.
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It is conceivable that the world view of Plotinus could be
placed within the world view of Augustine, without a great deal
of clash being involved, if its center as an end-in-itself is
transDorted outside of the center core ,of the world to the God
beyond the created univorse and Creationism is substituted for
Emanationism.

This would amount to the adaptation of the views

of Plotinus to the world view or Augustine, which could occur
much more easily than could the contrary.

See chart .Q!!

~

nage.

II. Religion
It has been noted that Plotinus tends to merge his religion
with his philosophy in all but the last stages of religion.
Augustine, on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between
religion and nhilosonhy.

The religion of Augustine does not it-

self constitute a system of philosonhy or deal with its own
first principles.

-

We have also noted that Augustine in his religion emphasizes
the meaning of God as an oxnerience more than he emphasizes the
intellectual or rational meanings of God~7

In the case of

Plotinus, it is difficult to determine what he would consider
"the God,of experience" to be.

Man experiences all three of his

deities, the World-Soul, the Divine-Mind, and the One, which he
tells us are really one thing---on& ultimate substance or

-207..
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the world views of Plotinus and

Augustine would be diagramed as follows:
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essence.

It is conceivable that Augustine might have taken his

argument for the one exsence end throe persons ;of God3 8 from
Plotipus' idea of the one essence of divine reality.

As has been

indicated, however, no exact parallel may be between the items
of their two trinities.
One notable religious difference is the role of God in the
salvation of the individual.

In Augustine, salvation is by

action of God and in Plotinus it is by action of man, each individual man.

Plotinus' God is removed from the work of Salvation,

whereas Augustine's God performs the major ;work of Salvation.
In Plotinus we find nothing of the "warmth", intimacy and
benevonence of God eo highly emphasized by Augustine.

Typical

of Plotinus' religious attitude toward deity is his satirical
remark

11

the gods must come to me. not I to them," by which he

really means to imply that gods do not come to men.

However,

in another sense he is teaching that men do go to God---not to
the gods, but to the One---by themselves.

His way of salvation

is a teaching concerning the way men may go to the One.

In an-

other sense, he would say that God is with us always by the fact
of the constant immanence of the orders of his trinity in every
man.

Knowledge of the experience of God·--something of what

Augustine means by the experience of the Holy Snirit--however,
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is reserved only for the high peak of the final stages of the
mystic way.

For Plotinus it comes only at the time of union with

the Divine-Mind and union with the One('l39
The role of free will in religion is essentially the same
for both Plotinus and Augustine.

Both deny indeterminism and

think of determinism in the sense of self-determinism.
there is one difference in their views.
~he

However,

In the case of Augustine

ideal is that the self should be directed from without, by

the will of God, even though it does have its own power of
choice.

Man's determination then is determined by God's·free

choice.

In the case of Plotinus no choice whatsoever is involv-

ed.

Man's plight is rigidly determined by the general nature of

the universe, by the unvarying princinle of things in their fixed
orders.

Nevertheless, both views are essentially optimistic.

Plotinus says that man possesses the inherent ability to work for
his own salvation.

Augustine says that man has the power of

choice to allow God to convert him.
Sin, according to Plotinus, is the choice of a lower good,
attachment to body instead of attachment to mind and unity.4°
Sin, according to Augustine, is also the choice of a lower good
but it consists in the choice of a great number of lower goods
instead of a possible higher good.

Loosely speaking, it is
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flesh 11 instead of to bodily
1
things that Augustine objects to.4 Here we may see a certain

attachment to the things of the

11

intimation of Plotinus' doctirne of the primacy of spiritual
things as value objects.

In Augustine, sin is the choice of the

less spiritual type of good.
about the nature of sin.

Augustine, however, has more to say

He identifies it with the will of man

more than he identifies it with bodily things.
abt

ot

will.

Man possesses a depraved

or

Sin is always an

corrupted will that

must be dealt with before his salvation can become effective.
The same doctrine is imnlicit in Plotinus in the fact of.his
emphasis unon man's ordinary attachment for bodily things, but it
1s not nearly so technical and well developed as it is in the
thought of Augustine.
Both Plotinus and Augustine had keen sense of justice and
believed that there will be adequate reward and punishment. for
human behavior.

Both taught that life as we know it does not

provide

rewards and punishments for human behavior.

ad~,1uate

Both teach a future life ,of the soul in which justice will be
'i

mbre completely effected.

dr

For Plotinus this is reincarnation,

the determined generation of a new body from the soul---a

body determined in type and value according to the merits stored
up in the previous existence.42 For Augustine, this would be a
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future existence of the soul and body of man in either heaven
or hell, if in heaven with a new or purified body not subject to
the depravity of earthly bodies and with a sanctified soul also
not subject to wrong choices; if in hell, with the same type;
body and soul even more corrupted and under more

~ositive

pains

than those felt in earthly lifa.43 As has already been indicated,
Plotinus' idea of life is that it is a quality of souls and
Augustine's idea is that it is a quality of deity.

Augustine

feels that life varies qualitatively according to the proportion
to the individual narticipation in the things of the spir1t--according to his faith and religious behaviour.44

Again, this

idea is implicit in Plotinus in the very fact that he suggests
that human life can be imnroved.

Plotinus, also, suggests that

human life grows better as it becomes more like the order of the
One but he does not see the possibl11ty for as great a change in
the order of human life on earth as Augustine

a~nears

to see.

Both Plotinus and Augustine have doctrines of Salvation.
Plotinus essentially merges his idea of salvation with hie meaning of mysticism and his meaning of religion.

All three are

separate and distinct in Augustine, yet related.
Plotinus conceives of salvation as a work of
.

...

4:5·.

P'D•

44 PU•

~-

157. . 158.
159•lb0e

45. i>· 64. ·· · ·

. ·:·

.'

·'·. . .
;

man,45

-212-

Augustine sees it as significantly the work of GodQ46 Both
Plotinus and Augustine agree that salvation demands certain worke
on the part .of man to be made completely effective in his lif9o
In a sense, this is

wha·~

they both mean by rel1B1on: that which

man can do in effecting his own salvation.

Augustine is careful

to give the credlt for salvation to God; Plotinus gives the
credit to man.

Their difference in opinion as to how the

work of salvation is

accom~lished

majo~

is a fundamental difference in

the religious thou.slit of Plotinus and Augustine.

The hero;of

salvation according to Augustine, is the Mediator.47 Plotinus'
hero, however, is man, himself--man is his own mediator.

The

answer to man's problem, according to Augustine, is God's grace:
redeeming and regenerating love made effective to man through the
life and work of Christ and communicated now in immediate experience through the power of the Holy Spirit.

The answer to

man's problem, according to Plotinus, is education, or possibly
philosophy~--ded1oation

way of

and self-discipline to a new idea and

life, a way which inoornorates optimistic assertions

about the meanings and possibilities of human life and puts
supreme emphasis unon the value of intellectual life and a specialized religious experienoe.48

Plotinus and Augustine have

quite similar meanings of the inner nature

or

salvation, although.

there is a technical difference in the meanings of their finel
stages of union.

However, there is a fundamental difference in

their doctrines· of the means of salvation.
!II. Mysticism
We have considered the mysticisms of Plotinus and Augustine
under the headings of their religion but it is well to point

~ut

that metanhysioal meanings as well are involved in their meanings.

Whether or not the religi'on is built upon the metaphysics

or the metaphysics is built unon the religion varies according
to the views of the particular philosopher. We suggest that the
former is t1ue in the case of Plotinus, and the latter, in the
case of Augustine.
We have also distinguished between the method of mysticism
and the meaning ot mysticism.

We have indicated that in certain

instances mysticism has been 1dent1f1ad with the meaning of
salvation, and in others there have been more technical distinc•.
tions :made between the two.
We suggest that the mysticism of Augustine was only indirectly influenced by the mysticism of Plotinus, being more
thnn

significantly determined by his own religious doctr1nes/oy the
direct influence of the mysticism of Plot1nus.

Many of the

methods of mysticism taught by Plot1nus appear within

A~gustine's

doctrine of Sanctif1cation~9but the meanings of their mysticism
vary cons1derably.50 We shall now compare the meanings of thiir
mysticism.
In the first place, the two theories of mysticism are
similar in that they regard mystical union as a worthy end in
1tself .5l

The psychological meaning of salvation ia apparently

the same for both Plotinus and Augustine, namely, a beatific
vision wherein there is a believed to be direct knowledge of God.
Augustine sees the beatific vision as the finest experience that
can hapnen to man on earth, but even so, regards it as only a
foretelling of the greater degree of joy and satisfaction that is
to result from the same sort of union in heaven.

Plotinua re-

•

gards the beatific vision as the final and most important experience possible in the life of man and is more cautious in
assertions about its possibility in future life.

Both regarded

the experience as a "sniritual" experienoe---52 an experience
contrary to the ordinary involvement in material affairs.

In

the case of Plotinus, it is a situation of pure spirit becoming

identical with pure sp1r1t.53

In Augustine's case it is that of

being acted upon by pure apirit.54

49.

aaj

PP•
i74.
50. PP• 90, 18la

51• PP• 86, 178.
52• PP• 71,
5;? • P• 90•

176.

54• DP• 181•182.

Both describe the experience

-2.15··
as a time of joy, rest, a nd peace.55 Both suggest that there is
pain at the time of the waning of the high peak of intensity of
the experience.5 6 It is a time when the soul feels at one with
God, the world., and all men«

Both regard the experience as a

time when that which was possessed previously, but lost, is regained.

In the case of Plotinus, the individual soul itself re-

gains its knowledge of its nrevious state of communion with God
before it fell into body.57 In the case of Augustine, man has a
sort .of intuitive awareness or recognition of the blessed state
of communion with God enjoyed by the first pair in the Garden
of Eden.58

Both Augustine and Plotinus argue rationally about their
mystical theories.

The theories themselves are essentially

rational in the sense that they are consistent within themselves--true to their own first principles.

The way of ascent in the

doctrine of Plotinus is rational in every phase but the last,
when it must be admitted that irrationality occurs.

It would be

difficult to call any nart of Augustine's mysticism

11

irrationaU'

Both Augustine and Plotinua have developed their mystical theo ..
ries into nhilosophies of mysticism.

They have well related

their mystical doctrines to their metaphysical and religious

55. np • rrc;-179"
PP• 86, 18b.
57. PP• 82-83.
58. n• 180•
56.
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systems---a situation that is rare, indeed, both in the history
of mysticism and in the history of philoaonhy.

Both Augustine

and Plotinus deal directly with most of the major problems of
philosophy in reference to their mysticism, and their theories
are
some

philosophical in the sense that they have not avoided giving
answer to normal philosonhical queries.

Both Plotinus and

Augustine were schooled in the meaning of abstract concepts and
in the terminology of philosophy.

Both theories are carefully

worked out theories, given cautiously, with the intention of
being taken seriously at face value.
The difference in the mysticisms of Augustine and Plotinua
should be quite apparent.

In the first place, their mysticisms

start from different sources.

In Plotinus, it starts in the will

of man, as man decides to try to save himself by entering into
the process of the way of salvation.59

In Augustine, it starts

in the will of God, actually in the love of God, when God, real.
izing that man is a sinner, decides to save him, elects the particular man to be saved, and suddenly comes to him with the revelation of his nature as love.6o
In the second place, the time of the occurence of the beatific vision is different.

In Plotinus, it occurs at the end of

a long and rigorous process involving hours, days, and years,
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~ossibly

as a reward for the effort rendered.

61

Xn Augustine,

it occurs at the beginning of religion as a gift, anparently
designed as an e.id in the livlng of life on earth.6 2 In 'Plotinus

6

it is an end-in-itself as it occurs in human life. 3

In

Augustine, it can be an end-in-itself only in heaven. 64

In

Plotinus, it occures rarely.

In Augustine, it occurs quite
frequently, almost constantly among the piouse 6 5
In the third nlace, the type ;,of the union is not the same.
In Plotinus, there is the merger of two identical substances. 66
In Augustine no virtual union occurs or can occur due to the
difference of the nature of the two essences. 67 Augustine's
union appears to be roughly similar to the type ·of union Plotinus
means in the union of the soul with the Divine-Mind.

Yet, even

this similarity is not strictly accurate, for in the case of the
union of the soul and the Divine-Mind, in Plotinus 1 the union
takes nlace, even then by virtue of the soul literally becomming
mind so as to allow a mind to Mind relationshin.

Augustine

teaches that man is a mind and that God is a mind but the two are
not the same sort of minds.

God as a mind is so sunerior to man

as a mind that the mental communication between them can occur
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only meagerly.
tion.
the

This 1s one reason for the need for the Incarna"

It might be conjectured that God differs from man even in

esse~ce

of his mind if His general essence is to be oonsider-

ed different from man's essence.

The tyoe of union cannot be the

same, for there is not the same type of God with whom the union
occurs. Augustine's 11 union 11 is minds in one accord~ 68 Plotinus'
"union" is a merger, a union beyond intellection. 69
In the fourth nlacej there is a difference in the manner
and meaning of purificaion,
Plotinus means

11

flight.u70

of the lower values.

Essentiallyj purification in
In Augustine, it means the negation

According to Plotinus, the soul is itself

superior to the nnture of the world about it, superior to all
bodies and sense life, so that its object in nurification consists of its being connected with and concerned about only

itsel~

Plotinus writes:
"Tho purific'1tion of tho Soul is simply to r-.11017 it to be 11lone; it
is pure r~hcn it keeps no comp'1ny; uhcn it looks to nothing Pithout
itself; ,·1hon it cntc;rt..,ins no -:lien thou:hts--·bo tho mode or origin
of such notions or offcctions -.-1h'1t they rnny, ••·-·-,:hon it no longor
secs in the 1·10rld of im~gc, rnuoh less ol".bor".tcs ime:ges into voritnble
nffcctions. Is it not r'\ tr~c purii'icii.tion to turn cxmy tot·:::lrds the
oxr.ot oontr".ry of 0 ~rthly things?" III. 6. 5.

In Plotinus,

purifica.ti~n

is by means of isolation.

Granting

the evilness of matter and the limitation of body, puriflc.ation

-219-

amounts to a higher degree of instrosnection in which matters cf
sense are forgotten.

Aufa\stine, on the other hand, not being

convinced that matter as such is evil or that bodies .or sense
life are evils as such, interprets purification in a positive
way--•in the rigid use of the body and the senses for the nurpose
here nad now for which God intended them.71 Conceiving of defilement as the prostitution of a value rather than as its
limitation by the presence of foreign elements, purification
consists simply in the return to the usage for which a thing
was intended.
Related to this difference in the idea of purification is
another difference: difference in ascetic ideal.

From the noint

of view of Plotinus the employment of the civic virtues was for
the purpose of the imnrovement of the self---civic virtues were
but a means of self-purification.72

Civic duty in the mysticism

of Augustine, on the other hand, results from a love for one's
fellowmen, not as a means to salvation but as a nroduct of it.7~
Plotinus's reason for suggesting a lack of close association with
other men is due to the bad influence

they are likely to exert

in distracting a person from the process of salvation, iri particular, away from the next higher phases of introspection.
Purity in heart for Plotinus means the nurity of the heart---
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complete singlemindedness of intention.7~ Purity in heart for
Augustine means goodness in the heart---a holy intention or
prooer attitudeo75

The struggle for purity results from the

'76

effort to recall the true nature of the soul, in Plot1nuso 1

In

Augustine, it comes as a result of the battle against Satan,
against the dep:raTJity of the will of man, the alurements of thE=l
flesh, etc. 77
A sixth difference in their mysticism is a difference in
their opinion as to the power by which the soul is able to come
into union with the divine and sustain itself in union.

In

Plotinus, the soul moves under its own oower.

It is its own

guide and source of energy and inspiration.78

In Augustine,·

the soul moves along the way of ascent led on by a
own.79

powe~

not its

Salvation comes from without, even within the mystic

process.

Augustine insists that the imnrovement of the soul

within its various levels is possible only by the extra power of
religion.

80 In Plotinus, this power is the

~ower

of introanec-

tion---the releasing of the remarkable powers latent within the
mind. 81

In Augustine, this power is grace---the grace of God,
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which takes over in the midst of man's realization of his own
weakness, and which comes more or less ae a reward for his
humility.

82

Little instrosoection in involved in the mysticism

of Augustine.

The seventh, and last difference that should be noted is
their difference in opinion as to the nature of the self at the
time of union.

Plotinus sees individuation as a vice and sug-

gests that in the final stage the soul loses consciousness of itself as an individual existing item.a;

There is no suggestion

at all that this happens in the view of Augustine.

As has al•

reacY been shown, in Augustine's case the soul cannot lose its
identity by becoming God in all its being, because, of course,
the soul never really changes in its fundamental order at all:
1t never becomes
already was.

ar.i~hing

that it was not or ceases being what 1t

In the case of Augustine we might almost argue

that the condition of the soul in the union is contrary to that
which Plotinus suggests, that is, that the soul is made more
acutely aware of its own individuation.

In the beatific vision

the soul sees itself in its true perspect1ve---1t sees itself a$
it really is in relation to God, the world, and other souls.
Time and time again Augustine asserts that there is a fundamental
difference between God, man, and the world in essential natures

82. P• 166.
8~.

P• 87 1 footnote, middle.
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and essence,

It would appear that this would be one pf the

facts of insight that the soul would be aware of in its time of
illumination.

The conclusion is at least implicit that the

exnerienoe of union tends to make the soul not only increasingly
aware of its own nart:i.cular nature, a nature which oan be aooented once it is understood, but also increasingly aware of the
true nature of other individual things---even as individuala,84
The mysticism of Augustine---indeed, even his mystical
theory of being--·is closely :related to his concept of

11

11ght 11 •

His high peak of religious ecstasy ia itself a revelation, the
coming of light into the world and creation itself is by virtue
of the shining of "the Unchanging Light,"

to use Augustine's

own term. 85 To sneak of God as light, as ~ugustine does, and to
think of the origin of the world, truth, wisdon, and goodness,
in terms of the radiation of a light, as Augustine also does, is
to identify mysticism and revelation in abstract terms, and in a
manner strongly reminiscient of the metaphysics (but not the
mysticism) of Plotinus.

It is the concern of Augustine's

mysticism that God does reveal himself to man, though the coming
of light in the form of Christ, the Mediator, in whom the light
of God remained steady.

The goal of life is the finding of the

truth: that which is itself of sunreme value because it is steady

and redeeming.

God as the unchanging source of revelation, as

the epitome of light itself is the major item of concern in the
mysticism of Augustine.

Ue may assume that Augustine was strong-_

ly influenced in his formulation of these abstract notions by
Plotinus' concent of the unchanging One, the absolute of being,
value, and meaningL
The mysticism of Plotinus is the mysticism of naturalism
and humanism.

By its anpeal to values beyond the ordinary and

material, it seeks to encourage man with the assuracne that the
world is better off than it apnears to be, that that which
appears to be meager and lowly is really noble, after all.

This

mysticism teaches the dignity of the· natural .order and locates
evil not in the nature of the order itself but in man's false
oninion of it.

Salvation, hence, lies in a process of re-

education: purification, self-discipline, and

i~trospection

un-

til the new oninion is reached in the merger of selfconsciousness with the All.
The mysticism of Augustine is the mysticism of hun:ility and
otherworldliness.

Granting that the present world ,order is bad,

it adds that it should not be so, because it was not created badJ
and suggests the possibility of its redemption.

The values to

which it appeals are not within the world order itself but over
and beyond it in a realm that does not exist in such a state 0£
depravity.

Man is really a rather helpless creature, he cannot

-224save himself.

If he und hie world order are to be suvej somo-

thing from this other .order must come into his own and arrange
for its transformation into tho order that it should bo---the
order that it once was.

Even so, man's final salvation is not

in reference to this natural order but in his existence in an
order

a~nrt

from this one---in the journey of his soul to heaven,

to live everluatingl¥ with God. in direct knowledge and communion
with his essence,

a~art

from the limitations of earth.

---000---

A.pnondices
I.
Tho Works of Plotinus
The works of Plotinus consist of six series each of which contain
nine essays, hence the name 11 Ennec.d3H (enneud is the Greek word
for nine). Those es8ayo h~ve been furthar numbered according to
paragraph. The fifty four essays are titled ns follows:
I. The Ethical Trcntises
l. The Animc.te end the i'v1an
2. On Virtue
3. Dialectic (or the Unward Way}
4. On Hcppiness (or the Authentic Good of Li£e)
5. On Hapniness and Extension of Time
be On Beauty
7, On the Primal Good ~nd its Secondary Forms
8. On Evil, its Nature and Source
9• On "The Reasoned Dism1ssal 11 •
II. Psychic ~nd Physical Treatises, Part One.
l. On the Kosmos or on tho hcav0nly System
2. Tho Heavenly Circuit
,. Are the Stars causes?
4. Matter 'in its Two Kinds
5. On Potentiality and Actuality
6. Quality and Form-Idea
7. On Comnlete Transfusion
8. Why Distant Objects anuear Small
9. Against those that affirm the Creator of the Kosmos and
the Kosmos itself to be Evil (Against the Gnostics.)

III. Psychic and Physical Treatises, Part II
1. Fate
2. Providence: First ·rreatise
; • Providence: Sec. ond Treatise
4. Our Tutelary Snirit

5. On Love
6. The Impassivity of the Unembodied

7.
8.
9.

Time and Eternity
Nature Comtemnlation and the One
Detached Considerations
continued--

IV.

Concerning the Nature of the Soul
l. On the Essence of the Soul (I)
2. On the Essence of the Sou1 (II)
,. Problems of the Soul (I}
4. Problems of the Soul (II}
5• ,Problems of the Soul (III)
6. Perception and Memory
7 • The Immortality of the Soul
8. The Soul ~·s Descent into Body
9. Are all Si.,uls one?

v.

The Divine Mind, Being
1. The Three Initial Hypostases
2. The Origin and Order of the Beings following on the amt
;. The Knowing Hy-postases and the Transcendent
•
4. How the Secondaries Rise from The First: and on The Che
5. That the Intellectual Beings are not Outside the
Intellectual Principle: And on the Nature of the Good
6. That the Principle Transcending Being has no Intellect~
ual Act.
What Being has Intellection primarily and
what Being has it secondarily
1.. Is there an Ideal Archetype of ?articular Beings?
8 On the Intellectual Beauty
9• The Intellectual-Principle, The Ideas and the Authentic
Existence

VI.

On

~he

l.

2.

;.

4•
5.
6.

7.

8.
9.

One and Good
On the Kinds of Being (I)
On the Kinds of Being (II}
On the Kinds of Being (III)
On the Integral Omnipresence of the Authentic
Existent (IJ
On the Integral Omnipresence of the Authentic
Existent (II)
On Numbers
On the Origin of Multiplicity in the Ideal Realm and
on the Good
On Free-Will and the Will of the One
On the Goo~, or The One
II

English Translations of the Works ot Plotinuaf
MacKenna., Stephen, The Work~ 91. Plotinus. Six voiumes in Two.
Senerate paginazation.
Charles T. Branford Company,
Bpeton. Translated about 1916
Uses som~ expressions
archaic to Americans.
Type is excellent~ Expression
is difficult.
Guthrie~

Kenneth Sylvan, ~lotinus Complete Works~ -Translation
completed about 1916. Small tYPe• Good exnression.
Comparative Literature Press$ Grantwood, N. J.
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The VJorks of Augustine
There are no complete works of Augustine available in English.
The most comnrehensive edition now available is the eight volumem
of his works in the Post Nicene Fathers, First Series, Phillip
Schaff, edi ti or, o~ ~he fr}._1~.. I\fi™ ,ithe Nicene ~ 2 ~
Nicene father~ ~er.·:t.es.
s. P. c. K. 1889.
A new English translation is now in preparation under Roman
Catholic auspicee~ The series is entitled Fathers of the
Church and is by Cima Publishing House. A.bout four-VoIU'ilies on
Augustine have now been released.
The three major la.tin ed1C:1ons of the VJorks of Augustine a.re:
Sancti Aureli!.~@lstini, Oper~ Edited by the Benedictines
of St. Maur. ll vols. Paris, 1679-1700.
Patrologia Latina, J. P. Migne. Opera ~ia Sanoti Aurel11
Augustin!, vol. XXXII•XLVII, Paris, 1877.
Cornus scrintormn ecclesiastioorum latinorum.
F. Tempiky & G. Freytag. 1887.

Vienna-Leipzig

IV
Major Writings of Augustine
De Civitate Del - The City of God
Trinitate--: Concerning the Trinity
COnfessionum libri tredecim
The Confessions
Enchridion ·--fii"0'Handbo~
Enistulae - The Letters
Sermones
- Sermons
Rectractationum libri duo
Retractiones
Ennarationes in PsalmoS--- Exposition of Psalms
.
Contra ~caCiemICos-Y-fbri ~ - Against the Academecians
De Doctrina Ch:'istiana, iv 11br1 - Christian Doctrine
De Genesi ad·litterarillibri duodeoim - Genesis
word for word
De Genesi ad litteram, liber imnerfeotus - 11 Imnerfect
C'Ontnit:PeiagI'um - The Anti-Pelagian Writings
De Musica " Concerning Music
SQ'if1QgU1'orum , libri 11 - The Soliloquies
In Joannis Evangelium tractatus " The Gospel of John
De Quantrt'ate Animae ·-·The Magnitude of the Soul
De immortalitate animae • Concerning the immortality of Soul

De

-

eto.
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